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Abstract
In 1970, K. Kunen, working in the context of Kelley–Morse set theory, showed that the existence
of a nontrivial elementary embedding j : V → V is inconsistent. In this paper, we give a finer
analysis of the implications of his result for embeddings V → V relative to models of ZFC.
We do this by working in the extended language {∈, j}, using as axioms all the usual axioms of
ZFC (for ∈-formulas), along with an axiom schema that asserts that j is a nontrivial elementary
embedding. Without additional axiomatic assumptions on j, we show that that the resulting theory
(denoted ZFC+BTEE) is weaker than an ω-Erdös cardinal, but stronger than n-ineffables. We show
that natural models of ZFC + BTEE give rise to Schindler’s remarkable cardinals. The approach to
inconsistency from ZFC+BTEE forks into two paths: extensions of ZFC+BTEE+Cofinal Axiom
and ZFC + BTEE + ¬Cofinal Axiom, where Cofinal Axiom asserts that the critical sequence
κ, j(κ), j2(κ), . . . is cofinal in the ordinals. We describe near-minimal inconsistent extensions of
each of these theories. The path toward inconsistency from ZFC+BTEE+¬Cofinal Axiom is paved
with a sequence of theories of increasing large cardinal strength. Indeed, the extensions of the theory
ZFC+“j is a nontrivial elementary embedding” form a hierarchy of axioms, ranging in strength
from Con(ZFC) to the existence of a cardinal that is super-n-huge for every n, to inconsistency.
This hierarchy is parallel to the usual hierarchy of large cardinal axioms, and can be used in the
same way. We also isolate several intermediate-strength axioms which, when added to ZFC+BTEE,
produce theories having strengths in the vicinity of a measurable cardinal of high Mitchell order,
a strong cardinal, ω Woodin cardinals, and n-huge cardinals. We also determine precisely which
combinations of axioms, of the form
ZFC+ BTEE + Σm-Separationj + Σn-Replacementj
result in inconsistency.
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1. Introduction
This paper is a study of elementary embeddings j : M → M , where M is a model of
ZFC. Examples of such embeddings abound in the literature. Two familiar examples are
j : L → L assuming the existence of 0#, and j : Vλ → Vλ, where λ is a limit above the
critical point, known as an I3 embedding. However, Kunen [17] showed, under reasonable
assumptions (such as the Axiom of Choice), that there is no j : V → V . We wish to
investigate the difference between these kinds of embeddings—what is it that makes one
kind of embedding inconsistent and other kinds consistent with large cardinals?
A common, though coarse, intuition about this question, derived from Kunen’s result,
tells us that “external embeddings from M to M are typically ok, but internal embeddings
lead to inconsistency”. Since any embedding from V to V is necessarily “internal”, we
expect inconsistency in this case. But how should “internal” and “external” be made
precise? A first try is to equate “internal” with definable (with parameters). Though
Kunen’s Theorem was originally formulated in Kelley–Morse (KM) set theory (since it
cannot be formulated in ZFC alone because quantification over classes is necessary1), his
proof can be carried out in ZFC if one formulates the theorem as follows: No elementary
embedding from V to V is definable (with parameters). In fact though, Kunen’s result
forbids more than just the definable embeddings; a proof that definable embeddings are
inconsistent can be established with a more direct proof, as Suzuki has shown in [21].
Treating a putative j : V → V as a KM-class gives the added freedom of defining j using
class parameters, and such constructions can produce KM classes that are not definable
from set parameters alone (see [19,15]). Indeed, even in ZFC, Kunen’s result forbids more
than the definable embeddings. In [4], we attempted to come closer to a characterization of
the embeddings j : M → M that are forbidden in the context of ZFC by introducing the
concept of weak definability: Suppose M |	 ZFC. We will say that a subcollection A of
M is weakly definable in M if the model 〈M,∈, A〉 satisfies Strong Replacement2 in the
language of set theory extended by a unary predicate. It is straightforward to show that if
1 As the referee points out, the result can also be formalized in Gödel–Bernays set theory where such
quantification is also allowed; this approach has the advantage that it commits the set theorist to a set theory that
is no stronger than ZFC. However, since classes can occur as parameters in KM-definitions, stating the theorem in
KM-set theory has the effect of “forbidding” a wider range of embeddings than could be accomplished in GB-set
theory.
2 By Strong Replacement for j formulas, we mean all instances of sentences of the form
∀A ∀a
(
∀x ∈ A ∃∗y ψ(x, y, a) 	⇒ ∃Y ∀z [z ∈ Y ⇐⇒ (∃x ∈ Aψ(x, z, a))]
)
,
where ψ(x, y, u) is a j-formula, and ∃∗ is short for “there exists at most one”. In [4], in our definition of weak
definability, we mistakenly used the weaker form of Replacement in which ∃∗ is replaced by ∃!—we correct this
error here. If one replaces Replacement with Strong Replacement in that paper, all the theorems and proofs (with
the obvious modifications) continue to be valid.
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A is definable in M , it must be weakly definable in M (see [4, Theorem 3.8]). Also, there
are examples in the literature that show that weak definability is genuinely weaker than
definability (see [7,22]). Now, it is straightforward to show, using Kunen’s argument, that
no elementary embedding j : M → M can be weakly definable in M . Thus, a somewhat
bigger class of embeddings than those definable with parameters are ruled out by Kunen’s
argument.
Even with these observations, one may still ask, What is it about the definability
or weak definability of j that leads to inconsistency? An obvious approach would be
to examine closely the exact instances of Strong Replacement for j formulas that are
used in Kunen’s proof. The approach taken in this paper is a somewhat easier variation
of this naive approach. However, we have found that any approach to this question
will be facilitated by working in a more suitable formal context; namely, we work in
the extended language {∈, j}, where j is a function symbol intended to represent the
elementary embedding. Axiomatically, our starting point is ZFC for ∈-formulas. We then
wish to gradually extend ZFC with axioms that regulate the behavior of j. We do not
automatically assume that the axioms of Separation and Replacement hold for j-formulas
(of course, if we were working in KM-set theory instead, Separation and Replacement for
j -formulas would necessarily hold for any KM-class j ). We first add the axiom schema
Elementarity which asserts, for each ∈-formula φ(x1, . . . , xn), that for all y1, . . . , yn ,
(φ(y1, . . . , yn) ⇐⇒ φ( j (y1), . . . , j (yn))); in other words, Elementarity asserts that j is
an ∈-elementary embedding. We also add an axiom Critical Point, which asserts that there
is a least ordinal moved by j. We call the axioms Elementarity + Critical Point the Basic
Theory of Elementary Embeddings, or BTEE. As we will show, ZFC + BTEE is already
strong enough to establish that the critical point κ of j is n-ineffable for each particular n.
Now, in this new context, the question of how inconsistency arises becomes the question,
How much Separation and Replacement for j-formulas can we consistently add to the
theory ZFC + BTEE, and, by contrast, Which combinations of such axioms result in an
inconsistent theory?
This issue points to a natural dichotomy, which shows itself in two of the most familiar
models of ZFC + BTEE: the models 〈L,∈, j〉, where j : L → L is elementary,
and 〈Vλ,∈, j〉, where j is an I3 embedding. In the second model, the critical sequence
κ, j (κ), j2(κ), . . . is cofinal in the ordinals of the model, whereas in the first model, the
critical sequence is bounded. We introduce the axiom Cofinal Axiom which asserts that the
critical sequence is cofinal, that is, that for every α there are n ∈ ω and β > α such that
β = jn(κ) (we show in Section 2 how to state the axiom more formally). As we show, very
little additional large cardinal strength is required to obtain the consistency of either of the
theories ZFC+BTEE+Cofinal Axiom or ZFC+BTEE+¬Cofinal Axiom. Therefore, we
consider each of these theories as a starting point for studying how inconsistency arises.
The theme that emerges, as we consider each of these theories, is that extensions
of ZFC + BTEE + Cofinal Axiom become inconsistent by introducing “too much”
Replacement for j formulas, whereas extensions of ZFC + BTEE + ¬Cofinal Axiom
become inconsistent when “too much” Separation for j formulas is added. In the first case,
there is a single instance of Replacement for j-formulas, which we denote CI (short for
“Critical Instance”), which renders ZFC + BTEE + Cofinal Axiom inconsistent. In this
case, inconsistency arises because this instance of Replacement for j formulas implies that
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the critical sequence exists (as a set), contradicting Cofinal Axiom. In the second case, we
observe that a significant consequence of Separation for j formulas is Amenability, which
asserts the existence of j  x for any set x . Restricting Amenability to any upper bound on
the critical sequence—that is, asserting the existence of j λ where λ is above all jn(κ)—
yields an axiom that renders ZFC + BTEE + ¬Cofinal Axiom inconsistent. In this case,
inconsistency arises because, as we will see, the large cardinal strength that arises from
adding axioms of the form “j β exists”, as β increases from κ+ to j(κ) to 22jn(κ) to λ
(where λ bounds the critical sequence) results in large cardinal strengths that eventually
exceed the bounds of consistency. Our analysis provides near-minimal extensions of the
theories ZFC + BTEE + Cofinal Axiom and ZFC + BTEE + ¬Cofinal Axiom that are
inconsistent.
Another way to state precisely how inconsistency arises is to isolate minimal
combinations of Separation and Replacement for j formulas in the Levy hierarchy that
suffice to carry out Kunen’s proof. An example of a result of this kind, from Section 10,
is the following: The extension of ZFC + BTEE obtained by adding all Σ1 instances
of Separation for j formulas, and all Σ0 instances of Replacement for j formulas, is
inconsistent.
An important philosophical conclusion that follows from our analysis of inconsistency
is that the assertion “the existence of a nontrivial embedding j : V → V is inconsistent
with ZFC” is incorrect. Certainly if V is to be the universe for KM-set theory, this
conclusion is warranted, because every KM-class j must satisfy every instance of
Separation and Replacement for j -formulas. But our work here shows that no such
requirement is present when the underlying theory is ZFC. For example, there is no known
proof that forbids the existence of a j : V → V for which 〈V ,∈, j〉 |	 ZFC + BTEE—
indeed, as we show in Section 3, the existence of an ω-Erdös cardinal is enough to establish
the consistency of this statement.3 Indeed, our analysis here shows that there are many
possible ways in which an embedding M → M can be considered “internal”, and these
different possibilities span the full spectrum of consistency strengths, with inconsistency
arising as an important special case.
The fact that extensions of ZFC in the language {∈, j} have consistency strengths that
range from Con(ZFC) to ZFC + ∃κ I3(κ), to inconsistency leads to a second main topic
of the paper. We pursue the idea that these extensions provide a ladder of theories that
are parallel in consistency strengths to the usual large cardinal axioms and can be used in
the same way—for example, as a measure for the consistency strengths of other theories.
A program of study that we initiate here is to determine how fine-grained this ladder of
3 On the other hand, there are certainly tenable philosophical reasons for insisting that any new predicate added
to the language of ZFC (such as j) should be required to satisfy all instances of Separation and Replacement, at
least if we wish to view the theory with the extra predicate as a foundation for mathematics. The philosophical
point here is the same as the point raised by the founders of set theory: Separation and Replacement are axiom
schema we take to be “true” of the universe; Separation is the natural local restriction of full Comprehension, and
Replacement prevents short sequences from being cofinal in the universe. From this point of view, then, if we
wish to supplement ZFC with an elementary embedding j of the universe, the embedding should be required to
satisfy all such instances—and therefore, by Kunen’s results, we are led to inconsistency.
Our point here is that, though this view is quite reasonable, it is nothing more than a point of view. There is
no logical necessity derivable from ZFC for requiring a j to satisfy all instances of Separation and Replacement.
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axioms is. In this paper, we introduce natural axioms which, when added to ZFC+BTEE,
produce theories having consistency strengths in the vicinities of 0#, of a measurable
cardinal having Mitchell order > o(κ), and of an n-huge cardinal (for each n, a different
theory). We also provide lower bounds in the vicinity of a strong cardinal for one theory,
and for another, ω Woodin cardinals. These results represent a first attempt to solve the
following general problem:
The Hierarchy Problem. For each classical large cardinal axiom A(x) expressible in the
language {∈}, find an extension of ZFC in the language {∈, j} whose consistency strength
is near A(x).
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we develop the Basic Theory of
Elementary Embeddings (BTEE). We show that the large cardinal strength of ZFC+BTEE
is somewhat beyond that of a cardinal that is n-ineffable for every particular n and that
of a totally indescribable cardinal. In Section 3, we show that the existence of an ω-Erdös
cardinal is sufficient to obtain a transitive model of ZFC+BTEE. We also define the notion
of a good transitive model of ZFC + BTEE, showing that such models are also derivable
from an ω-Erdös cardinal, but also showing that these models give rise to transitive models
of Schindler’s remarkable cardinals. As a result, good transitive models of ZFC + BTEE
are naturally linked to recent results about forcing absoluteness. In Section 4 we introduce
induction axioms for j-formulas. We show that Σ1-Inductionj suffices to establish that the
formulaΨ (n, β) that defines the critical sequence 〈κ, j(κ), . . .〉 is a (total) class function, as
is the formulaΦ that defines the relation jn(x) = y. These observations allow us to improve
results from Section 2 of the form “for each particular n . . .” to results of the form “for all
n . . .”. In Section 5, we take a closer look at the fairly weak theory ZFC + BTEE + Σ0-
Inductionj. In this theory, it is not possible to prove that jn(x) exists for every n, x ; the main
result describes the conclusions that can be drawn, and yields a number of corollaries—one
of these states that Π1-Inductionj suffices to show that Φ and Ψ are (total) class functions.
In Section 6, we introduce the Least Ordinal Principlej, which asserts that for each formula
φ(x, y), whenever φ(α, b) holds for an ordinal α, then φ(β, b) holds for a least β. This
axiom gives us a number of simple consequences, like the fact that j(α) ≥ α for any ordinal
α, which are needed in later sections.
In Section 7, after showing that an ω+ω-Erdös cardinal is sufficient to obtain models of
each of the theories ZFC+BTEE+Cofinal Axiom and ZFC+BTEE+¬Cofinal Axiom,
we describe near-minimal inconsistent extensions of each theory. In studying extensions of
ZFC + BTEE + ¬Cofinal Axiom, we pause to examine the logical relationships between
statements such as “the critical sequence is a set”, “the critical sequence is bounded”, “if
the critical sequence has a supremum δ, then j(δ) = δ”. The model that we present in
this section that is obtained by performing the iterated ultrapower construction starting
from a normal measure on a measurable cardinal κ , producing the model 〈Mω,∈, j  Mω〉,
provides a rich source of insight into the possibilities of elementary embeddings M → M ,
and will be used in later sections for other purposes. We then show that adding to
ZFC + BTEE the combination of ¬Cofinal Axiom and ∃z z = j  λ, whenever λ bounds
the critical sequence of j, produces an inconsistent theory, and suggests that axioms of
this kind have significant large cardinal strength. We pursue this point further in Section 8,
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where we study Amenabilityj, which asserts that for every z, j  z is a set. For each n,
let WAn denote the axioms of BTEE together with all Σn instances of Separation of
j-formulas, and let WA denote the union, over all n ∈ ω, of these sets of statements. After
showing that, in ZFC+BTEE, Amenabilityj is equivalent to Σ0-Separation for j-formulas,
we show that ZFC + WA0 suffices to prove Cofinal Axiom, that Vκ ≺ Vj(κ) ≺ . . . ≺ V
forms an elementary chain, where κ is the critical point of j, and that κ is super-n-huge for
every n. In particular, this latter result shows that all known large cardinal consequences
of the theory ZFC + WA, established in [4], also hold for ZFC + WA0. The consequences
we mention here of ZFC + WA0 are considerably easier to prove in ZFC + WA (or even
ZFC + WA1). We have gone to the extra trouble of proving the results from ZFC + WA0
for the following reason: The work of Hamkins [9] shows that ZFC + WA0 has some
extraordinary properties that are not (apparently) shared by ZFC + WAn for n ≥ 1, or by
weaker extensions of ZFC + BTEE. For instance, Hamkins has shown that ZFC + WA0
is finitely axiomatizable (this is not known to be true for the other theories mentioned).
He also has developed a forcing methodology by which one obtains relative consistency
results of the form
Con(ZFC + WA0) 	⇒ Con(ZFC + WA0 + σ),
where σ is a statement like GCH or V = HOD. His approach to preserving the embedding
does not work for weaker extensions of ZFC+BTEE; and his technique does not preserve
WAn for n ≥ 1 starting from the theory ZFC + WAn .
In Section 9 we turn to a study of axioms of intermediate strength that can be added
to ZFC + BTEE. We examine several statements and in some cases establish fairly tight
bounds on their consistency strengths. These axioms range in strength between that of a
strong cardinal and that of an n-huge cardinal.
In Section 10, we isolate other combinations of Separation and Replacement axioms
that render ZFC + BTEE inconsistent; here the interest is in determining how high in the
Levy hierarchy of formulas one needs to climb in order to produce inconsistency. In this
context, we also study the impact of varying the version of Replacement that is used—
we consider Strong Replacement, Replacement, and Collection, for j-formulas. Finally, in
Section 11 we list a number of problems left open by our work here.
The reader will find in this paper many familiar theorems about elementary embeddings.
However, because we are working primarily in a new context—ZFC and its extensions
in the language {∈, j}—details of familiar proofs have had to be re-examined. Since
Replacement for j-formulas is generally forbidden in the theories we consider, the resulting
set theory often has a different flavor. Two notable differences are:
(A) Definition by transfinite recursion (when the recursion depends on a formula having
an occurrence of j) is almost never allowed;
(B) Bounded quantifiers increase the complexity of a j-formula.
Much of the work here consists in determining which axioms about the embedding j are
needed to obtain standard theorems. When the extension of ZFCj under consideration is
too weak to carry out standard proofs, other proofs have been devised or weaker theorems
are proved. The result of our efforts, we hope, has been to provide a framework for studying
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the natural axiomatic extensions of ZFC+BTEE—all of which formalize the notion “ZFC
plus an elementary embedding of the universe to itself”. Certain natural questions about
embeddings j : M → M—such as determining the precise axiomatic assumptions about
such an embedding that would render it inconsistent with ZFC (via Kunen’s argument)—
seem to be easier to understand and address within the framework provided here. Our hope
is that our framework can be used by others to approach the many other natural questions
about embeddings j : M → M that remain.
2. The basic theory of elementary embeddings
In this section, we work in the languageL = {∈, j}, where j is a unary function symbol;
and we introduce the Basic Theory of Elementary Embeddings, or BTEE, which consists
of the axioms that are needed to assert that j is a nontrivial elementary embedding. We
develop the basic machinery and show that the critical point of the embedding is n-ineffable
for each particular n, and totally indescribable.
Formulas in which j does not occur will be called ∈-formulas whereas formulas having
at least one occurrence of j will be called j-formulas. Including the function symbol j
means that we need to consider L-terms (which we will call j-terms from now on). As
usual, terms are defined by the clauses: (a) a variable is a term, and (b) if t is a term, so is
j(t). The terms are of the form jn(x) for variables x (assuming j0(x) is taken to be x).
Our basic theory is ZFC, now in the context of the language, and first order logic of, L.
In this context, we will have occasion to prove j-sentences from ZFC using the logic of L;
we will wish to add j-axioms to ZFC; and we will be considering models of ZFC that are
L-models. Since derivations from ZFC, extensions of ZFC, and models of ZFC normally
pertain to the language {∈}, we use the notation ZFCj to signify ZFC in the context of
L—so that we may unambiguously refer to derivations from ZFCj, extensions of ZFCj,
and models of ZFCj.
L-formulas can be classified by complexity in the usual way, though some of the usual
theorems about the Lévy hierarchy of ZFC formulas do not hold here, as we discuss below.
An atomic formula is any formula of the form s = t or s ∈ t , where s and t are j-terms.
A bounded formula is one in which all quantifiers are bound. The collection of bounded
formulas is denoted Σ0 (or, equivalently,Π0 or∆0). Continuing the inductive definition in
the metatheory, Σn+1 is the set of L-formulas φ of the form ∃x ψ where ψ is in Πn , and
similarly for Πn+1. If T is an extension of ZFCj and φ is an L-formula, we say that φ is
Σ Tn if for some Σn L-formula ψ , T  φ ⇐⇒ ψ , and similarly for Π Tn . A formula is ∆Tn
if and only if it is both Σ Tn and Π Tn . In the special case T = ZFCj, we will often assert
that a particular formula is Σn (Πn) when we really mean that the formula is Σ Tn (Π Tn ); for
proper extensions T of ZFCj, we will not suppress the superscript T .
Some arguments will require formalization of syntax; to the extent that this
formalization will be needed, we follow [6]. In particular, we represent in ZF j-terms t
and L-formulas φ by constant terms t and φ, respectively (added to ZF by definitional
extension), using absolute formulas, and having the property that each is an element of
Vω (see [6, pp. 90–91]). We also have available the usual simple formulas that describe
properties of these sets, such as “x is a variable” and “u represents a j-formula”. Two such
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formulas of particular importance are those that formalize the satisfaction relation, for both
of the languages {∈} and {∈, j}:
(A) Sat(u, M, b): “u is an ∈-formula φ(x1, . . . , xm) and 〈M, E(M)〉 |	 φ(b(1), . . . ,
b(m))”
(B) Sat(u, M, i, b): “u is an L-formula φ(x1, . . . , xm) and 〈M, E(M), i〉 |	 φ(b(1), . . . ,
b(m))”.
As in [6], Sat(u, M, b) and Sat(u, M, i, b) are ∆ZF1 formulas. Also, we have the
following standard result:
Theorem 2.1. For each L-formula φ(x1, . . . , xm),
∀M ∀b, i
[
(“b and i are functions” ∧ b : rank(φ)→ M ∧ i : M → M)
	⇒ [φ〈M,E(M),i〉(b(1), . . . , b(m)) ⇐⇒ Sat(φ, M, i, b)]]. 
Different kinds of models of ZFCj are possible, depending on one’s assumptions about
the surrounding universe. In this paper, all models will live in a ZFC universe 〈V ,∈〉, fixed
once and for all, and in particular, if 〈M, E, i〉 is a model of ZFCj, we assume i is definable
in V . We call such models sharp-like because they fit the familiar pattern of an elementary
embedding j : L → L given by the axiom “0# exists”. An alternative approach, which
we explore only briefly in this paper, would be to consider models 〈M, E, i〉 living in a
ZFCj universe 〈V ,∈, j〉. In this approach, i would be definable in 〈V ,∈, j〉, but possibly
not in 〈V ,∈〉. Such models which, in addition, are not sharp-like, will be called strictly
j-definable. An important subclass of these will be called j-inherited—models of the form
〈M,∈, i〉 for which i = j  M . These are the submodels of 〈V ,∈, j〉. Sharp-like models
have interesting properties that strictly j-definable models often do not have; often, we
can see what goes wrong in the latter case by considering a j-inherited example. Our
plan, then, is to work with sharp-like models (referring to them simply as “models”), but
occasionally mention variations that arise when strictly j-definable models are used. Our
philosophical reason for considering these sometimes strange variants of the background
theory originates with our work in [4], where we suggested that ZFC + WA could provide
a reasonably natural extension of ZFC in which all (or virtually all) large cardinals are
derivable. Our brief observations about j-definable and j-inherited models serve as further
explorations along these lines.
We note here that, given a model M = 〈M, E, j〉 of an extension of ZFCj, it is often
useful to consider another modelM0 = 〈M0, E, j  M0〉, where M0 ⊆ M . In such cases,
M0 will not typically be sharp-like with respect to M; this fact is not a violation of our
convention (of restricting ourselves to sharp-like models), because M0 will be sharp-like
with respect to V as long asM is. This situation arises in forcing arguments, whereM0 is
the ground model andM is the forcing extension; see [2].
Another convention we will adopt is that every well-founded proper class model will
be assumed to be set-like; that is, for every element of the model 〈M, E〉, its class of
E-predecessors is a set.
We observe next that familiar absoluteness results for Σ0 and ∆1 formulas hold in the
present context; these will be useful in forcing arguments. Given a model 〈M, E〉 of the
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language {∈}, we shall call A a transitive subset of M if A ⊂ M and for all x ∈ A and all
y ∈ M , if y E x then y ∈ A.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose M = 〈M, E, j〉 is a model of T = ZFCj. Suppose A is a
transitive subset of M and j  A : A → A. Let A = 〈A, E, j  A〉.
(1) Suppose φ(x1, . . . , xn) is a Σ0 L-formula. Then for all a1, . . . , an ∈ A,
M |	 φ[a1, . . . , an] ⇐⇒ A |	 φ[a1, . . . , an].
(2) SupposeA |	 T and φ(x1, . . . , xn) is a ∆T1 L-formula. Then
M |	 φ[a1, . . . , an] ⇐⇒ A |	 φ[a1, . . . , an].
Proof. For (1), notice that the result easily holds for quantifier-free formulas, possibly
involving j-terms; and for formulas with bounded quantifiers, since the bounds always lie
in A, the result follows as in the usual ZFC setting. For (2), the proof is essentially the
same as the standard result in ZFC. To emphasize that the possible non-well-foundedness
of E does not affect the proof, we give the details for one direction. Let γ (x1, . . . , xn) be
Σ1 and ψ(x1, . . . , xn) be Π1 L-formulas such that
ZFCj  ∀a1, . . . , an
[
φ(a1, . . . , an)←→ γ (a1, . . . , an)
]
.
Also, write
γ (x1, . . . , xn) ≡ ∃y γ ′(y, x1, . . . , xn)
ψ(x1, . . . , xn) ≡ ∀z ψ ′(z, x1, . . . , xn),
where γ ′ and ψ ′ are Σ0. Suppose a1, . . . , an ∈ A. Then
M |	 φ[a1, . . . , an] 	⇒ M |	 ∀z ψ ′[z, a1, . . . , an]
	⇒ ∀z ∈ M (M |	 ψ ′[z, a1, . . . , an])
	⇒ ∀z ∈ A (A |	 ψ ′[z, a1, . . . , an])
	⇒ A |	 ∀z ψ ′[z, a1, . . . , an]
	⇒ A |	 φ[a1, . . . , an].
A similar argument, using γ and γ ′ in place of ψ and ψ ′, establishes upward
absoluteness. 
One important difference between the hierarchy of L formulas and the usual Lévy
hierarchy of ∈-formulas is that it is not generally the case that ∃x ∈ y φ is equivalent
to a Πn formula if φ is Πn , nor that ∀x ∈ y ψ is equivalent to a Σn formula if ψ is Σn .
The reason is that the usual proof of this equivalence involves some form of Replacement
(for example, see [11, Lemma 14.2] or [6, 3.2.7]); as was discussed in Section 1, the
extensions of ZFCj that will concern us primarily in this paper will not satisfy even
Σ1-Replacement for j-formulas. Therefore, we issue the following caveat, to which we
will refer from time to time:
Πn is not generally closed under bounded existential quantification; and
Σn is not generally closed under bounded universal quantification.
(2.1)
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We turn to the task of explicitly introducing the axioms that govern the behavior of
j; we do not assume that the usual axioms of Separation or Replacement hold for
j-formulas. In order to make an initial observation, we introduce the following standard
terminology: Suppose T is a theory that extends some sufficiently large fragment of ZFC.
We will say that a formula Γ (x, y) defines a class function in T if T  ∀x∃!y Γ (x, y).
In particular, functions and class functions are always assumed to be total. We observe
that the formula j(x) = y defines a class function in all extensions of ZFCj: Since j
is a unary function symbol, it follows that for any model M = 〈M, E, j〉 of ZFCj,
∀x ∈ M ∃!y ∈ MM |	 j (x) = y. Thus M |	 ∀x ∃!y j (x) = y. By the Completeness
Theorem, ZFCj  ∀x ∃!y j(x) = y.
As we introduce L-sentences to axiomatize the behavior of j, we adopt the following
convention: If σ is anL-sentence having an occurrence of j, then we shall denote the theory
ZFCj + σ by simply ZFC + σ , with the understanding that our language is L and we are
using the first order logic for L.
To capture the idea that j is a nontrivial elementary embedding from the universe to
itself, we supplement the theory with the following axioms:
Elementarity. Each of the following j-sentences is an axiom, where φ(x1, x2, . . . , xm) is
an ∈-formula:
∀x1, x2, . . . , xm
(
φ(x1, x2, . . . , xm)⇐⇒ φ(j(x1), j(x2), . . . , j(xm))
)
.
Nontriviality. ∃x j(x) "= x .
Note that Elementarity is an axiom schema, whereas Nontriviality is a single axiom.
Elementarity and Nontriviality impose the minimal conditions on j to guarantee that
each interpretation of j is a nontrivial elementary embedding of the universe. Note that
“elementarity” is with respect to ∈-formulas only. We cannot derive Kunen’s inconsistency
result from this theory—indeed, as R. Holmes reminded the author, the mere consistency
of ZFC is enough to get a model (see [1, Theorems 3.3.10, 3.3.11(d)]):
Proposition 2.3. Con(ZFC) implies that there is a model 〈M, E, j〉 of ZFC +
Elementarity+ Nontriviality. 
For the proof, assuming ZFC is consistent, one begins by extending the language
with countably many constants corresponding to some infinite ordered set 〈I,<〉, and
extending ZFC with axioms that assert that these constants are indiscernibles. Using
Ramsey’s Theorem and the Compactness Theorem, and the fact that ZFC has a model,
one shows that the extended theory is consistent. Let N = 〈N, E〉 be the reduct of a
model of this theory. Now I ⊂ N is a set of indiscernibles for N . Assuming, without
loss of generality, that N has built-in Skolem functions, one then may extend any order-
preserving f : I → I to an elementary embedding j : HN (I ) → HN (I ) by defining
j (t[i1, . . . , im]) = t[ f (i1, . . . , f (im)]. The final model is therefore 〈M, E, j〉 where
M = HN (I ).
In contrast to Proposition 2.3, large cardinal assumptions are needed in order to obtain
a well-founded model. This is shown in Lemma 2.7 below.
In standard set-theoretic practice, one studies elementary embeddings having a least
ordinal moved. However, an instance of Separation for j-formulas is required to prove the
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existence of such an ordinal. As it turns out, adding such an axiom to the theory greatly
increases its large cardinal strength. We call this new axiom Critical Point:
Critical Point: There is a least ordinal moved by j.
Certainly Critical Point implies Nontriviality. Let Separationj denote Separation for
j-formulas. Before showing that Critical Point is derivable from a Σ0 instance of
Separationj, we make precise the notion of an instance of Separationj, make some general
remarks about such instances, and then prove a useful lemma.
Formally, an instance of Separationj is a sentence
∀A ∀a ∃z ∀u [u ∈ z ←→ u ∈ A ∧ φ(u, A, a)],
where φ is a j-formula; in particular, this is the instance of Separationj that is determined
by φ.
Remark 2.4. Many instances of Separation for j-formulas can be proved directly from the
theory ZFC + BTEE. For example, for any ∈-formula φ(x, y, z) and any sets A,Y, Z ,
{u ∈ A : φ(u,Y, j (Z))} is a set because ZFC proves that for all sets W , {u ∈ A :
φ(u,Y,W )} is a set. However, it is not necessarily true that {u ∈ A : φ( j (u),Y, Z)} is
a set. A familiar counter-example is the attempt to construct a measurable ultrafilter from
j : Let U = {X ∈ P(κ) : κ ∈ j (X)}. U fails to be a set in the model 〈L,∈, j〉, where
j : L → L is any embedding obtained from Silver indiscernibles (assuming 0# exists).
Lemma 2.5. The theory ZFC+Elementarity+Nontriviality proves that if x and j(x) have
the same rank, and for all sets y for which rank(y) < rank(x), j(y) = y, then j(x) = x.
Proof. If y ∈ x , then by elementarity, j(y) ∈ j(x). Also, since j(y) = y, y ∈ j(x), and
we have shown that x ⊆ j(x). Conversely, if y ∈ j(x), we have j(y) = y ∈ j(x), whence
y ∈ x . The result follows. 
Now we show that Critical Point is derivable from ZFC+ Elementarity+Nontriviality
together with the instance of Σ0-Separationj determined by the formula j(x) "= x . Seeking
a contradiction, assume Critical Point fails. There are two cases: The first case (which was
brought to the attention of the author by the referee) is that some ordinal α is moved by j,
but there is no least such. In that case, by an application of the instance of Σ0-Separationj
determined by “j(x) "= x”, the following is a set:
S = {β < α + 1 | j(β) "= β}.
Since α ∈ S, S has a least element (arguing in ZFC alone), yielding a contradiction. The
second case is that for all α, j(α) = α. Using Nontriviality, let x be such that j(x) "= x . Let
α = rank(x) + ω and let X = Vα. Let M = {x ∈ X : j(x) "= x}; the fact that M is a set
follows from an application of the instance of Σ0-Separationj determined by “j(x) "= x”.
Let B = {rank(x) : x ∈ M}; B is a set by Replacement for ∈-formulas. Also, B "= ∅ since
M "= ∅. Let α = inf B and let y ∈ M be such that rank(y) = α. By the lemma and the
leastness of rank(y), we must have j(y) = y, and we have a contradiction.
When Critical Point holds, we will denote the critical point of j (and of any of its
interpretations) with the letter κ , and also with the notation cp j or cp j . We think of κ
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as a constant added by definitional extension. Note that the j-formula “x is the critical
point of j” is ΣZFCj0 . By elementarity, as usual, j(κ) > κ :
Proposition 2.6. ZFC + Elementarity+ Critical Point  j(κ) > κ. 
The axioms Elementarity + Critical Point capture the basic features of elementary
embeddings, as they are used in practice; so we give this collection of axioms the name
Basic Theory of Elementary Embeddings, or BTEE. Although this theory is not strong
enough to obtain inconsistency either, the critical point of the embedding must be a large
cardinal. For the moment, we prove that κ must be inaccessible, and prove more after
setting up some preliminaries.
We begin by observing that κ is an infinite ordinal > ω: We argue in (ZFC− Infinity)+
BTEE: By elementarity, j(0) = 0 and for each n, j(n+ 1) = j(n)+ 1. If j(n) "= n, then, by
ordinary Separation, and the fact that j  (n+1) is a set, {m ∈ n+1 : (j  (n+1))(m) "= m}
is a set, having a least element, and this leads to the usual contradiction. (This argument
actually shows that (ZFC − Infinity)+ BTEE  Infinity, which shows that each axiom of
the form “there exists j : V → V having a critical point” can be viewed as a generalized
Axiom of Infinity.) Finally, κ > ω since, by definability of ω, j(ω) = ω.
To see κ is a regular uncountable cardinal, we can argue as follows (in ZFC + BTEE):
Whenever f : α → κ , where α < κ , we have, by elementarity and leastness of κ , that
j ( f ) = f ; thus it would be impossible for such an f to be a bijection or even cofinal.
To see that κ is inaccessible, first observe that for any bounded subset A of κ , j(A) = A:
If α ∈ A, then α = j(α) ∈ j(A); conversely, if β < κ is such that A ⊂ β then
j(A) ⊆ j(β) = β, and so α ∈ j(A) implies j(α) = α, whence α ∈ A. For the proof of
inaccessibility, assume there is some α < κ for which there is a surjection g : P(α) → κ .
Then j(g) : P(α) → j(κ) is also a surjection. Now for each A ⊂ α, by our previous
observation and the fact that ran (g) = κ ,
j(g)(A) = j(g)( j(A)) = j(g(A)) = g(A),
whence j(g) = g. But since j(κ) > κ , this is impossible.
We can now give the reason that well-founded set models of ZFC + Elementarity +
Nontriviality have large cardinal strength; we begin with a useful lemma:
Lemma 2.7. Suppose 〈M, E, i〉 is a well-founded model of ZFCj. Let π : 〈M, E〉 →
〈N,∈〉 be the Mostowski collapsing isomorphism. If j = π ◦ i ◦ π−1, then 〈N,∈, j〉 |	
ZFCj. Moreover, j is the unique function N → N satisfying
π is an isomorphism between the structures 〈M, E, i〉 and 〈N,∈, j〉. (2.2)
In addition, if 〈M, E, i〉 |	 ZFC + Elementarity + Nontriviality, then 〈N,∈, j〉 |	
ZFC+ Elementarity+ Nontriviality.
M i ✲ M
π
❄ ❄
π
N j ✲ N
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Proof. The fact that 〈N,∈, j〉 |	 ZFCj, where j = π ◦ i ◦ π−1, is obvious. To see that π
is an isomorphism between the structuresM and N , it suffices to observe that π respects
j . But this follows from the equation
π ◦ i = j ◦ π, (2.3)
which is easily derived from the definition of j . Finally, notice that any function j : N →
N satisfying (2.2) must satisfy the Eq. (2.3), and hence we must have j = π ◦ i ◦ π−1.
If 〈M, E, i〉 |	 ZFC+ Elementarity+ Nontriviality, elementarity and nontriviality of j in
〈N,∈, j〉 follow immediately from its definition. 
Proposition 2.8. Any well-founded model of ZFC + Elementarity + Nontriviality also
satisfies Critical Point, and hence BTEE.
Proof. Since Critical Point is preserved by isomorphisms between models it suffices,
by Lemma 2.7, to prove the result for any transitive model of ZFC + Elementarity +
Nontriviality. Thus, suppose 〈N,∈, j〉 is such a model. In V , we can form the set
S = {y ∈ N : j (y) "= y} (since j is definable in V ); by absoluteness, S "= ∅. Let x
be a set in S of least rank (obtained in V ), and let κ = rank(x). Now in N , x also has a
rank, and by absoluteness of the rank function, this rank must be κ . We show that, in V ,
j (κ) "= κ : If j (κ) = κ , then
rank( j (x)) = j (rank(x)) = j (κ) = κ = rank(x).
Now one can argue as in Lemma 2.5 to conclude that j (x) = x , which is impossible. Thus
V , and hence also 〈N,∈, j〉 by absoluteness, satisfies
j (κ) > κ ∧ ∀α < κ ( j (α) = α).
It follows that 〈N,∈, j〉 |	 Critical Point. 
The referee suggests the following alternative proof for Proposition 2.8: First observe
that Nontriviality is equivalent to the assertion that there is an ordinal α with j(α) "= α.
This is true because by AC any set is coded with a set of ordinals. If all ordinals were fixed
by j, then any set of ordinals would also be fixed by j, and so every set would be fixed by j.
Proposition 2.8 now follows, since if a model is well-founded and has an ordinal moved, it
has a least ordinal moved.
With additional hypotheses, we get comparable results for j-inherited models; these
additional hypotheses appear to be necessary:
Proposition 2.9. Suppose 〈M,∈, i〉 is a transitive j-inherited model of ZFC +
Elementarity + Nontriviality. Assume that 〈V ,∈, j〉 |	 ZFC + BTEE. Then 〈M,∈, i〉 |	
Critical Point.
Proof. Suppose κ is the critical point of j in V . Since Elementarity+ Nontriviality holds
in M , some set x is moved by i , and hence also by j . But then rank(x) ≥ κ . Since rank is
computed the same way in both models, κ ∈ M . By absoluteness, κ is the critical point of
i in M . 
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Assuming that 〈V ,∈, j〉 satisfies slightly more than ZFC + BTEE, we prove in
Proposition 6.7 that there is no countable transitive j-inherited model of ZFC +
Elementarity+ Nontriviality.
We now show that the theory ZFC + BTEE implies that the critical point of j is
n-ineffable for every n ≥ 1. A cardinal λ is n-ineffable if every partition f : [λ]n+1 → 2
has a stationary homogeneous set (that is, a stationary set H ⊂ λ such that f  [H ]n+1
is constant). λ is said to be ineffable if λ is 1-ineffable. It is known that the n-ineffables
below an n+1-ineffable λ form a stationary set in λ. Every measurable cardinal is ineffable;
assuming 0# exists, every Silver indiscernible is ineffable in L; and an ineffable cardinal λ
is the λth weakly compact (see [11,13]). Also, it is known that λ is ineffable iff for each
sequence 〈Aα : α < λ〉 satisfying Aα ⊆ α for all α < λ, there is a set A ⊆ λ such that
{α < λ : A ∩ α = Aα} is stationary in λ.
We need the following standard lemma:
Proposition 2.10. ZFC + BTEE proves the following:
(1) ∀A ∈ P(κ) j(A) ∩ κ = A.
(2) ∀A ∈ P(κ) (κ ∈ j(A) 	⇒ “A is stationary”).
(3) Suppose α < κ, S ⊆ κ, κ ∈ j(S), and S = ⋃β<α Sβ . Then there is β < κ such that
κ ∈ j(Sβ).
Proof of (1). By Remark 2.4, j(A) ∩ κ is a set. If α ∈ A, then α = j(α) ∈ j(A) ∩ κ .
Conversely, if α ∈ j(A) ∩ κ then α = j(α), whence α ∈ A. 
Proof of (2). Suppose C ⊆ κ is closed and unbounded. κ is a limit point of C = j(C)∩ κ ,
whence κ ∈ j(C). Since j(A) ∩ j(C) "= ∅, we have A ∩ C "= ∅, by elementarity. Thus, A
is stationary. 
Proof of (3). Define f : α → P(κ) by f (β) = Sβ . By elementarity, j( f ) = 〈j(Sβ) : β <
α〉. Then since
κ ∈ j(S) = j(⋃ ran f ) =⋃ ran j( f ) = ⋃
β<α
j(Sβ),
it follows that κ ∈ j(Sβ) for some β < κ . 
We also need a lemma that gives us information about slightly stronger versions of the
equivalent definitions of ineffable given above. Only one of the possible implications is
needed for our work here:
Lemma 2.11. Consider the following two statements, expressed in the language L:
For each sequence 〈Aα : α < κ〉 satisfying Aα ⊆ α for all α < κ ,
there exist A, S such that A ⊆ κ , S = {α < κ : A ∩ α = Aα},
and κ ∈ j(S),
(2.4)
and
Each f : [κ]2 → 2 has a homogeneous set H for which κ ∈ j(H ). (2.5)
Then it is provable in ZFC + BTEE that (2.4) implies (2.5).
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Proof. The proof is like [11, Lemma 32.7(a)], except that we must verify that no axioms
beyond ZFC + BTEE are used when working with j. Assume (2.4), and let f : [κ]2 → 2
be a partition of [κ]2. Using ZFC, define Aα ⊆ α, α < κ , by
Aα = {β < α : f (β, α) = 1}.
Using (2.4), let A, S be such that A ⊆ κ , S = {α < κ : A ∩ α = Aα}, and κ ∈ j(S). Using
Proposition 2.10(3), we define H to be the element of {S ∩ A, S \ A} for which κ ∈ j(H ).
If H = S ∩ A and β < α are in H , then, since β ∈ Aα, f (β, α) = 1. If H = S \ A and
β < α are in H , then, since β "∈ Aα, f (β, α) = 0. Either way, f is constant on H , so H is
homogeneous for f . 
Theorem 2.12. For each particular (methatheoretic) natural number n ≥ 1, ZFC +
BTEE  κ is n-ineffable.
Proof. By induction in the metatheory, we prove the following slightly stronger result, for
each particular n ≥ 1:
Each f : [κ]n+1 → 2 has a homogeneous set H such that κ ∈ j(H ). (2.6)
(This statement implies n-ineffability by Proposition 2.10(2).)
For the basis step n = 1, we prove (2.4), which suffices by Lemma 2.11. We follow the
argument in [11, Lemma 32.7]. Suppose f = 〈Aα : α < κ〉, where, for each α < κ ,
Aα ⊆ α. Let A = j( f )(κ); A ⊆ κ . Note by Separation for ∈-formulas, using the
Remark 2.4, S = {α < κ : A ∩ α = Aα} is a set. Now, because j(A) ∩ κ = A (by
Proposition 2.10(1)), κ ∈ j(S), as required.
For the induction step, assume (2.6) holds for n ≥ 1, and let f : [κ]n+2 → 2 be a
partition. For each α < κ , define fα : [κ]n+1 → 2 by
fα(ξ0, . . . , ξn) = f (ξ0, . . . , ξn , α).
By the induction hypothesis, for each α there is a set Hα ⊆ κ such that Hα is homogeneous
for f and κ ∈ j(Hα). Using ZFC only, we form the sets Kε = {α < κ : f ′′α Hα = ε}, for
ε ∈ {0, 1}. Using Proposition 2.10(3), we let K denote the element of {K0, K1} for which
κ ∈ j(K ). Without loss of generality, we assume K = K1. Let Aα = Hα ∩ α. By the basis
step, there exist subsets A, S of κ such that S = {α < κ : Aα = A ∩ α} and κ ∈ j(S).
By elementarity, κ ∈ j(S ∩ K ). We define H to be (S ∩ K ) ∩ A if κ ∈ j((S ∩ K ) ∩ A)
or (S ∩ K ) \ A if κ ∈ j((S ∩ K ) \ A). By Proposition 2.10(3), H is well-defined. We
prove that H is homogeneous in the case in which H = (S ∩ K ) ∩ A; the other case is
handled similarly. Let ξ0 < . . . < ξn < α be elements of H . Since α ∈ S, it follows that
A ∩ α = Aα = Hα ∩ α. Since ξ0, . . . , ξn ∈ Hα ∩ α and α ∈ K (and using the assumption
that K = K1),
1 = fα(ξ0, . . . , ξn) = f (ξ0, . . . , ξn, α).
Thus, H is homogeneous for f . 
The slightly stronger versions of ineffability that we have introduced here, replacing
stationarity of a set S with the condition “κ ∈ j(S)”, have allowed us to “step around” the
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well-known obstacle to proving the equivalence of n-ineffability and m-ineffability for all
m and n.
Corollary 2.13. Every well-founded set model of ZFC+Elementarity+Nontriviality, also
satisfies “there is a cardinal that is n-ineffable for every n”.
Proof. This follows immediately from Propositions 2.8 and 2.12. 
Once we know that κ is n-ineffable for every n, we can show that the cardinals below κ
that also have this property form a stationary set, and that there are more than κ many such
cardinals above κ . This follows from a more general fact:
Theorem 2.14. Suppose A(x) is a large cardinal property, expressible in the language
{∈}, and ZFC + BTEE  A(κ). Then,
(1) ZFC+ BTEE  “{α < κ : A(α)} is stationary”.
(2) For each particular (metatheoretic) natural number n,
ZFC + BTEE  |{λ : A(λ)}| > jn(κ).
In order to prove (2), we will need to be able to talk about iterates j ◦ j, j ◦ j ◦ j, . . . of j
in the formal theory. We do this in the usual way, by adding, for each particular n > 0, a
function symbol jn by definitional extension, where
j1(x) = j(x)
jn+1(x) = (jn ◦ j)(x) = jn(j(x)).
It is straightforward to show that for each particular n, the formula jn(x) = y defines a class
function and that jn satisfies the Elementarity schema. We can now prove Theorem 2.14:
Proof of Theorem 2.14(1). Let B = {α < κ : A(α)}. To see that B is unbounded in κ ,
assume B ⊂ β < κ . Applying j to the true formula ∀γ (β < γ < κ 	⇒ ¬A(γ )) yields
∀γ (β < γ < j(κ) 	⇒ ¬A(γ )),
which contradicts the fact that A(κ) is true. Finally, notice that, since j(B) contains all the
cardinals λ < j(κ) for which A(λ) holds, κ ∈ j(B). Therefore, by Proposition 2.10(2), B
is stationary. 
Proof of Theorem 2.14(2). By elementarity of each jn and by induction in the metatheory,
A( jn(κ)) is true for each particular natural number n. Elementarity of jn also shows that
the set {λ < jn(κ) : A(λ)} is unbounded in jn(κ). The result follows. 
A result related to Theorem 2.14 is the fact that κ must be totally indescribable. Recall
that a cardinal λ is Π nm-indescribable if, whenever U ⊆ Vλ and σ is a Π nm sentence
such that 〈Vλ,∈,U〉 |	 σ , then for some α < λ, 〈Vα,∈,U ∩ Vα〉 |	 σ (treating
U as a unary predicate). λ is totally indescribable if it is Π nm-indescribable for every
m, n. It is known (see [11, Exercise 32.13]) that if 〈M,∈, j〉 is a transitive model of
ZFC + BTEE, then cp( j) is totally indescribable in M . Showing that ZFC + BTEE 
“κ is totally indescribable” represents a slight improvement of this result, though, in fact,
essentially the same proof works: Let Sent(X, n, p) assert that n ∈ ω and p codes an
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(n + 1)th order sentence in the language {∈, X}, where X denotes a first-order unary
predicate symbol. Let Sat(n, p, M,U) be a formula asserting Sent(X, n, p) and that
〈M, E(M),U〉 |	 σ (using (n + 1)th-order satisfaction). Let Π (n,m, p) say that p codes
a Π nm formula. Working in ZFC + BTEE, fix positive integers m, n and a p such that
Sent(X, n, p) andΠ (p, n,m). Let U ⊂ Vκ . Note that U = j(U)∩Vκ . If Sat(n, p, Vκ ,U),
then ∃α < j(κ) Sat(n, p, Vα, j(U) ∩ Vα). By elementarity, ∃α < κ Sat(n, p, Vα,U ∩ Vα),
as required. We record this observation here:
Proposition 2.15. ZFC+ BTEE  “κ is totally indescribable”. 
To close this section, we give the definition of the three-parameter formula Φ(n, x, y),
uniformizing the formulas jn(x) = y mentioned earlier. Assuming enough Induction
axioms for j-formulas, this formula defines the functional relation y = jn(x); in Section 4,
we will introduce these additional induction axioms. Here, we use the formula to prove
some basic results that do not require these extra axioms.
Define
Φ(n, x, y) ≡ n ∈ ω 	⇒ ∃ f Θ( f, n, x, y), (2.7)
where
Θ( f, n, x, y) ≡ “ f is a function” ∧ dom f = n + 1 ∧ f (0) = x ∧
∀i (0 < i ≤ n 	⇒ f (i) = j( f (i − 1))) ∧ f (n) = y. (2.8)
An important variant of Φ(n, x, y) is given by the Σ1 formula
Ψ (n, y) ≡ ∃x ∈ y [Φ(n, x, y) ∧ x = κ]. (2.9)
Without extra induction axioms, it is easy to verify that, whenever Θ( f, n, x, y)
holds, so must Θ( f m + 1,m, x, f (m)) for any m < n. We prove next that whenever
Θ( f, n, α, y) and α is an ordinal, then f is a sequence of ordinals. We shall say that jn(x)
exists or is defined just in case there is some y for which Φ(n, x, y).
Lemma 2.16. ZFC + BTEE  ∀ f, n, x, y [Θ( f, n, x, y) ∧ “x is an ordinal” 	⇒
“y is an ordinal”
]
.
Proof. Let f, n, x, y be such that n ∈ ω, x is an ordinal, andΘ( f, n, x, y). One then shows
by a straightforward (ordinary) bounded induction that
∀m ≤ n f (m) is an ordinal. 
Proposition 2.17. In ZFC+ BTEE, suppose α is an ordinal.
(1) If j(α) > α and f, n, β satisfy Θ( f, n, α, β), then f is a strictly increasing sequence
of ordinals.
(2) If j(α) ≥ α and f, n, β satisfy Θ( f, n, α, β), then f is a nondecreasing sequence of
ordinals.
(3) The sequence 〈jn(κ) : n ∈ ω and jn(κ) exists〉 is strictly increasing.
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Proof. Part (3) follows from (1). The proofs for parts (1) and (2) are nearly identical, so we
just prove (1). Let f, n, α, β be such thatΘ( f, n, α, β) and α is an ordinal. By Lemma 2.16,
β is also an ordinal. It suffices to prove by (ordinary) bounded induction
∀m ≤ n ∀i < m f (i) < f (m).
The basis step is true vacuously. For the induction step, let m < n; we prove ∀i <
m + 1 f (i) < f (m + 1). This formula holds when m = 0 by hypothesis, so assume
m > 0. By induction hypothesis, f (m − 1) < f (m). Applying j to the latter formula, we
have
f (m) = j( f (m − 1)) < j( f (m)) = f (m + 1);
this completes the induction and the proof of (1). 
The hypotheses “j(α) > α” and “j(α) ≥ α” in Proposition 2.17(1), (2), respectively,
cannot be eliminated. We show in Proposition 6.4 that even the theory ZFC + BTEE +
Σ0-Inductionj does not suffice to prove that for all α, j(α) ≥ α.
The next lemma establishes the simple ZFC + BTEE fact that the sets y for which
Φ(n, j(x), y) are the same as the sets y for which Φ(n + 1, x, y). Intuitively, this says that
jn( j(x)) = jn+1(x). This result is used in the proof of Proposition 5.3.
Lemma 2.18. ZFC + BTEE  ∀n ∈ ω ∀x ∀y [Φ(n, j(x), y) ⇐⇒ Φ(n + 1, x, y)].
Proof. We define the following formulas:
Q0(n, f ) ≡ n ∈ ω ∧ “ f is a function” ∧ dom ( f ) = n + 1,
Q1(n, x, g) ≡ n ∈ ω ∧ “g is a function” ∧ dom (g) = n + 2 ∧ g(0) = x .
Q0(n, f ) says that f is a function with domain n + 1 and Q1(n, x, g) says g is a function
with domain n + 2 for which g(0) = x . It is easy to see that
ZFC  ∀n, x, f ∃!g [Q0(n, f ) 	⇒ Q1(n, x, g)
∧∀i (0 ≤ i ≤ n 	⇒ g(i + 1) = f (i))], (2.10)
and
ZFC  ∀n, g ∃! f [Q1(n, g(0), g) 	⇒ Q0(n, f )
∧∀i (0 ≤ i ≤ n 	⇒ f (i) = g(i + 1))]. (2.11)
Now, suppose n ∈ ω, x, y, f are such that Θ( f, n, x, y) holds. Since Q0(n, f ) holds, we
obtain from (2.10) a unique g for which Q1(n, κ, g) is true and g(i + 1) = f (i) whenever
0 ≤ i ≤ n. For each i , with 0 < i ≤ n, we have
g(i + 1) = f (i) = j( f (i − 1)) = j(g(i)).
It follows that Θ(g, n + 1, x, y) holds, whence Φ(n + 1, x, y). A similar argument
demonstrates the reverse implication. 
We also show here that j(jn(x)) = jn(j(x)):
Lemma 2.19. ZFC + BTEE  ∀n ∈ ω ∀x ∀y [Φ(n, x, y) 	⇒ Φ(n, j(x), j(y))].
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Proof. From ZFC alone it follows that for any function f defined on n + 1 there is a g
defined on n such that for all i < n, g(i) = f (i + 1). Now, assume Θ( f, n, x, y). Define
g as above, and define gˆ on n + 1 by gˆ = g ∪ {(n, j(y))}. Clearly, Θ(g, n, j(x), j(y)), and
the result follows. 
Assuming Σ0-Induction, one may extend these results to show that, if there is y such
that y = jn(x), then for each particular integer k, jn( jk(x)) = jn+k(x) = jk( jn(x)); see
Proposition 5.3(1).
3. Transitive models of BTEE and remarkable cardinals
In this section, we show that only a rather weak large cardinal hypothesis (namely, the
existence of an ω-Erdös cardinal) is necessary to obtain models of ZFC + BTEE. After
describing a canonical procedure for obtaining such models from a set of indiscernibles,
we discuss a particularly nice class of models that are rich enough to prove the consistency
of Schindler’s remarkable cardinals.
Whenever we have a set I of ordinal indiscernibles of type ω for a transitive set model
of ZFC having built-in or definable Skolem functions, we can obtain a transitive model of
ZFC+ BTEE, and we can do so in a canonical way:
Remark 3.1 (Canonical Construction of Models of ZFC+ BTEE). Given a transitive M
|	 ZFC with built-in or definable Skolem functions and I ⊂ ONM of indiscernibles for M
having ordertype ω. Define B = HM (I ) ≺ M . Let π : B → N be the transitive collapsing
map, and let e : N → M denote the induced elementary embedding (e = π−1). Define
i0 : I → I so that i0 takes each element α of I to the next element sI (α) of I above α.
Define i : B → B by
i(t M [α1, . . . , αk ]) = t M [i0(α1), . . . , i0(αk)]
where t (x1, . . . , xk) is any Skolem term and α1 < . . . < αk are in I ; as usual, i is well-
defined and is an elementary embedding. Letting j = π ◦ i ◦π−1, we have, by Lemma 2.7,
that 〈N,∈, j〉 |	 ZFC + BTEE. Note that if J = π ′′ I , then J is a set of indiscernibles
for N , and j acts on J by sending each β ∈ J to sJ (β). We call the model 〈N,∈, j〉 the
canonical transitive model of ZFC+BTEE derived from M, I . (Of course, N also depends
on the choice of Skolem functions, but this dependency will not need to be made explicit
in any of our arguments here. In particular, when we work in models of type 〈Lγ ,∈, i〉, we
will always use the definable Skolem functions already available in the model.)
The only way known (so far) for building models of ZFC + BTEE under mild large
cardinal hypotheses (0# or weaker) is by using a set of indiscernibles that is a subset of
some ordinal. If 0# exists, indiscernibles for L and Lλ for cardinals λ are always available.
For our purposes, though, it usually suffices to assume the existence of an α-Erdös cardinal
for some countably infinite limit ordinal α. We pause here to review a central theorem
about 0# and the main properties of α-Erdös cardinals. (We assume familiarity with the
development of 0# as in [11] or [6].) The proof of Theorem 3.2 can be found in [5]; proofs
of (1)–(5) of Theorem 3.3 can be found in [11, Chapter 32]; and the proof of part (6) of
that theorem is a special case of Theorem 8.2.4 of [6].
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Given an infinite ordinal α, λ is α-Erdös if
λ is least such that λ → (α)<ω .
Theorem 3.2. The following are equivalent:
(1) 0# exists.
(2) There is an elementary embedding j : Lα → Lβ , where α and β are limit ordinals
and cp( j) < |α|.
(3) For any uncountable cardinal λ, there is a nontrivial elementary embedding j : Lλ →
Lλ.
(4) There is a nontrivial elementary embedding L → L. 
Part (4) of this theorem cannot be stated in this form in ZFC. Also, as we show in
Example 9.2, (4) is not equivalent to (1)–(3) unless it is understood that j is “sufficiently”
definable in V ; certainly, requiring j to be a class (defined with parameters) in V suffices
for the proof (and this is nearly always assumed to be the case in this context)—but much
less definability will do.
Theorem 3.3 (α-Erdös Cardinals). Assume α and β are infinite limit ordinals.
(1) If α < ω1 and λ is α-Erdös, then λ is α-Erdös in L.
(2) If there is an ω1-Erdös cardinal, then 0# exists.
(3) If α < β and λβ is β-Erdös, then the α-Erdös cardinal λα exists and λα < λβ .
(4) Each α-Erdös cardinal is inaccessible.
(5) If there is an α-Erdös cardinal λ and A is a model whose language has less than
λ symbols and whose domain contains every element of λ, then A has a set of
indiscernibles of ordertype α.
(6) Suppose λ is α-Erdös. Let M denote either 〈Lλ,∈〉 or 〈Vλ,∈, hMφ 〉φ∈Fmla∈ (where
each hMφ is a Skolem function for φ in 〈Lλ,∈〉 or 〈Vλ,∈〉, respectively).(a) For any set I ⊆ λ of indiscernibles for M, we have that if α1 < . . . < αk < β
are in I , t (x1, . . . , xk) is a Skolem term, andM |	 “t (α1, . . . , αk) is an ordinal”,
thenM |	 t (α1, . . . , αk) < β.
(b) If α > ω, then there is a set I ⊆ λ of indiscernibles for M such that if
α1 < . . . < αk < β < γ1 < . . . < γm are in I , t (x1, . . . , xk, z1, . . . , zm) is
a Skolem term, and
M |	 “t (α1, . . . , αk , γ1, . . . , γm) is an ordinal and
β < t (α1, . . . , αk , γ1, . . . , γm)”,
then
M |	 γ1 ≤ t (α1, . . . , αk, γ1, . . . , γm). 
Part (6) of the theorem is needed for the next corollary; the proof of the corollary is
essentially the same as the standard proof used to derive the same properties for Silver
indiscernibles from an ω1-Erdös cardinal (as in [11, Chapter 30] for example).
Corollary 3.4. Suppose λ is α-Erdös, where α is an infinite limit ordinal. Let M denote
either 〈Lλ,∈〉 or 〈Vλ,∈, hMφ 〉φ∈Fmla∈ (where each hMφ is a Skolem function for φ in〈Lλ,∈〉 or 〈Vλ,∈〉).
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(1) For any set I ⊆ λ of indiscernibles forM, if B = HM(I ), then I is unbounded in the
ordinals of B.
(2) If α > ω, there is a set I = {αξ : ξ < α} ⊆ λ of indiscernibles for M such that for
each infinite limit ordinal ζ < α, αζ = sup{αξ : ξ < ζ }.
Proof. Part (1) follows immediately from Theorem 3.3(6a). For (2), assume ζ and β are
such that
ζ is an infinite limit ordinal, β < αζ , and for all ξ < ζ , αξ < β. (3.1)
Let t (x1, . . . , xk) be a Skolem term such that β = tM(δ1, . . . , δk), where δ1 < . . . < δk
are in I . Suppose first that δk < αζ . Since ζ is a limit, there is αξ ∈ I such that
δk < αξ < αζ . By (3.1), αξ < β, but by Theorem 3.3(6a) we have β < αξ ; thus, not
all the δi are below αζ . Thus, we can write
β = tM(γ1, . . . , γr , ν1, . . . , νs)
where s > 0 and γ1 < . . . γr < ν1 < . . . νs are in I , and γr < αζ ≤ ν1. Using (3.1)
and the fact that ζ is a limit, there is αξ such that γr < αξ < β < αζ . Now, applying
Theorem 3.3(6b), since αξ < β, we must have ν1 ≤ β. Since β < αζ ≤ ν1, we have a
contradiction. 
We can use the indiscernibles obtained from an ω-Erdös cardinal to get a transitive
model of ZFC+ BTEE:
Proposition 3.5. Assume there is an ω-Erdös cardinal. Then there is a transitive set model
of ZFC + BTEE.
Proof. Let λ be an ω-Erdös cardinal. LetM = 〈Vλ,∈, hMφ 〉φ∈Fmla∈ , where each hMφ is a
Skolem function for φ in 〈Vλ,∈〉. By Theorem 3.3,M has a set of indiscernibles I ⊂ λ of
order type ω. Now, the required model can be obtained from M, I in the canonical way,
as in Remark 3.1. 
Assuming that 0# exists, we can get a stronger result than Proposition 3.5—we show
that for each δ, there is a transitive model 〈M,∈, j〉 of ZFC + BTEE with cp( j) > δ.
To see this, let κ be an uncountable cardinal > δ. Define f on the Silver indiscernibles
Sκ = {αξ : ξ < κ} below κ by
f (αξ ) =
{
αξ if αξ ≤ δ
αξ+1 otherwise.
Extend f to an elementary embedding i : Lκ → Lκ via Skolem terms. Now 〈Lκ ,∈, i〉 is
the required model.
Returning to the more restrictive hypotheses, we record two of the particularly nice
properties of the models of ZFC + BTEE that one gets from an ω-Erdös cardinal.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose λ is an ω-Erdös cardinal and I ⊂ λ is a set of indiscernibles
for M of ordertype ω, where M is either 〈Vλ,∈, hMφ 〉φ∈Fmla∈ or 〈Lλ,∈〉. Suppose
N = 〈N,∈, j〉 is the canonical model of ZFC + BTEE derived from M, I , and let
B, π : B → N, e : N →M, and J be as in the canonical construction. Then
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(1) j is an extension of an order-preserving function J → J .
(2) J = {κ, j (κ), j2(κ), . . .} is cofinal in O NN (where κ = cp( j)).
Proof. (1) follows immediately from the canonical construction of N . For (2), by
Corollary 3.4, I is cofinal in ONN . It is easy to verify that the map X +→ π ′′X preserves
cofinal sets; hence J is cofinal in ONN . 
We have shown that the consistency strength of the theory ZFC + BTEE is bounded
below by the existence of n-ineffable cardinals and of totally indescribable cardinals; and
it is bounded above by the existence of an ω-Erdös cardinal. Schindler [20] has shown that
the consistency strength of remarkable cardinals has the same upper and lower bounds.
We define a particularly good class of transitive models of ZFC + BTEE and show that
whenever one of these models exists, there is a transitive model of a remarkable cardinal.
In particular, a transitive model 〈M,∈, j〉 of ZFC+ BTEE will be considered good in this
sense if 〈M,∈〉 can be elementarily embedded into 〈Lκ ,∈〉, where κ is inaccessible. This
fact, by way of Schindler’s results, links models of ZFC+BTEE to models of absoluteness
of set forcing over L(R); we will indicate some of these connections below.
For each infinite cardinal θ , H (θ) denotes the sets hereditarily of cardinality < θ . We
begin with the definition of a remarkable cardinal.
Definition 3.7 ([20]). A cardinal α is remarkable if for each regular cardinal θ > α,
there exist a countable transitive M and an elementary embedding e : M → H (θ) with
α ∈ ran (e) and also a countable transitive N and an elementary embedding σ : M → N
such that
(1) cp(σ ) = e−1(α);
(2) (ONM is a regular cardinal)N ;
(3) M = H N (ONM );
(4) σ(e−1(α)) > ONM .
We also need the following definition from [20]: Say that L(R) is absolute under proper
forcings if for each proper forcing P , each formula φ(v), and each finite sequence x of
reals in V , we have:
L(R) |	 φ(x)⇐⇒ ‖– P L(R˙) |	 φ( ˇx),
where R˙ is a P-name for the set of reals in the extension.
Similarly, L(R) is absolute with ordinal parameters under proper forcings if for each
proper forcing P , each formula φ(v, w), each x ⊆ R, and each α ⊆ ON,
L(R) |	 φ(α, x)⇐⇒ ‖– P L(R˙) |	 φ( ˇα, ˇx).
Some of Schindler’s results on remarkable cardinals are the following:
Theorem 3.8 ([20]).
(1) If there is an ω-Erdös cardinal, then there is a transitive model of a remarkable
cardinal. In particular, there are α < β < ω1 such that Lβ |	 ZFC +
“α is remarkable”.
P. Corazza / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 139 (2006) 327–399 349
(2) Every remarkable cardinal is n-ineffable for every n, and is totally indescribable.
(3) The existence of a remarkable cardinal is equiconsistent with the statement that L(R)
is absolute under proper forcings, and also with the statement that L(R) is absolute
with ordinal parameters under proper forcings. 
We now specify the conditions on a transitive model of ZFC + BTEE that will
suffice to establish consistency of remarkable cardinals. We will call a transitive model
M = 〈M,∈, j〉 of ZFC + BTEE good if
(1) M is countable;
(2) the set {κ, j (κ), j2(κ), . . .} is cofinal in ONM;
(3) there exist λ, e such that λ is inaccessible and e : 〈M,∈〉 → 〈Lλ,∈〉 is an elementary
embedding.
We observe that the canonically derived models of ZFC + BTEE one obtains from an
ω-Erdös cardinal satisfy these properties:
Theorem 3.9. Suppose λ is an ω-Erdös cardinal. Then there is a good transitive model of
ZFC+ BTEE.
Proof. Let I ⊂ λ be a set of indiscernibles of type ω for Lλ, and let N = 〈N,∈, j〉 be
the canonical transitive model of ZFC + BTEE derived from Lλ, I , with e : N → Lλ
and J ⊂ ONN defined as in the canonical construction. Clearly, N is countable. By
Proposition 3.6(2), J = {κ, j (κ), j2(κ), . . .} is cofinal in ONN . Finally, e witnesses (3) in
the definition of good since λ is inaccessible. 
Theorem 3.10. Suppose there is a good transitive model of ZFC + BTEE. Then there is a
countable transitive model of a remarkable cardinal.
Proof. LetN = 〈Lγ ,∈, j〉 be a good transitive model of ZFC+BTEE. Let κ = cp( j) and
λ, e be such that λ is inaccessible and e : 〈Lγ ,∈〉 → 〈Lλ,∈〉 is a nontrivial elementary
embedding. Let J = {κ, j (κ), j2(κ), . . . , }.
Let α = κ and β = j (κ). We now show that Lβ |	 “α is remarkable”. Let θ be an
ordinal such that α < θ < β and (θ is a regular cardinal)Lβ . We claim that the following
holds in Lλ:
∃M ∃eθ ∃σθ ∃θ¯
[
“M is countable and transitive” ∧ “eθ : M → Le(θ) is elementary”∧
e(α) ∈ ran (eθ ) ∧ “σθ : M → L θ¯ is elementary”∧
cp(σθ ) = e−1θ (e(α)) ∧ “θ¯ is countable” ∧ σθ (e−1θ (e(α))) > ONM ∧
“ONM is a regular cardinal in L θ¯ ” ∧
(
M = H(θ)
)L θ¯ ]
.
(3.2)
Letting M = Lθ , eθ = e  Lθ , σθ = j  Lθ , and θ¯ = j (θ), it is easy to verify that the claim
is true. Since (by elementarity) Lλ |	 “e(β) is inaccessible”, the formula (3.2) also holds
in Le(β). By elementarity of e, pulling back, we have:
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Lβ |	 ∃M ∃eθ ∃σθ ∃θ¯
[
“M is countable and transitive” ∧ “eθ : M → Lθ is elementary”∧
α ∈ ran (eθ ) ∧ “σθ : M → L θ¯ is elementary”∧
cp(σθ ) = e−1θ (α) ∧ “θ¯ is countable” ∧ σθ (e−1θ (α)) > ONM ∧
“ONM is a regular cardinal in L θ¯” ∧
(
M = H(θ)
)L θ¯ ]
.
This proves the theorem. 
Schindler’s work now gives us the following:
Corollary 3.11. If there is a good transitive model of ZFC + BTEE, then each of the
following is consistent:
(1) L(R) is absolute under proper forcings.
(2) L(R) is absolute with ordinal parameters under proper forcings. 
4. Induction axioms
Because not every model of ZFC + BTEE is an ω-model (see [16, IV.10]), we cannot
prove (from ZFC + BTEE) induction on the natural numbers relative to j-formulas. We
therefore introduce this property as an axiom schema, which we call Inductionj, and study
some of its consequences. We will adopt the convention of referring to the natural numbers
in the metatheory as particular (metatheoretic) natural numbers, and to the natural numbers
formalized within the theory at hand (usually some extension of ZFCj) as formal natural
numbers.
We show that transitive models always satisfy Induction j , and that the schema
Σ1-Induction j is sufficient to show that Φ(n, x, y) and Ψ (n, y) (defined at the end of
Section 2) are class functions. Using weak forms of Induction j , we will be able to improve
some of our results in Section 2 of the form “for each particular natural number n . . .” to
results of the form “for all formal n . . .”. One such result is that, by full Inductionj, jn is
elementary for all formal n ≥ 1.
Inductionj: For any j-formula φ(x, y) and sets a,[
φ(0, a) ∧ ∀n ∈ ω [φ(n, a) 	⇒ φ(n + 1, a)]] 	⇒ ∀n ∈ ω φ(n, a).
We let Σn-Inductionj (Πn-Inductionj) denote Inductionj restricted to Σn (Πn)
j-formulas. (We continue to follow our convention of calling a formula Σn (Πn) when
it may only be ΣZFCjn (Π ZFCjn ).) For each n, Σn-Inductionj follows from Σn-Separation
for j-formulas: if the hypothesis of the Inductionj axiom holds for the Σn j-formula φ,
and yet ∃n¬φ(n, a), the j-class {m ∈ ω : ¬φ(m, a)} is a set by Σn-Separation (since
this is equivalent to Πn-Separation). One can then take the least element of this set to
obtain a contradiction as usual. The same proof shows that Πn-Inductionj follows from
Σn-Separation for j-formulas. Finally, Hatch [8] has observed that Σn-Inductionj implies
Πn-Inductionj; it is unknown whether the converse is true.
Hatch [8] has shown that Induction j need not hold in models of ZFC+ BTEE: Given a
nonstandard modelM = 〈M, E, j〉 of ZFC + BTEE, he shows that the model N whose
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domain is N = {x ∈ M : ∃n ∈ ωM |	 rank(x) < jn(κ)}, and whose embedding is
j  N , is a model of ZFC + BTEE + ¬Σ1-Induction j . (In the sequel, we will refer to this
model as Hatch’s model.) For future reference, we mention here that the Σ1 formula for
which Σ1-Induction j fails in Hatch’s model is the formula Ψ (n, β), defined at the end of
Section 2. Hatch also shows that, assuming additional large cardinal hypotheses (weaker
than the existence of 0#), it is consistent with ZFC + BTEE for Σ0-Inductionj to fail.
The next result shows that, by contrast, Inductionj always holds in well-founded models
of ZFC + BTEE:
Proposition 4.1. Any well-founded model of ZFCj is also a model of Inductionj.
Proof. Since Inductionj is preserved by isomorphisms between L-structures, it suffices, by
Lemma 2.7, to prove the proposition for all transitive models of ZFCj. Given such a model
N = 〈N,∈, j〉, suppose
N |	 φ(0, a) ∧ ∀x ∈ ω (φ(x, a) 	⇒ φ(s(x), a)), (4.1)
and also
N |	 ∃x ∈ ω¬φ(x, a), (4.2)
for some formula φ(x, y). Since ωN = ω, we obtain from (4.2) that there is (in V ) a least
n for which N |	 ¬φ(n, a). But now this choice of n contradicts (4.1) (in the usual way).
ThusN |	 Inductionj. 
Two familiar variations on the Induction j schema are bounded induction and total
induction. We formulate these and state the standard results about them without proof:
Bounded Inductionj: For any j-formula φ(x, y) and sets a,
∀n ∈ ω
([
φ(0, a) ∧ ∀m (m < n ∧ φ(m, a) 	⇒ φ(m + 1, a))]
	⇒ ∀m ≤ n φ(m, a)
)
.
We let Σn-Bounded Inductionj (Πn-Bounded Inductionj) denote Bounded Inductionj
restricted to Σn (Πn) j-formulas.
Proposition 4.2. For each particular (methatheoretic) k, the theory ZFC + BTEE + Σk -
Inductionj proves each instance of Σk-Bounded Inductionj. In particular ZFC + BTEE +
Inductionj proves each instance of Bounded Inductionj. 
Total Induction: For any j-formula φ(x, y) and sets a,(
∀n ∈ ω
[
φ(0, a) ∧ ∀m < n φ(m, a) 	⇒ φ(n, a)
])
	⇒ ∀n ∈ ω φ(n, a).
We let Σn-Total Inductionj (Πn-Total Inductionj) denote Total Inductionj restricted to
Σn (Πn) j-formulas.
We note that Total Inductionj follows from Inductionj, as expected. However, because of
the difficulties discussed in (2.1), we are unable to prove that Σn-Total Inductionj follows,
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in general, from Σn-Inductionj. This limitation significantly reduces the usefulness of this
variant of Inductionj. However, we can prove the implication for the case n = 0; we will
make good use of this fact in the next section.
Proposition 4.3.
(1) The theory ZFC+ BTEE + Inductionj proves each instance of Total Inductionj.
(2) The theory ZFC+BTEE+Σ0-Inductionj proves each instance ofΣ0-Total Inductionj.
Proof. We prove (2). Let φ(x, y) be Σ0 j-formula. Let ψ(x, y) be given by
ψ(x, y) ≡ ∀m ≤ n φ(m, y).
Certainly ψ is Σ0 (and this is where generalization to Σk, k > 0 fails). Work in ZFC +
BTEE+Σ0-Inductionj. Let a be sets. We use Σ0-Inductionj to prove ∀n ∈ ωψ(n, a); this
will complete the proof of the theorem. We assume
∀n ∈ ω
[
φ(0, a) ∧ ∀m < n φ(m, a) 	⇒ φ(n, a)
]
. (4.3)
By (4.3), ψ(0, a) holds. Assuming ψ(n, a), we have
∀m ≤ n φ(m, a). (4.4)
Again by (4.3), φ(m + 1, a) must hold; it follows that ψ(m + 1, a) holds as well. This
completes the induction step and the proof. 
We observed in [4] that, assuming Separation for j-formulas, the formula Φ(n, x, y)
defined in (2.7) defines a class function. The same proof works assuming only ZFC +
BTEE + Σ1-Inductionj. We outline the results here.
Proposition 4.4.
(1) It is provable in ZFCj that, for all n, x, y, there is at most one f for whichΘ( f, n, x, y)
(where Θ is as in (2.8)). That is
ZFCj  ∀n ∈ ω ∀x ∀y ∀ f, g [Θ( f, n, x, y) ∧ Θ(g, n, x, y) 	⇒ f = g].
(2) It is provable in ZFC+BTEE+Σ1-Inductionj that Φ(n, x, y) defines a class function.
That is,
ZFC + BTEE + Σ1-Inductionj  ∀n ∈ ω ∀x ∃!y Φ(n, x, y). (4.5)
(3) It is provable in ZFC + BTEE + Σ1-Inductionj that Ψ (n, y) defines a class function
(where Ψ (n, y) is as in (2.9)). That is,
ZFC + BTEE + Σ1-Inductionj  ∀n ∈ ω ∃!yΨ (n, y). (4.6)
Proof. We prove (1) and (2), and leave (3) to the reader. For (1), we begin by observing
that the following holds in ZFC by a simple induction:
Suppose n ∈ ω, f, g are functions with domain n + 1, f (0) = g(0) and f "= g.
Then there is a least i with 1 ≤ i ≤ n for which f (i) "= g(i). (4.7)
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Thus, working in ZFCj, if there are n, x, y, f, g for whichΘ( f, n, x, y) ∧Θ(g, n, x, y)
and f "= g, then, since f (0) = x = g(0), we obtain from (4.7) a least i for which
f (i) "= g(i) (in other words, the “induction step” is already given to us by ZFC). This
contradicts the definition of f and g since
f (i) = j( f (i − 1)) = j(g(i − 1)) = g(i).
For (2), we first establish the uniqueness part. It suffices to show that for all n, x there
is at most one pair ( f, y) for which Θ( f, n, x, y). So, assume there are two such pairs,
( f1, y1) and ( f2, y2). The argument in part (1) can be used again to show that f1 = f2. But
uniqueness of f implies uniqueness of y since, by the definition of f , f (n) = y.
To complete the proof, we prove σ where
σ ≡ ∀n ∈ ω ∀x ∃y Φ(n, x, y).
We show that for each a,
∀n ∈ ω γ (n, a),
where
γ (n, x) ≡ ∃y Φ(n, x, y).
We use the Σ1 formula γ (n, x) for the induction. For the induction step, let z satisfy
Φ(n, a, z) with witness f having domain n + 1. Setting fˆ = f ∪ {(n + 1, j( f (n)))},
it is clear that fˆ witnesses Φ(n + 1, a, j(z)). Thus, by Σ1-Inductionj, we have ∀n γ (n, a).
Since a was arbitrary, the result follows. 
We show in Corollary 5.4 that the theory ZFC+BTEE+Π1-Inductionj also suffices to
obtain the conclusions of Proposition 4.4(2) and (3).
Remark 4.5. Part (3) of Proposition 4.4 tells us that, in the presence of Σ1-Inductionj, Ψ
defines the class sequence 〈κ, j(κ), j2(κ), . . .〉. However, in the absence of Σ1-Inductionj,
we have no guarantee that jN (κ) is defined for each nonstandard integer N—recall Hatch’s
model—though for standard integers N we do have this assurance. Of course, such
pathologies could arise only in non-well-founded models. In particular, Ψ defines a class
function within any transitive model of ZFC + BTEE. Similar observations apply to the
formula Φ.
Proposition 4.4 suggests the correct version of the definition-by-induction theorem for
sufficiently strong extensions of ZFCj:
Theorem 4.6 (Definition By Induction, One Variable). Suppose F : V → V is a j-class
function defined by a Σn j-formula φ(x, y). Then there is a unique j-class function
G : ω → V , defined by a Σn+2 j-formula ψ(n, z) such that for all n ∈ ω, G  n is a
set and
G(n) = F(G  n). (4.8)
Proof. Let γ (g, n, y) denote the following Πn+1 formula:
γ (g, n, y) ≡ dom g = n + 1 ∧ ∀i ∈ dom g φ(g  i, g(i)) ∧ g(n) = y.
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We first show that
∀n ∈ ω ∃!g ∃!y γ (g, n, y). (4.9)
For each n, the uniqueness of g and y can be shown exactly as in Proposition 4.4, using
(4.7); no induction axioms for j-formulas are required for this part of the proof. To prove
that g and y exist for each n, one proves the following by Σn+2-Inductionj; the proof is
similar to Proposition 4.4(2):
∀n ∈ ω ∃g ∃y γ (g, n, y).
This establishes (4.9). G : ω → V can now be defined as the union of the witnesses gs
given by (4.9). The formula ψ(n, y) that defines G is clearly Σn+2:
ψ(n, y) ≡ n ∈ ω 	⇒ ∃g ∃y γ (g, n, y). (4.10)
For uniqueness of G, suppose G′ satisfies (4.8), defined by a j-formula ψ ′(n, y).
Translating away the classes in (4.8) gives us
∀n ∈ ω ∀y (ψ ′(n, y) ⇐⇒ ∃g γ (g, n, y)).
It follows immediately, by uniqueness of such g, that
∀n ∈ ω ∀y (ψ(n, y) ⇐⇒ ψ ′(n, y)). 
Remarks.
(1) We have not yet stated the theory in which the theorem is to be proven; technically,
as in the ZFC case, it is a theorem schema—one theorem for each F. As in [16, p.
25], the theorem says that given φ, we can explicitly define the formula ψ so that the
class-free version of (4.8) is true; to establish this, the proof required Σn+2-Inductionj
if φ is Σn . Thus, whenever F is Σn , the theorem for F is derivable from the theory
ZFC+ BTEE + Σn+2-Inductionj.
(2) In the proof, we claimed that γ is merely a Πn+1 formula; this is because, as in (2.1),
we cannot ignore the bounded quantification ‘∀i ∈ dom g’ in computing complexity
as we can in ZFC. Thus, the complexity of G jumps above that of F by 2.
(3) When F happens to be defined by a Σ0 j-formula, notice that the bounded quantifier in
this case does not increase complexity; thus, for such F, G is defined by a Σ1 formula.
(4) The critical sequence can be shown to be a class function in this scheme by defining
F(x) = y iff y = ∅, unless x is a finite sequence s of ordinals; in that case, if z is the
last term of s, then set y = j(z). Of course, now that we have Theorem 4.6, we can
define the critical sequence by the familiar clauses
h(0)= κ
h(n + 1)= j(h(n)).
In order to define Φ(n, x, y) using definition-by-induction, a two-variable version of
Theorem 4.6 is necessary. We state the theorem and leave the proof to the reader.
Theorem 4.7 (Definition By Induction, Two Variables). Suppose F : V × V → V is a
j-class function defined by a Σn j-formula φ(u, x, y). Then there is a unique j-class
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function G : ω × V → V , defined by a Σn+2 j-formula ψ(n, w, z) such that for all
n ∈ ω and all x ,
G(n, x) = F(n, 〈G(0, x),G(1, x), . . . ,G(n − 1, x)〉).  (4.11)
We conclude this section by considering some improvements of results in Section 2,
upgrading “for each particular n” to “for all formal n” by means of Inductionj. We begin
with Theorem 2.12:
Proposition 4.8. ZFC + BTEE + Inductionj  “κ is n-ineffable for every n ∈ ω”.
Proof. The proof of Theorem 2.12 can be written in terms of formal n ∈ ω instead of
standard n by using Inductionj. 
The next proposition shows that jn is elementary for all formal n.
Proposition 4.9.
(1) For each particular m ≥ 1 and each∆ZFm ∈-formula φ(x1, . . . , xk),
ZFC+ BTEE + Σm-Inductionj  ∀n ≥ 1
∀a1, . . . , ak “jn preserves φ(a1, . . . , ak)”.
(2) For each ∈-formula φ(x1, . . . , xk),
ZFC+ BTEE + Inductionj  ∀n ≥ 1
∀a1, . . . , ak “jn preserves φ(a1, . . . , ak)”.
Remarks.
(A) In Part (1), we have required m ≥ 1 because for such m, Σm -Inductionj suffices to
establish that Φ(n, x, y) is a class function—a fact that is needed when we apply
various jn to parameters a1, . . . , ak . We establish a weaker version of this result for
the case m = 0 in the next section.
(B) Note that if jn “preserves φ” for every (Σr ) formula φ, then jn is (Σr -) elementary.
Proof. Part (2) follows from (1); we prove (1): Let φ∀(x1, . . . , xk) be Πm and
φ∃(x1, . . . , xk) be Σm such that
ZF  ∀a1, . . . , ak
[
φ(a1, . . . , ak) ⇐⇒ φ∀(a1, . . . , ak) ⇐⇒ φ∃(a1, . . . , ak)
]
.
Fix a1, . . . , ak . We use the following Σm formula for induction:
γ (n, a1, . . . , ak) ≡ φ∀(a1, . . . , ak) 	⇒ ∃z1, . . . , zk[
z1 = jn(a1) ∧ . . . ∧ zk = jn(ak) ∧ φ∃(z1, . . . , zk)
]
.
The case n = 1 is immediate. Assume γ (n, a1, . . . , ak) and φ∀(a1, . . . , ak). By
γ (n, a1, . . . , ak), we have φ∃( jn(a1), . . . , jn(ak)). By elementarity of j, it follows that
φ∃( jn+1(a1), . . . , jn+1(ak)), as required. By Σm -Inductionj, we conclude that ∀n ∈
ω γ (n, a1, . . . , ak). Since a1, . . . , ak were arbitrary, and since φ∀ and φ∃ are equivalent,
the result follows. 
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5. The theory ZFC + BTEE + Σ0-Inductionj
We restrict our focus in this section to ZFC + BTEE + Σ0-Inductionj in order to lay
the foundation for our results in Section 8. We begin by addressing the following question:
What can be said about the critical sequence 〈κ, j(κ), j2(κ), . . .〉 using onlyΣ0-Inductionj?
As we have seen, in the absence of Σ1-Inductionj, it is possible that jn(x) does not exist
for some n, x . We will show that Σ0-Inductionj allows us to conclude that Φ(n, x, y) is
as “close to” being a (total) class function as we need it to be for the results we wish to
prove in Section 8. Using these initial observations, we show thatΠ1-Inductionj suffices to
establish that Φ(n, x, y) and Ψ (n, β) are class functions.
In Section 3, we observed that in the canonical models ZFC + BTEE obtained from an
ω-Erdös cardinal, the critical sequence is cofinal in ON. We will see that any model of
ZFC+WA0 also has this property. However, this property does not hold in every model of
ZFC+BTEE—consider for example 〈L,∈, j〉 obtained from 0#. We show next that when
this property fails, Ψ is a class function assuming onlyΣ0-Inductionj. We first give a name
to this property in the form of an axiom:
Cofinal Axiom: ∀α ∃n ∈ ω ∃β (Ψ (n, β) ∧ α ≤ β).
Theorem 5.1. The theory ZFC + BTEE + Σ0-Inductionj + ¬Cofinal Axiom proves that
Ψ (n, y) defines a class function; that is,
∀n ∈ ω ∃!β Ψ (n, β).
Proof. We work in the theory ZFC + BTEE + Σ0-Inductionj + ¬Cofinal Axiom. The
uniqueness part follows from Theorem 4.4(1). Let α be such that
∀n ∈ ω ∀β (Ψ (n, β) 	⇒ α > β). (5.1)
It follows that
∀n ∈ ω ∀β ∀ f [Θ( f, n, κ, β) 	⇒ f ∈ αn+1]. (5.2)
Let X = α<ω. We show by Σ0-Inductionj that ∀n ∈ ω γ (n, X), where
γ (n, X) ≡ ∃ f ∈ X ∃β < α (dom f = n + 1 −→ Θ( f, n, κ, β)).
The case n = 0 is trivial. Assuming γ (n, X), let f0 ∈ αn+1 and β0 be witnesses. Let
β = j(β0) and f = f0 ∪ {(n + 1, β)}. Then Θ( f, n + 1, κ, β) holds, and f ∈ αn+2, as
required. 
We can obtain the same result without any assumption concerning the Cofinal Axiom
if we modify Ψ slightly. Recall that we say jn(x) exists or is defined just in case there is
some y for which Φ(n, x, y).
Let F denote the j-class function defined by Ψ (n, y). Define G by
G(n) =
{F(n) if jn(κ) exists
0 otherwise.
Proposition 5.2. The theory ZFC+BTEE+Σ0-Inductionj proves that G is a class function.
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Proof. The uniqueness part follows from a proof like the one used in Theorem 4.4(1). The
existence part follows because G was explicitly defined to have value 0 wherever F is
undefined. 
In the presence of the Cofinal Axiom, G is a satisfactory substitute for F because any
set x is contained in some G(n) = F(n).
Hatch’s model shows that, without Σ1-Inductionj, jn(x) may not be defined for various
n, x . The next proposition describes conditions under which jn(x) does exist, assuming
only Σ0-Inductionj. Certainly, for all standard n, jn(x) always exists. The results below
show that, whenever jn(x) exists and k is standard, then jn+k(x) exists, as do all jn(y) for
which the rank of y is at most ρ+m , where rank(x) = ρ, for some standard m. Some of
these arguments could be simplified under the additional assumption that j(α) ≥ α for all
ordinals α.
Proposition 5.3. The theory ZFC + BTEE + Σ0-Inductionj proves the following, for all
formal n ∈ ω.
(1) Suppose jn(x) exists. Then for all m ≤ n, jm(x) exists, and for each particular k ∈ ω,
jn+k(x) exists.
(2) If jn(Vα) exists, then jn(x) exists for all x ∈ Vα.
(3) Suppose jn(x) exists. Then jn(rank(x)) exists and jn(rank(x)) = rank( jn(x)).
(4) If jn(Vα) exists, then jnα exists and jn(Vα) = Vjn(α).
(5) If α is an ordinal and jn(α) exists, then jn(Vα) exists.
(6) If jn(Vα) exists, jn(V2α ) exists.
(7) If jn(x) exists, there is an ordinal α such that x ∈ Vα and jn(Vα) exists.
(8) Assume the Cofinal Axiom. Then for each set x , there is n ∈ ω such that both jn(Vκ)
and jn(Vj(κ)) exist, and x ∈ jn(Vκ). Moreover, for such n, jn(Vω) exists.
Proof of (1). If f, y are such that Θ( f, n, x, y), then, for each m < n, Θ( f m + 1,
m, x, f (m)) is true (and so jm(x) exists). For the second part, if jn(x) exists and k
is a particular natural number, clearly jk( jn(x)) must also exist (since jk is defined
everywhere). To see that jk( jn(x)) = jn+k(x), we use Σ0-Inductionj. Let g, y and h, z
be such thatΘ(g, n, x, y) andΘ(h, k, y, z). Define h′ on [n, n+ k) by h′(m) = h(m−n).
Define u on n + k by u = g ∪ h′. By Σ0-Inductionj on i ≤ k, it is easy to see that
Θ(u, n+ k, x, z) must be true (one shows that for 0 < i ≤ k, Θ(u, n+ i, x, h′(i)) must be
true). This completes the proof. 
Proof of (2). Let x ∈ Vα and assume jn(Vα) exists.
Claim. Suppose m ≤ n is such that jm(x) exists. Then jm(x) ∈ jm(Vα).
Proof of Claim. Let f, y be such that Θ( f,m, x, y), and let g, z be such that
Θ(g,m, Vα, z). We use Σ0-Bounded Inductionj to prove
∀k ≤ m f (k) ∈ g(k).
The case k = 0 is just the assertion x ∈ Vα, and is therefore true. Assume the formula holds
at k < m; then f (k) ∈ g(k). Using the definitions of f and g and the induction hypothesis,
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we have f (k + 1) = j( f (k)) ∈ j(g(k)) = g(k + 1), as required. This completes the proof
of the claim. 
Continuing the proof of (2), let δ be a limit ordinal such that jn(Vα) ∈ Vδ , and let
Y = Vδ. We use Σ0-Bounded Inductionj to prove
∀m ≤ n ∃ f, w ∈ Y Θ( f,m, x, w). (5.3)
By the Claim, proving (5.3) will complete the proof of (2), since the claim implies
that any f, w that witness the existence of jn(x) must lie in Vδ . The induction proof is
straightforward; the Claim is used in the induction step to ensure that for any function
f ∈ Y witnessing the existence of jm(x), the extension of f obtained by adding to it the
ordered pair (m + 1, j( f (m))) still lies in Y . 
Proof of (3). Let f, y be such thatΘ( f, n, x, y). Define g on n+1 by g(m) = rank( f (m)).
To complete the proof of (3), it suffices to prove the following claim:
Claim. For all m ≤ n, jm(rank(x)) exists, and g(m) = jm(rank(x)).
Proof of Claim. Let α = rank(x). Let δ > rank( jn(x)) be a limit ordinal, and let Y = Vδ .
To establish the Claim, we prove by Σ0-Bounded Inductionj that
∀m ≤ n ∃h, β ∈ Y (Θ(h,m, α, β) ∧ g(m) = h(m)).
The case m = 0 asserts that rank(x) = α, which is true. Let m < n and let h0, β0 ∈ Y be
such that Θ(h0,m, α, β0) and g(m) = h0(m). Let β = j(β0). Then
β = j(h0(m)) = j(g0(m)) = j(rank( f (m)) = rank( j( f (m)))
= rank( f (m + 1)) = g(m + 1).
This shows that β ∈ Y ; it follows that the function h = h0 ∪{(m + 1), β)} has the required
properties. This completes the induction, the proof of the claim, and the proof of (3). 
Proof of (4). By (3), since jn(Vα) exists, so does jn(α). Let f, y, g, z be such that
Θ( f, n, Vα, y) and Θ(g, n, α, z). Define h on n + 1 by
h(m) = Vg(m).
We use Σ0-Bounded Inductionj to show
∀m ≤ n f (m) = h(m).
The case m = 0 is immediate. Assuming f (m) = h(m) for m < n, we have
f (m + 1) = j( f (m)) = j(h(m)) = j(Vg(m)) = Vj(g(m))
= Vg(m+1) = h(m + 1), (5.4)
as required. 
Proof of (5). Let g, β be such that Θ(g, n, α, β). Define h on n + 1 by
h(m) = Vg(m).
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Let δ be a limit ordinal such that h ∈ Vδ. Let X = Vα and Y = Vδ. To complete the proof
of (5), we use Σ0-Bounded Inductionj to show
∀m ≤ n ∃ f, y ∈ Y (Θ( f,m, X, y) ∧ f (m) = h(m)). (5.5)
The case m = 0 is trivial. Assume (5.5) holds for m < n, with witnesses f0, y0 ∈ Y . Let
y = j(y0). Certainly j(y0) = j(h(m)), and the steps in (5.4) can be used here to verify
that j(h(m)) = h(m + 1). By the choice of δ, y ∈ Y , letting f = f0 ∪ {(m + 1, y)}, it is
clear that f ∈ Y and f (m + 1) = h(m + 1). This completes the induction and the proof
of (5). 
Proof of (6). By (3), jn(α) exists. Using an argument like the one for (5) above, one proves
that
jn(2α) exists and jn(2α) = 2jn(α).
By (5), the result follows. 
Proof of (7). Let β = rank(x). By (3), jn(β) exists. By (5), jn(Vβ) exists. By (6), jn(V2β )
exists. Now α = 2β satisfies the conclusion of part (7). 
Proof of (8). Given x , let α = rank(x). By the Cofinal Axiom, there is n ∈ ω such that
jn(κ) exists and exceeds α. It follows from (5) that jn(Vκ) exists. By (1), jn+1(Vκ) also
exists. Using the fact that j(Vκ) = Vj(κ) and Lemma 2.18, it follows that jn+1(Vκ) =
jn(Vj(κ)) (since Φ(n, j(Vκ ), y) is equivalent to Φ(n + 1, Vκ , y)). This completes the proof
of the main clause. The final clause now follows because of (2). 
We consider several corollaries to the theorem. The first is a slight modification of
Hatch’s proof that Σn-Inductionj implies Πn-Inductionj.
Corollary 5.4. The theory ZFC + BTEE + Π1-Inductionj proves that Φ(n, x, y) and
Ψ (n, β) are class functions.
Proof. It suffices to prove the result for Φ(n, x, y). Since uniqueness follows from ZFCj,
we need only prove that jn(x) is defined for every set x and n ∈ ω. We show that if this
fails for some x, N and Σ0-Inductionj holds, then an instance of Π1-Inductionj must fail.
(We include Σ0-Inductionj in the hypothesis so that we can use Proposition 5.3.)
Suppose x, N are such that jN (x) does not exist. By Proposition 5.3(1), the class
C = {n : jn(x) exists} forms an initial segment of ω. Consider the following Π1 formula:
γ (n, x, N) ≡ n ≤ N 	⇒ ¬∃y Φ(N − n, x, y).
The formula γ (n, x, N) asserts that jN−n (x) does not exist. We claim that Π1-Inductionj
fails for γ . Toward a contradiction, assumeΠ1-Inductionj holds for γ . Certainly γ (0, x, N)
holds. Also, by Proposition 5.3(1) again, γ (n, x, N) implies γ (n + 1, x, N). By Π1-
Inductionj, γ (n, x, N) holds for all n ∈ ω. Therefore, γ (N, x, N) holds; but this says
that j0(x) does not exist, which is impossible. Thus, Π1-Inductionj fails, and the result
follows. 
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Corollary 5.5. Suppose φ(x1, . . . , xk) is a Σ0 ∈-formula. Then
ZFC + BTEE + Σ0-Inductionj ∀n ≥ 1∀a1, . . . , ak
(
“jn(a1), . . . , jn(ak) exist” 	⇒
“jn preserves φ(a1, . . . , ak)”
)
.
Proof. Given a1, . . . , ak , there is some ai of largest rank; use Proposition 5.3(7) to obtain
a Vδ such that ai ∈ Vδ and jn(Vδ) exists. The rest of the proof is the same as that for
Proposition 4.9(1), except that we use the following formula for the Σ0 induction:
γ (n, a1, . . . , ak) ≡φ(a1, . . . , ak)
	⇒ ∃z1, . . . , zk ∈ X
[
z1 = jn(a1) ∧ . . . ∧ zk
= jn(ak) ∧ φ(z1, . . . , zk)
]
,
where X = jn(Vδ). (Note that the formulas zi = jn(ai ) can be expressed so that all
quantifiers are bound by X ; thus, γ is actually Σ0.) 
Corollary 5.6. Assume ZFC + BTEE + Σ0-Induction j + Cofinal Axiom. Then the
inaccessibles are unbounded in ON.
Proof. Let α be an ordinal. By the Cofinal Axiom, for some n ∈ ω, jn(κ) exists and is
greater than α. By Proposition 5.3(5), jn(Vκ) exists, and by Proposition 5.3(6), jn(Vκ+ω)
exists. Let Y = Vκ+ω. There is a formula that is Σ0 in the parameters κ,Y which asserts
that κ is inaccessible. By Corollary 5.6, jn preserves this formula. Since jn(Y ) = Vjn(κ)+ω
(by Proposition 5.3(4)), it follows by absoluteness that jn(κ) is inaccessible. Since α was
arbitrary, the result follows. 
6. The least ordinal principle
In this section, we extend the induction axioms of the previous section into the
transfinite by introducing the Least Ordinal Principlej. This axiom implies Inductionj and
follows from Separationj. We will use the Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej to prove several
lemmas that will be used in Section 8 where we study the theory ZFC + WA0.
We begin with the definition of the Least Ordinal Principlej:
Least Ordinal Principlej: For any j-formula φ(x, y) and sets a,
∃α [“α is an ordinal” ∧ φ(α, a)] 	⇒
∃α [“α is an ordinal” ∧ φ(α, a) ∧ ∀β ∈ α (¬φ(β, a))].
The axiom says that, whenever there is an ordinal that satisfies the j-formula φ, there
is a least such ordinal. The Σn-Least Ordinal Principlej (Πn-Least Ordinal Principlej) is
the Least Ordinal Principlej restricted to Σn (Πn) j-formulas. (We continue to follow our
convention of calling a formula Σn (Πn) when it may only be ΣZFCjn (Π ZFCjn ).)
We have the following easy proposition:
Proposition 6.1.
(1) The Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej implies Σ0-Inductionj.
(2) For all n ∈ ω, the Σn-Least Ordinal Principlej implies Πn-Inductionj.
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(3) The Least Ordinal Principlej implies Inductionj.
(4) For all n, Σn-Separationj implies the Σn-Least Ordinal Principlej.
Proof. Parts (1) and (3) follow from (2). To prove part (2), one argues indirectly in the usual
way, using the Least Ordinal Principlej to obtain the least natural number for which the
induction assumptions hold but the given formula fails. For (4), given aΣn formula φ(x, y)
and assuming ∃β φ(β, a) for some a, useΣn-Separationj to form the set {γ < β : φ(γ, a)}.
Now we can use ZFC to obtain the least member of this set, as required. 
We also observe that if, in the definition of the Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej, we restrict
ordinals to the finite ordinals, then this restricted version of theΣ0-Least Ordinal Principlej
is equivalent to Σ0-Inductionj.
As with Inductionj, the Least Ordinal Principlej always holds in well-founded models:
Proposition 6.2. Any well-founded model of ZFCj is also a model of the Least Ordinal
Principlej.
Proof. The proof is like that of Proposition 4.1. As in that proof, it suffices to prove
the result for transitive models M = 〈M,∈, j〉. Given a j-formula φ(x, y) such that
M |	 ∃α [“α is an ordinal” ∧ φ(α, a)], for some a1, . . . , ak ∈ M , simply obtain the
least ordinal in V for which φM holds. By transitivity of M , the result follows. 
We consider some convenient consequences of the Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej.
Lemma 6.3. ZFC + BTEE + Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej  ∀α j(α) ≥ α.
Proof. Assume that for some α we have j(α) < α. By the Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej, we
can find a least such α. But now by elementarity of j and the fact that j(α) < α, we have
j( j(α)) < j(α), which is a contradiction. 
A corollary to Lemma 6.3 and Proposition 6.2 is that if λ andM = 〈M,∈, j〉 are such
thatM is a transitive model of ZFC+BTEE, λ is the supremum ofΨ inM (see the formal
definition in Section 7), and j (λ) "= λ, then j (λ) > λ.
To establish the conclusion of Lemma 6.3, Σ0-Inductionj does not suffice: Though one
can prove from Σ0-Inductionj that, if j(α) < α, there is a j-class {α, j(α), j2(α), . . .} such
that α > j(α) > j2(α) . . ., without an additional instance of Separation for j-formulas, one
cannot prove that this class is a set to get the expected contradiction. The next proposition
shows that, relative to the existence of an ω-Erdös cardinal, “j(α) < α” is consistent with
Σ0-Inductionj. This result is a slight improvement of an observation made by the referee,
who outlined a proof of the result to the author assuming the existence of 0#.
Proposition 6.4. Con(ZFC+ “there is an ω-Erdös cardinal”) implies Con(ZFC+ BTEE
+ Σ0-Inductionj + ∃α j(α) < α).
Proof. Let M = 〈M, E〉 be a model of ZFC + “λ is an ω-Erdös cardinal” having a
nonstandard integer q . In M, there is a set I ⊂ Lλ of indiscernibles for Lλ, having
ordertype ω. Still in M, define the Skolem hull B = HLλ(I ). Let IE = {x ∈ M |M |	
x E I }. Since the integers in M are nonstandard, their ordertype in V is, as usual, that of
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N + Z · A, where (A,<) is some unbounded dense linearly ordered set of integers (see
[14, Chapter 6]); therefore this is the ordertype of IE . Write
IE = {sn : n ∈ ωV } ∪ {sξ : ξ ∈ Z · A}.
Define iE : IE → IE so that it satisfies:
iE (sn) = sn+1;
iE (sq ) < sq; and
iE is order-preserving.
Now we may define i : I → I inM by(M |	 i(x) = y) iff iE (x) = y.
Now, in M, i lifts to an elementary embedding i : B → B in the usual way. Because, in
M, i moves some of the indiscernibles (one of them downward), and because, according
toM, 〈B, E〉 is well-founded, we have
(〈B, E, i〉 |	 ZFC + BTEE + ∃α j(α) < α)M
from which it follows that
B = 〈BE ,∈, iE 〉 |	 ZFC + BTEE + ∃α j(α) < α.
We observe next that B satisfies Σ0-Inductionj as well: Suppose φ(x, y) is a Σ0 j-formula,
a are sets, and we have
B |	 ψ(0, ω, a),
where
ψ(0, ω, a) ≡ φ(0, a) ∧ ∀n ∈ ω [φ(n, a) 	⇒ φ(n + 1, a)].
In M, the model 〈B, E, i〉 also models ψ(0, ω, a). Because ψ is Σ0 and because i
is a set in M , ψ(0, ω, a) holds in M as well, and so by ordinary induction in M,
M |	 ∀n ∈ ω φ(n, a). By absoluteness again, 〈B, E, i〉 also satisfies ∀n ∈ ω φ(n, a).
It therefore follows that
B |	 ∀n ∈ ωφ(n, a),
as required. 
A corollary to Lemma 6.3 is that, in the presence of Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej, we
may restrict the schema of Elementarity to its Σ1 instances (this was pointed out to the
author by Joel Hamkins), as we now show. Let Σ1-Elementarity denote the schema of Σ1
instances of Elementarity:
Corollary 6.5. For each ∈-formula φ(x1, . . . , xk),
ZFC + Σ1-Elementarity+ Critical Point+Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej 
∀a1, . . . , ak
(
φ(a1, . . . , ak)⇐⇒ φ(j(a1, . . . , ak)
)
.
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Proof. Kanamori gives an easy induction argument in [12] showing that if aΣ1 elementary
embedding j : V → M satisfies the property
for each set x ∈ M there is a set y ∈ V such that x ⊆ j (y), (6.1)
then j is fully elementary. For this proof only, we call embeddings satisfying (6.1) cofinal
embeddings. In the present context, suppose j satisfies the hypotheses of the corollary; to
prove the result, it suffices to show that j is a cofinal embedding. For each ordinal α, we
have
a. j(Vα) = Vj(α), by Σ1 elementarity (recall that the Vα have a Π1 definition), and
b. Vα ⊆ Vj(α) by Lemma 6.3.
Thus, for any x , we can obtain y such that x ⊆ j(y) by letting y = Vα where α is greater
than rank(x). 
The next lemma says that whenever f is a witness for Φ(n, x, y) (as defined at the end
of Section 2) and x is an ordinal, then f is a nondecreasing sequence of ordinals.
Proposition 6.6. ZFC+BTEE+Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej  ∀ f, n, x, y
[
Θ( f, n, x, y)
∧ “x is an ordinal” 	⇒ “ f is a nondecreasing sequence of ordinals”].
Proof. Using Lemma 6.3, this is an immediate corollary to Proposition 2.17. 
We close this section with an application to j-inherited models (see the definition given
in Section 2).
Proposition 6.7. Assume the universe 〈V ,∈, j〉 satisfies ZFC + Elementarity +
Nontriviality + Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej. Then there is no j-inherited countable
transitive model of ZFC+ Elementarity+ Nontriviality.
Proof. Assume there is such a model 〈M,∈, i〉, where i = j  M : M → M .
There is, therefore, some x ∈ M that is moved by i and hence by j . Apply the Σ0-
Least Ordinal Principlej on the formula γ defined by
γ (α) ≡ ∃x ∈ M ( j(x) "= x ∧ α = rank(x)). (6.2)
to obtain a least α for which γ (α) holds. Let x be such that rank(x) = α. Since α is
countable, i(α) = j(α) = α. Thus, by elementarity, rank(x) = rank(i(x)) = rank( j(x)).
By Proposition 2.5, we have a contradiction. 
The Least Ordinal Principlej allows us to carry out arguments by transfinite induction.
However, in extensions of ZFC + BTEE + Cofinal Axiom, we cannot prove the
corresponding definition-by-transfinite-recursion theorem—if we could, we would be able
to define a class sequence like this:
x0 = κ
xα+1 = j(xα)
xλ = sup{xα : α < λ} (λ a limit).
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Of course, the Cofinal Axiom prevents such a sequence from being well-defined. The
problem is that the proof of the definition-by-recursion theorem makes essential use of
Replacement at limit stages; however, as we shall prove in Section 10, very little of
Replacement for j-formulas is consistent with the theory ZFC + BTEE + Cofinal Axiom.
Thus, we must abide by the following guideline:
The method of definition by transfinite recursion is not allowed. (6.3)
Exceptions to this rule have to be established on a case-by-case basis.
7. The cofinal axiom and inconsistency
In this section, we will isolate axioms that will lead to the Kunen inconsistency. As we
remarked in the Introduction, the two most familiar embeddings of a model of set theory
to itself are given by an I3 embedding j : Vλ → Vλ and an embedding j : L → L.
In the first case, the critical sequence is cofinal in the ordinals; in the second case, the
critical sequence is bounded. These examples suggest a dichotomy, marked by the notion
of the cofinality of the critical sequence. An ω + ω-Erdös cardinal suffices to build
a transitive model of Cofinal Axiom as well as of ¬Cofinal Axiom. Therefore, in this
section, we seek a minimal set of axioms necessary to produce an inconsistent extension
of ZFC + BTEE + Cofinal Axiom, and another minimal set of axioms that will yield an
inconsistent extension of ZFC + BTEE +¬Cofinal Axiom.
Two general themes that will start to become apparent in this section are:
(1) Inconsistency of a set of axioms about j (even “natural” axioms) is not always due to
the fact that the large cardinal strength has become “too big”.
(2) If we wish to consider statements of the form “there is an elementary embedding
M → M having certain properties” as a hierarchy of statements having ever
greater consistency strengths, like large cardinals, then the direction toward greater
consistency strength lies in adding instances of Separationj but not instances of
Replacement for j-formulas.
We begin with the observation that, under mild hypotheses, models of Cofinal Axiom
and of ¬Cofinal Axiom can be constructed:
Proposition 7.1. Assume there is an ω + ω-Erdös cardinal. Then there are transitive
models of both ZFC+BTEE+Induction j +Cofinal Axiom and ZFC+BTEE+Induction j
+¬Cofinal Axiom.
Proof. For Cofinal Axiom, we simply observe that our standard construction of a transitive
model of ZFC + BTEE also satisfies Cofinal Axiom, and by transitivity, Inductionj holds
as well. (This construction required only an ω-Erdös cardinal.) To obtain a model of
¬Cofinal Axiom, recall that from an ω+ω-Erdös cardinal λ, we can obtain a set I ⊆ λ of
indiscernibles of type ω + ω with the property that the ωth indiscernible is the supremum
of the previous indiscernibles. We can take the transitive collapse of the Skolem hull of I
in Lλ; the resulting model must be some Lα generated by a set J ⊆ α of indiscernibles
isomorphic to I . Enumerate J by J = {βξ : ξ < ω + ω}. Define f : J → J so that
f (βn) = βn+1 for each n ∈ ω. Extend f to an elementary embedding j : Lα → Lα in
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the usual way. Clearly, 〈Lα,∈, j〉 |	 ZFC + BTEE + Induction j (see arguments of this
kind in Section 3). Since the critical sequence of j is 〈βn : n ∈ ω〉 and is bounded in Lα ,
¬Cofinal Axiom must also hold in the model, as required. 
A low-complexity instance of Replacement for j-formulas suffices to push the theory
ZFC + BTEE + Cofinal Axiom to inconsistency. We start by defining the axiom schema
Replacement j as follows:
Replacement j : For each j-formula ψ(x, y, u),
∀A ∀a (∀x ∈ A ∃!y ψ(x, y, a) 	⇒ ∃Y ∀z [z ∈ Y ⇐⇒ (∃x ∈ A ψ(x, z, a))]). (7.1)
We letΣn-Replacement j (Πn-Replacement j ) denote the restriction of the Replacement j
schema toΣn (Πn) j-formulasψ . We define the Critical Instance (CI) of Replacement j that
leads to inconsistency as follows:
Critical Instance (CI):
∀n ∈ ω ∃!y Ψ (n, y) 	⇒ ∃Y ∀z [z ∈ Y ⇐⇒ (∃n ∈ ωΨ (n, z))],
where Ψ is defined as in (2.9).
Clearly, CI is a Σ1 instance of Replacementj. In order for CI to be potent at all, each
jn(κ) must exist; otherwise CI is vacuously true. Existence of each jn(κ) can be established
with either Σ1-Inductionj (Proposition 4.4) or Π1-Inductionj (Corollary 5.4). Therefore,
we have:
Proposition 7.2. The following theories are inconsistent:
(1) ZFC + BTEE + Σ1-Inductionj + Cofinal Axiom+ CI
(2) ZFC + BTEE + Π1-Inductionj + Cofinal Axiom+ CI.
Proof. We prove (1) and (2) simultaneously. Use either Σ1-Inductionj or Π1-Inductionj to
establish that Ψ is a class function. Therefore, by CI, the critical sequence is a set, and
therefore has a supremum, and this contradicts the Cofinal Axiom. 
Corollary 7.3. There is no transitive model of ZFC + BTEE + Cofinal Axiom+ CI. 
Proposition 7.2 is, in an obvious sense, trivial: of course the critical sequence cannot
be simultaneously bounded (because of CI) and unbounded (by Cofinal Axiom) in
the ordinals. The significance of the proposition, though, is that the axioms CI and
Cofinal Axiom arise in different ways—CI from Replacementj, Cofinal Axiom from
Separationj. Recall from [4] that we denote BTEE + Separationj by WA; as we showed
there, ZFC + WA is not inconsistent (since 〈Vλ,∈, j〉 is a model whenever j : Vλ → Vλ
is an I3 embedding); however, adding this single instance of Replacementj—CI—does
render the theory inconsistent. The proposition shows that the inconsistency that we find in
ZFC+WA+ CI is already present in ZFC+ BTEE+ CI together with two consequences
of Separationj: Σ1-Inductionj and Cofinal Axiom. Indeed, the set {Σ1-Inductionj,CI} is in
a sense a minimal set of axioms that can be added to ZFC + BTEE + Cofinal Axiom to
obtain inconsistency because each of the theories ZFC+ BTEE+ Cofinal Axiom+¬Σ1-
Inductionj + CI (Hatch’s model), ZFC + BTEE+ Cofinal Axiom+ Inductionj (canonical
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indiscernible models from Section 3), and ZFC + BTEE + Inductionj + CI (the modelN
in Proposition 7.6) is consistent.
Notice that the inconsistency we obtain in Proposition 7.2 does not, in this case, require
Kunen’s argument (though, as we will see in the next section, his argument is used to
prove Cofinal Axiom from Separationj). Here, the difficulty lies in the combination of the
fact that the critical sequence is cofinal and, at the same time, it is required to satisfy an
instance of Replacementj. A familiar corollary is the fact that the critical sequence of an I3
embedding j : Vλ → Vλ must not be weakly definable in Vλ (see Section 1).
Inconsistency in this case does not arise because we have combined very strong axioms
of infinity. As we observed above, the theory ZFC+BTEE+Inductionj+Cofinal Axiom is
quite weak. Similarly, the consistency of a measurable cardinal suffices for the consistency
of ZFC+ BTEE + Inductionj + CI, as Example 7.6 below shows.
We turn now to extensions of the theory ZFC+BTEE+¬Cofinal Axiom. The statement
¬Cofinal Axiom asserts that the critical sequence has an upper bound; in the discussion
below (in this section only), the Greek letter λ will signify such an upper bound. (Thus,
for example, the statement “j λ is a set” is short for “whenever jn(κ) exists, jn(κ) < λ,
and j  λ is a set”.) We consider now several statements related to ¬Cofinal Axiom and the
relationships between them. The discussion will bring to light several interesting examples
of models of ZFC + BTEE + ¬Cofinal Axiom. We will conclude with the promised
inconsistency result for this theory.
We introduce the following terminology, so that we can talk about the “supremum” of
the critical sequence even when it may not be totally defined, or not a set. An ordinal δ is
said to be the supremum of Ψ if the following is true:
∀n ∈ ω∀β [Ψ (n, β) 	⇒ β < δ] ∧
∀δ′
[(∀n ∈ ω∀β [Ψ (n, β) 	⇒ β < δ′]) 	⇒ δ ≤ δ′
]
.
Consider the following statements:
(A) jn(κ) exists for every n ∈ ω
(B) if δ is the supremum of Ψ , j(δ) = δ
(C) ¬Cofinal Axiom
(D) Ψ has a supremum
(E) the (range of the) critical sequence is a set
(F) j λ is a set
(G) j′′(λ) is a set.
Proposition 7.4. The theory ZFC + BTEE proves the following:
(1) (C) + Σ0-Inductionj ⇒ (A).
(2) (D) ⇒ (C).
(3) (C) + Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej ⇒ (D).
(4) (E) ⇒ (B) ∧ (D).
(5) (F) ⇒ (E).
(6) (F) ⇔ (G).
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Proof. (1) was proved in Proposition 5.1, and (2) is obvious. For (3), let λ be an upper
bound for the critical sequence, given by ¬Cofinal Axiom, and let A = λ<ω, the set of
finite sequences n → λ, n ∈ ω. Then the following holds:
∀n ∈ ω∀ f ∈ A (dom f = n + 1 −→ ∃β < λΘ( f, n, κ, β)).
ByΣ0-Least Ordinal Principlej, there is a least such λ; clearly, this least λ is the supremum
of Ψ . For (4), (E) ⇒ (B) is obvious. For the other implication, assume the critical
sequence z : ω → δ is a set with supremum δ. Then j(δ) = sup(ran ( j(z))). For
each n, j(z)(n) = j(z(n)). From Proposition 2.19, we may conclude that for each n,
j(z(n)) = z(n+1). It follows that sup(ran ( j(z))) = sup(ran (z)) = δ, as required. For (5),
let g = j  λ. Then using just ZFC, we may form the set {κ, g(κ), g2(κ), . . . , gn(κ), . . .}, as
required. For (6), note that j′′(λ) is the range of j  λ, and j  λ is the increasing enumeration
of j′′λ. 
None of the implications here is reversible (unless otherwise indicated, as in part (6)).
In particular, the example given in Proposition 6.4 shows that Σ0-Inductionj + (C) "⇒ (D).
Example 7.5 shows (D) "⇒ (B). The modelM of Example 7.6 below shows (B) ∧ (D) "⇒
(E), whereas the modelN of Example 7.6 shows (E) "⇒ (F).
Example 7.5. A model of ZFC+BTEE+Least Ordinal Principlej+“Ψ has supremum λ”
+ j(λ) "= λ, from an ω + ω-Erdös cardinal. For the example, assume there is an
ω + ω-Erdös cardinal δ. Let I = {αξ : ξ < ω + ω} ⊆ δ be a set of indiscernibles
for Lδ of ordertype ω + ω satisfying the conclusion of Corollary 3.4(2)—in particular,
αω = sup{αn : n ∈ ω}. Let B = HLδ (I ). Let f : I → I be any order-preserving function
such that f (αξ ) = αξ+1 whenever ξ ≤ ω, and lift f to i : B → B in the usual way.
As usual, the transitive collapse of B must be an Lβ , and the collapsing map π induces
an elementary embedding j : Lβ → Lβ . Let J = π ′′ I = {βξ : ξ < ω + ω}. Clearly,
〈Lβ,∈, j〉 |	 ZFC + BTEE + Induction j . Let λ = sup{βn : n ∈ ω} = βω. By definition
of f , j (λ) > λ. Since 〈βn : n ∈ ω〉 is the critical sequence of j , we have shown that
〈Lβ,∈, j〉 has all the required properties. 
The next example was discovered by Joel Hamkins, who communicated it to the author.
With his permission, we present his results here.
Example 7.6 (Hamkins). Assuming a measurable cardinal, there are models M and
N with
(1) M |	 ZFC + BTEE + Least Ordinal Principlej + “Ψ has a supremum λ” + j(λ) =
λ+ “the critical sequence is not a set”.
(2) N |	 ZFC + BTEE + Least Ordinal Principlej + “the critical sequence is a set” +
∀λ (“λ bounds the critical sequence” −→ ¬∃z (z = j λ)).
Proof. We start with a measurable cardinal κ and a normal measure U on κ . M = 〈M,
∈, j〉 will be an embedding of an iterated ultrapower, and N = 〈M[S],∈, jˆ 〉 will be
obtained from M by adding a Prikry-generic sequence S, and lifting j to M[S]. Since
both models will be transitive, both will satisfy Least Ordinal Principlej.
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For the first model, let M0 = V and let
M0
i01−→ M1 i12−→ M2 → . . .→ Mn in,n+1−→ Mn+1 → . . .→ Mω
be the usual sequence of ultrapowers defined by U , where Mn = Ult(n)(U) is the (transitive
collapse of the) nth ultrapower, in,n+1 = iUn,n+1 is the canonical embedding by i0,n(U), and
Mω = limdirn∈ω {Mn; iUm,n | 0 ≤ m ≤ n}, (7.2)
where iUm,n is the composition in−1,n ◦ . . .◦ im,m+1. For each n ≤ ω, let in = i0,n , κ(0) = κ ,
κ(n) = in(κ), and U (n) = in(U). The following facts are well-known (see [10]):
〈κ(n) : n ≤ ω〉 is increasing and continuous. (7.3)
Also, for all X ∈ Mω for which X ⊆ κ(ω),
X ∈ U (ω) iff ∃n ∈ ω (X ⊇ {κ(k) : n ≤ k < ω}). (7.4)
It is straightforward to verify that i2 = i1 · i1 (where · is application of embeddings),
and in general in+1 = i1 · in . It follows that, for each n < ω,
cp(in+1) = i n1 (κ) = in(κ), (7.5)
where i n1 is the nth iterate of i1 under composition.
The following is a commutative diagram of elementary embeddings:
V iω ✲ Mω
i1
❄ ❄
i1 Mω
M1 i1·iω ✲ i1(Mω)
We observe that, in the diagram, i1(Mω) = Mω: If we apply i1 to (7.2), we obtain
i1(Mω) = limdirn≥1{Ult(n)(U); iUm,n | 1 ≤ m ≤ n}
= Mω.
We let j = i1  Mω : Mω → Mω. Let M = 〈Mω,∈, j〉. Since j is elementary
with critical point κ , it follows that M |	 ZFC + BTEE. By (7.5), for each n ∈ ω,
j n(κ) = κ(n). Thus, the critical sequence for j is 〈κ(0), κ(1), . . . , κ(n), . . .〉. Since, in
V , sup{κ(n) : n ∈ ω} = κ(ω), it follows that M |	 “Ψ has a supremum”. Because
{κ(n) : n ∈ ω} is a set in V , the argument in Proposition 7.4(4) can be used to show
j (κω) = κω. We have proven all the desired properties of M, except for the fact that the
critical sequence is not a set; we prove this in the context of describing the properties of
the modelN .
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For the modelN , note that, in Mω , κ(ω) = i0,ω(κ) is a measurable cardinal and U (ω) is
a normal measure on κ(ω). Therefore, in Mω , we let P denote Prikry forcing with respect
to κ(ω) and U (ω):
P = {(s, A) | s ∈ [κ(ω)]<ω and A ∈ U (ω)}
(t, B) ≤ (s, A) iff s is an initial segment of t , B ⊇ A, and t − s ⊂ A.
Recall (see [10, Theorem 21.14]) that for sets S ⊂ κ(ω) (in V ) of ordertype ω,
S is P-generic over Mω iff for every X ∈ U (ω), S − X is finite. (7.6)
Moreover, given P-generic G, the set S = SG = ⋃{s : (s, A) ∈ G} is also P-
generic; given a generic S ⊂ κ(ω) of ordertype ω, the set G = GS = {(s, A) ∈ P |
s is an initial segment of S and S − s ⊂ A} is generic. In both cases, Mω[G] = Mω[S]. In
particular, it is well-known (see [10, Theorem 21.15]) that if S is the critical sequence of
j , S = {κ(n) : n ∈ ω}, then S is P-generic over Mω . But this means that S "∈ Mω , and so
we have established the final property of the modelM.
Let
S′ = i1(S) = {κ(n) : n ≥ 1}.
By (7.6), S′ is P-generic over Mω . Let G′ = GS ′ . Using (7.4), one shows that j (U (ω)) =
U (ω). Therefore, A ∈ U (ω) iff j (A) ∈ U (ω), so
if S − s ⊂ A, then S′ − j (s) ⊂ j (A). (7.7)
It follows that
p = (s, A) ∈ G 	⇒ j (p) = ( j (s), j (A)) ∈ G′.
Thus, defining jˆ : Mω[G] → Mω[G′] by
jˆ(σG) = ( j (σ ))G ′
yields a well-defined elementary embedding. But since M[G] = M[S] = M[S′] = M[G′],
we have that jˆ : M[G] → M[G]. It follows that
〈M[S],∈, jˆ 〉 |	 ZFC+ BTEE + “the critical sequence is a set”.
Let N = 〈M[S],∈, jˆ 〉. Since Inductionj holds in the model and the critical sequence is a
set,N satisfies CI in a nontrivial way.
Finally, we observe that, in N , if λ bounds the critical sequence, then j  λ is not a set.
This follows by Proposition 7.7; indeed, adding the axiom “j λ is a set” to Th(N ) would
render the theory inconsistent. 
We conclude by showing that any extension of ZFC + BTEE + ¬Cofinal Axiom
that includes the assertion that j λ is a set, where λ bounds the critical sequence, is
inconsistent. The set {∃z (z = j λ)} is minimal among sets of axioms that render
ZFC+BTEE+¬Cofinal Axiom inconsistent in a couple of ways. First, replacing ∃z (z =
j λ) with any of the sentences (A)–(E) above yields a consistent theory, as the model
N from the previous example shows. Secondly, as we show in Proposition 9.11, for each
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particular n, the theory ZFC+BTEE+¬Cofinal Axiom+(∃z (z = j  jn(κ))) is consistent
(relative to an n + 2-huge cardinal).
Proposition 7.7. The following theory is inconsistent:
ZFC + BTEE +¬Cofinal Axiom+ ∃z (z = j λ),
where λ is any bound for the critical sequence.
Proof. Since j λ is a set, we know by Proposition 7.4 that the critical sequence is a set, it
has a supremum δ, j(δ) = δ, and there is a set H = j′′δ (since j  δ must also be a set). Note
that δ is a strong limit cardinal of cofinality ω. As in Kunen’s proof, let F : ωδ → δ ∈ Vδ+2
be an ω-Jonsson function (that is, F has the property that for all A ∈ [δ]δ, F ′′(ωA) = δ).
Since j(F) is also such a function, we have j(F)′′(ωH ) = δ, leading to the contradiction
that, for some s : ω → H ,
κ = j(F)(s)
= j(F)( j(t)) for some t : ω → δ
= j(F(t)). 
As we will show in Section 9, any axiom of the form “∃z (z = j α)”, where α ≥ κ+
has significant large cardinal strength—at least that of a strong cardinal. In the presence
of ¬Cofinal Axiom, such an axiom leads to inconsistency, as we have just seen, when α is
large enough. But when added to extensions of ZFC + BTEE + Cofinal Axiom, no such
inconsistency arises, though the consistency strength of the theory grows tremendously. In
the next section, we study the theory ZFC + BTEE + Cofinal Axiom + ∀α ∃z (z = j α)
and show that such a theory is strong enough to prove the existence of all known large
cardinals having consistency strength below an I3 embedding.
8. Separation axioms and amenability
In the last section, we showed that in the presence of ¬Cofinal Axiom, a statement of
the form ∃z (z = j λ) leads to inconsistency, and we mentioned that an axiom of this
kind (where λ ≥ κ+), always has significant large cardinal consequences. This section
is dedicated to investigating the theory ZFC + BTEE + ∀x∃z (z = j  x); one expects
much stronger large cardinal consequences from such a theory. The new axiom is called
Amenabilityj:
Amenabilityj: For every set x , there is a set z such that z = j  x .
As we will show, Amenabilityj is a consequence of ZFC + WA (recall the definition
of WA and WAn from Section 1; more details are given below). We study this apparent
weakening of WA here as part of one of the paper’s themes, to see to what extent axioms
of the type “there exists an elementary embedding from M to M having certain properties”
can be viewed as a hierarchy of assertions that are parallel to the hierarchy of large
cardinal axioms. So far, in this paper, none of the models or theories we have considered
have had consistency strength beyond a measurable cardinal. We will see in this section
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that the theory ZFC + BTEE + Amenabilityj has consistency strength beyond a super-n-
huge cardinal. In the subsequent section, we will explore axioms that produce consistency
strengths somewhere between these two.
Another reason for studying this axiom in some detail is to verify a conjecture shared
by the author and Hamkins, which arose during the writing of [9]: That paper began
as an attempt to improve the hypotheses of a consistency result obtained in [3]; in the
latter it was shown that, assuming an I1 embedding, V = HOD is consistent with
ZFC + WA. Seeking to weaken the I1 hypothesis, Hamkins eventually established the
relative consistency result for Amenabilityj rather than WA: If ZFC + WA0 is consistent,
so is ZFC + WA0 + V = HOD. The conjecture in this case was that this weaker theory
ZFC + WA0 is almost as strong as ZFC + WA. In this section, we verify the conjecture
by showing that all large cardinal consequences that are known for ZFC + WA are also
consequences of ZFC+ WA0.
We begin by setting up notation and giving the necessary definitions. In general, we
recall from Section 1 that for each n ∈ ω, we denote the Σn-Separation axioms Σn-
Separation j , and we denote full separation by Separation j . Recall that WA = BTEE +
Separation j and WAn = BTEE + Σn-Separation j .
We recall from Section 2 that an instance of Separationj is a formula
∀A ∀a ∃z ∀u [u ∈ z ←→ u ∈ A ∧ φ(u, A, a)],
where φ is a j-formula. When φ is Σn (Πn), we call this instance an instance of Σn-
Separationj (Πn-Separationj). Given a (Σn , Πn) j-formula φ and sets A, a, we may also
refer to the formula
∃z ∀u [u ∈ z ←→ u ∈ A ∧ φ(u, A, a)]
as a (Σn , Πn) instance of Separationj. We continue to follow our convention of calling a
formula Σn (Πn) when it may only be ΣZFCjn (Π ZFCjn ).
We now show the connection between Separationj and Amenabilityj. This observation
is mentioned in [9]. Enayat points out that a result of this kind is known in a much broader
context. We need the following easy lemma:
Lemma 8.1. For each particular (metatheoretic) natural number n ≥ 1,
ZFC + BTEE + Amenabilityj  ∀x ∃z (z = jn  x).
Proof. Proceed by induction on n ≥ 1 in the metatheory. The case n = 1 follows from
Amenabilityj. Assume the proposition holds for n ≥ 1. By our definition of j-terms (see
the beginning of Section 2), jn+1 = j ◦ jn . Let x be a set. Since jn  x is a set, it has a range
y, and certainly j  y is a set by Amenabilityj. Let
f = ( j  y) ◦ ( jn  x).
The fact that f is a set follows from ZFCj. Clearly, f (u) = jn+1(u) for all u ∈ x , and the
result follows. 
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Theorem 8.2 ([9]). The theory ZFC+ BTEE proves
Amenabilityj 	⇒ Σ0-Separation j .
Proof. Suppose φ(x, u) is a Σ0 formula. The idea is this: Given a set A, replace
occurrences of j in φ with the restrictions j Vδ , where δ is large enough; by Amenabilityj,
each such restriction is a set; by ordinary Separation, the subclass of A defined by φ must
be a set. Here are the details:
Let ρ(z, w) be the j-formula asserting that z = j Vw. Let γ (z, w) say that “z is a
function with domain Vw”. Let θ(x, u, z) be the ∈-formula obtained from φ by replacing
each occurrence of j with4 the variable z. Let
σ(x, u, w) ≡ ∃z (ρ(z, w) ∧ γ (z, w) ∧ θ(x, u, z)).
Note the σ says that z plays the role of j  Vw in φ. Let a be a finite sequence of parameters.
Let m denote the number of occurrences of j in φ. Amenabilityj implies that
∀β > rank(a) ∀x ∈ Vβ ∀δ
[
δ = jm+1(β) 	⇒ [φ(x, a)⇐⇒ σ(x, a, δ)]
]
. (8.1)
(The proof of this equivalence is straightforward: One first proves it when φ is an atomic
formula composed of j-terms; one then proceeds by induction on the complexity of φ,
establishing the result for quantifier-free formulas and then all bounded formulas. In every
case, one shows that δ is large enough so that the witness to σ can play the role of j.)
Notice that ZFC proves that for any A, a, f, δ,
∃X ∀x [x ∈ X ⇐⇒ x ∈ A ∧ γ ( f, δ) ∧ θ(x, a, f )]. (8.2)
We now work in ZFC + BTEE + Amenabilityj. Given A, a, let β > rank({A, a}) and let
δ = jm+1(β). There is a set f = j  Vδ. It therefore follows from (8.2) that
∃X ∀x [x ∈ X ⇐⇒ x ∈ A ∧ γ ( f, δ) ∧ θ(x, a, f ) ∧ ρ( f, δ)],
and so
∃X ∀x [x ∈ X ⇐⇒ x ∈ A ∧ σ(x, a, γ )]. (8.3)
Combining, (8.1) and (8.3),
∃X ∀x (x ∈ X ⇐⇒ x ∈ A ∧ φ(x, a)).
In particular, {x ∈ A : φ(x, a)} is a set. 
By the theorem, we may now establish consequences of the theory ZFC + BTEE +
Amenabilityj by working instead in the theory ZFC + WA0. We begin by showing that
WA0 suffices to prove the Cofinal Axiom. We start with an important lemma:
4 More precisely, each occurrence of a j-term jm(v0) is replaced with an appropriate variation of∃vm ηm(v0, vm , z) where ηm(v0, vm , z) ≡ ∃v1 . . . vm−1 [(v0, v1) ∈ z ∧ (v1, v2) ∈ z ∧ . . . ∧ (vm−1, vm) ∈ z].
Thus, for example, an atomic formula such as x ∈ jm (v0) would be replaced by ∃vm (ηm(v0, vm , z) ∧ x ∈ vm).
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Proposition 8.3. ZFC + WA0  ∀α ∃z1, z2 (z1 = j′′α ∧ z2 = j α).
Proof. j′′α is a Σ0 definable subset of j(α):
j′′α = {γ ∈ j(α) : ∃β ∈ α (γ = j(β)}.
Also, j α is a Σ0 definable subset of α × j′′α: Let z1 = j′′α. Then
j α = {(γ, β) ∈ α × z1 : j(γ ) = β}. 
Proposition 8.4. ZFC + WA0  Cofinal Axiom.
Proof. If this fails, there is a model of ZFC + WA0 + ¬Cofinal Axiom; in particular, for
some λ that bounds the critical sequence, the sentence ∃z (z = j λ) holds in the model.
But Proposition 7.7 shows that this is impossible. 
Corollary 8.5. Any well-founded model of ZFC+ WA0 satisfies the following:
(1) 〈κ, j(κ), j2(κ), . . .〉 is cofinal in ON.
(2) V =⋃n∈ω Vj n(κ).
Proof. We can represent Ψ (n, β) as the class sequence 〈κ, j (κ), . . .〉 because Inductionj
holds in such models. Now both parts follow from Proposition 8.4. 
Note that in Corollary 8.5, jn(κ) exists for every n because the model is well-founded.
We now start working toward a proof that
Vκ ≺ Vj(κ) ≺ Vj2(κ) ≺ . . . ≺ V
assuming WA0. Since we do not have Σ1-Inductionj, we may not assume that Ψ or Φ are
class functions, and have to take account of the possibility that jn(x) may not be defined
for certain n and x . We recall our terminology from Section 2: we say that jn(x) exists or
is defined if ∃y Φ(n, x, y).
We observe here that if M = 〈M, E, j〉 is a model of ZFC + BTEE + Amenabilityj
with a nonstandard membership relation, Amenabilityj does not say that j  x ∈ M for
each x ∈ M; this is because the restriction operator is not absolute in this case. Of course,
what the axiom does guarantee is that, for each x ∈ M ,
∃i ∈ M [i = ( j  x)M]. (8.4)
Lemma 8.6.
(1) ZFC + WA0  ∀n ≥ 1 ∀x
(
“jn(x) exists” 	⇒ ∃z (z = jn  x)). In particular,
ZFC + BTEE  Σ0-Separationj ⇐⇒ Amenabilityj.
(2) ZFC + WA0  ∀n ≥ 1 ∀M
(
“jn(M) exists” 	⇒ “jn  M : M → jn(M) is an
elementary embedding”
)
.
(3) ZFC + WA0  ∀n ≥ 1 jn  Vκ = idVκ .
Proof of (1). One direction was proved in Theorem 8.2. For the other direction, first notice
that j  x is Σ0-definable from x × j(x) and is therefore a set:
j  x = {(r, s) ∈ x × j(x) : r ∈ x ∧ j(r) = s}.
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Assume the result fails for some n ∈ ω and some x ; by Proposition 5.3(4), we may
assume x = Vα for some α. By Proposition 5.3(3) jn(α) exists. Let δ > jn(α) and let
X = Vδ . We have the following:
∀z ∈ X ∃y ∈ X ¬
[
y ∈ z ⇐⇒ (“y is an ordered pair”∧
(y)0 ∈ X ∧ ∃ f ∈ X Θ( f, n, (y)0, (y)1)
)]
.
(8.5)
Since (8.5) is Σ0, we can use the Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej to obtain the least n for
which the formula holds. Notice that for this least n, the fact that there is no z ∈ Vδ for
which z = jn  Vα implies that there is no such z at all since any such restriction would
have to lie in Vδ . By Proposition 5.3(1), (2), jm(Vα) exists for all m < n, and jm(u) exists
for all m ≤ n and u ∈ Vα.
Because Amenabilityj holds, we have that n > 1. Again by Amenabilityj, j  Vjn−1(α) is
a set. Because of the leastness of n, jn−1  Vα is also a set. We therefore have the following
equation, which demonstrates that jn  Vα is a set as well:
jn  Vα = j  Vjn−1(α) ◦ jn−1  Vα.
By our orginal assumption, this is impossible. Therefore, the theorem is proven. 
Proof of (2). We first obtain the result for the case n = 1. Work in ZFC + WA0. Let M
be a set; by (1), i = j  M is also a set. We show i : 〈M,∈〉 → 〈 j(M),∈〉 is, formally, an
elementary embedding. Suppose p is a formal ∈-formula in Vω. Let b : rank(p) → M .
Then j(p) = p and j(b) : rank(p)→ j(M). By elementarity of j, we have
Sat(p, M, b) ⇐⇒ Sat(p, j(M), j(b)),
as required.
For general n, we will apply the Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej to a formula that asserts
that jn is not elementary, and arrive at a contradiction. We begin with a formula that
makes this assertion, but that is not Σ0. Then, by binding all quantified variables to a
large enough set, we will devise an equivalent formula that is Σ0, and then apply Σ0-
Least Ordinal Principlej.
Let Fmla∈ ⊂ Vω denote the set of all formal formulas (formulas coded as sets in one of
the standard ways; see [6]). Consider the following formula:
γˆ (n, M) ≡ ∃p ∈ Fmla∈ ∃b ∈ rank(p)M
([
Sat(p, M, b) ∧ ¬Sat(p, jn(M), jn(b))]∨
[¬Sat(p, M, b) ∧ Sat(p, jn(M), jn(b)]).
The formula γˆ (n, M) says that jn  M is not, formally, an elementary embedding. Note
that jn(Vω) is defined (and hence jn  Vω can be applied to p). We observe also that jn(b)
is defined for any b : rank(p) → M . This follows because, by Proposition 5.3(4), (7), we
can find a limit ordinal δ such that M ∈ Vδ and jn(Vδ) exists; but any such b must lie
in Vδ. Also, in order for the formula Sat(p, jn(M), jn(b)) to make sense, jn(b) must be a
function rank(p) → jn(M). By Proposition 5.5, Σ0-Inductionj (whence WA0) suffices to
establish that jn is Σ0-elementary (relative to parameters at which it is defined). Therefore
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jn(p) = p and jn(m) = m for all m ∈ ω. It follows that rank(p) = rank( jn(p)). Thus, by
Σ0-elementarity again, jn(b) : rank(p)→ jn(M).
Assume now that there is an n ∈ ω for which γˆ (n, M) is true. By (1), jn  M is a set.
By Corollary 5.6, we can find δ > rank({jn  M, jn(ωM)}) such that δ is inaccessible. Let
X = Vδ . Since Sat is ∆ZF1 , we can obtain ∆0 formulas φ(x, u, v,w) and ψ(y, u, v,w)
such that
ZF  ∀u, v,w(∃x φ(x, u, v,w) ⇐⇒ Sat(u, v,w)), (8.6)
and
ZF  ∀u, v,w(∀y ψ(y, u, v,w) ⇐⇒ Sat(u, v,w)). (8.7)
Let h : Fmla∈ → ω be defined by h(x) = rank(x). Let A = jn(M). With these constants,
we can bound all necessary variables by X and transform γ (n, M) into the following
equivalentΣ0 formula γ (n, M, X, h, A):
∃p, b, c, f ∈ X
(
p ∈ Fmla∈ ∧ “b is a function” ∧ dom (b) = h(p) ∧ Θ( f, n, b, c)∧([∃x ∈ X φ(x, p, M, b) ∧ ∃y ∈ X¬ψ(y, p, A, c)]∨[∃y ∈ X¬ψ(y, p, M, b) ∧ ∃x ∈ X φ(x, p, A, c)])).
The Σ0 j-formulaΘ( f, n, x, y), which asserts that jn(x) = y with witness f , is defined in
Section 2. Note that c = jn(b), A = jn(M). Since∆ZF1 formulas are absolute for transitive
models of ZFC and 〈X,∈〉 is such a model, it follows from (8.6) and (8.7) that, for the given
choices of n, X, h, A, γˆ (n, M) is equivalent (in ZFCj) to theΣ0 formula γ (n, M, X, h, A).
By the Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej, we can find a least k ≤ n for which
γ (k, M, X, h, A) is true. For this choice of k, γˆ (k, M) holds. Note that k > 1 since we
have already established the n = 1 case. Let p ∈ Fmla∈ and b ∈ rank(p)M be witnesses for
γˆ (k, M). By the leastness of k, we have
Sat(p, M, b)⇐⇒ Sat(p, jk−1(M), jk−1(b)). (8.8)
By elementarity of j we have, as before, j(p) = p and jk(b) : rank(p)→ jk(M); applying
j to the formula Sat(p, K , L), with K = jk−1(M) and L = jk−1 yields:
Sat(p, jk−1(M), jk−1(b))⇐⇒ Sat(p, jk(M), jk(b)). (8.9)
Combining (8.8) and (8.9) yields
Sat(p, M, b)⇐⇒ Sat(p, jk(M), jk(b)),
and this contradicts γˆ (k, M). This completes the proof. 
Proof of (3). We first prove the result for n = 1. Let M = Vκ . Consider the following Σ0
formula:
γ (α) ≡ ∃x ∈ M ( j(x) "= x ∧ (α = rank(x))M). (8.10)
We have relativized the formula “α = rank(x)” to M in order to ensure that γ isΣ0. Notice
that if there is an x ∈ M for which j(x) "= x , its rank must lie in M . Therefore, if γ ′(α)
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is the formula obtained by replacing the subformula “(α = rank(x))M ” with the formula
“α = rank(x)”, then for all α, γ ′(α) ⇒ γ (α).
Applying the Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej to γ , we obtain the least α for which γ (α)
holds. Let x be such that rank(x) = α. By elementarity, rank(x) = rank( j(x)). By
Proposition 2.5, we have a contradiction.
For general n, an easy Σ0-Inductionj on the following Σ0 formula
ρ(n) : ∀x ∈ M (jn(x) = x)
(recalling M = Vκ ) establishes the result. It is not immediately obvious that “jn(x) = x”
is equivalent to a Σ0 formula. Certainly, this formula is equivalent to ∃ f Θ( f, n, x, x). But
in the present context, the existential quantifier can be bound by Vκ , making it Σ0. (The
referee points out that this step may also be proved by observing that Θ( fx , n, x, x) holds
for each x ∈ Vκ , where fx (i) = x for 0 ≤ i ≤ n.)
The induction now shows that for all (formal) n, ∀x ∈ Vκ (jn(x) = x). It follows that
jn  Vκ is a set, namely, the function idVκ . 
We remark that part (1) of the lemma gives us that “z = jn  x” isΣ0, by the usual proof.
Thus,
the formula “z = jn  x” is ΣZFC+WA00 . (8.11)
In part (3), we did not require the hypothesis “if jn(κ) exists” in order to obtain the result.
However, in order to conclude that jn  Vκ is elementary, part (2) is needed, and then an
assumption of this kind is necessary; by Proposition 5.3(5), the hypothesis that jn(κ) exists
suffices.
A handy corollary to Lemma 8.6(1) is the following:
Corollary 8.7. The theory ZFC + WA0 proves the following:
(1) For any set A, j′′A ⊂ A 	⇒ j  A = idA.
(2) ∀α ≥ κ j(α) > α.
(3) For any set A,
|A| = |j(A)| ⇐⇒ A = j(A) ⇐⇒ A ∈ Vκ .
Proof of (1). Let a ∈ A be such that j(a) "= a. Then a "∈ Vκ . By the Cofinal Axiom,
there is n ∈ ω such that jn(κ) exists and A ∈ Vjn (κ). Since rank(a) ≥ κ , one shows
by Σ0-Inductionj that there is a least m ≤ n such that jm(a) "∈ A and m > 0. Then
a′ = jm−1(a) ∈ A (here, we let j0(a) denote a), but j(a′) "∈ A. Thus j′′A "⊂ A. 
Proof of (2). Assume the conclusion fails. We can use the Σ0-Least Ordinal Principlej to
obtain the least α > κ for which j(α) = α. By the Cofinal Axiom, there is an n such
that α < jn(κ). Translating this inequality into a Σ0 statement using Θ , and using the
fact that the jm(κ) are increasing for m ≤ n (by Proposition 6.6), we can use the Σ0-
Least Ordinal Principlej to obtain the largest m ≤ n for which jm(κ) ≤ α; let β = jm(κ).
Then β ≤ α but j(β) > j(α), contradicting the fact that j is nondecreasing. 
Proof of (3). Since the implications
A ∈ Vκ 	⇒ A = j(A) 	⇒ |A| = |j(A)|
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are obvious, it suffices to prove that if A "∈ Vκ , then |A| < |j(A)|. Given A "∈ Vκ , let
λ be such that |A| = λ ≥ κ . By (2), we have |j(A)| = j(|A|) = j(λ) > λ = |A|, as
required. 
Theorem 8.8.
(1) ZFC + WA0  ∀n ∈ ω
(
(“jn(κ) exists”) 	⇒ [Vκ ≺ Vj(κ) ≺ . . . ≺ Vjn(κ)]
)
.
(2) ZFC + WA0  Vκ ≺ Vj(κ) ≺ Vj2(κ) ≺ . . . ≺ V .
Remarks.
(A) The ellipsis in part (2) has an unusual interpretation in the present context—we
understand the statement in (2) to mean that the chain of Vjn(κ)s extends as far as jn(κ)
exists, and that each member in this chain below V is an elementary submodel of V . In
the proof, we give a precise statement. The notation is justified by the fact that for every
set x , there is an n such that jn(κ) exists and x ∈ Vjn(κ), by the Cofinal Axiom. In other
contexts in which Σ1-Inductionj holds (and hence, in which Φ is a class function), we
will understand (2) to have its usual meaning (namely, that n ranges over all of ω). In
particular, the proofs of (1) and (2) in ZFC + WA1 are identical to those given in [4,
Proposition 3.12].
(B) Part (2) is actually a schema. For each ∈-formula φ(x) we show that φ[a] iff
Sat(φ, Vjn(κ), b) for all sufficiently large n (for which jn(κ) exists) and suitable b.
We cannot improve this to a statement about all formal formulas since there is no
formal definition of truth in V .
Proof of (1). Fix n ≥ 1. Suppose p, M, N, r, ρ are such that ρ = max{rank(M), rank(N)},
jn(ρ) exists, r = rank(p), and
∀b ∈ r M [Sat(p, M, b) ⇐⇒ Sat(p, N, b)].
The displayed formula says that the ∈-formula coded by p is absolute for M, N .
By Proposition 5.3(6), (7), we can find a cardinal δ such that ρ < δ and jn(Vδ) exists;
let X = Vδ. By Lemma 8.6(2), i = jn  X is elementary. Applying i , we have
∀b ∈ r ( jn(M)) [Sat(p, jn(M), b) ⇐⇒ Sat(p, jn(N), b)]. (8.12)
(Notice that jn(X) is large enough to ensure that (8.12) is absolute for jn(X); see for
example [5, Lemma 1.9.10]. Notice also that we must restrict jn to a set to ensure its
elementarity.) The displayed formula says that the ∈-formula coded by p is absolute
for jn(M), jn(N). Since p was arbitrary, we have shown formally that M ≺ N implies
jn(M) ≺ jn(N).
By hypothesis, jn(Vκ) exists, and as in Proposition 5.3(8), jn(Vj(κ)) exists as well.
By Lemma 8.6(2), jn  Vκ : Vκ → jn(Vκ) = Vjn(κ) is elementary. By Lemma 8.6(3),
jn  Vκ = idVκ . It follows that Vκ ≺ Vj(κ). Now setting M = Vκ and N = Vj(κ) in the
previous paragraph, we conclude Vjn(κ) ≺ Vjn+1(κ), as required. 
Proof of (2). In this case, we argue as in [4, Proposition 3.12] by induction on the
complexity of an ∈-formula φ; in the present context, we must take care to extend the
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elementary chain only as far as jn(κ) exists. To this end, we define
CondSat(n, p, A, b) ≡ (“jn(A) exists”) 	⇒ Sat(p, jn(A), b).
CondSatLimInf(k, p, A, p) ≡ Sat(p, jk(A), b) ∧ ∀n ≥ k CondSat(n, p, A, b).
We show that
ZFC + WA0  ∀r, b
[
(r = rank(φ) ∧ “b is a function with domain r”
	⇒ [φ(b(1), . . . , b(m))
⇐⇒ ∃k ∈ ωCondSatLimInf(k, φ, Vκ , b)
]]
.
We prove the atomic and existential quantifier cases.
For the forward direction in the case of atomic formulas φ(x1, x2) and assignment
〈b(1), b(2)〉, we can find, by the Cofinal Axiom, a k ∈ ω for which b(1), b(2) ∈ Vjk(κ),
whence Sat(φ, Vjk(κ), b); it follows easily that ∀n ≥ k CondSat(n, φ, Vκ , b). The
converse is immediate.
For the existential quantifier case, assume
φ(x1, . . . , xm) ≡ ∃y ψ(x1, . . . , xm, y)
and let r = rank(φ) and let b be a function defined on r . For one direction, if k ∈ ω is
such that Sat(φ, Vjk (κ), b), and for all n ≥ k, CondSat(n, φ, Vκ , b), let c ∈ Vjk(κ) and
b′ be such that
b′  (r \ {m + 1}) = b  (r \ {m + 1}) and b′(m + 1) = c, (8.13)
and Sat(ψ, Vjk(κ), b′). By part (1), it follows that for all n ≥ k, CondSat(n, ψ, Vκ , b′).
By the induction hypothesis, ψ(b′(1), . . . , b′(m), b′(m + 1)) holds, and hence so does
φ(b(1), . . . , b(m)).
For the other direction, assume φ(b(1), . . . , b(m)) holds and let c, b′ be such that b′ is
as in (8.13) and ψ(b′(1), . . . , b′(m), b′(m + 1)). Using the induction hypothesis, one can
find k ∈ ω such that Sat(ψ, Vjk(κ), b′) and for each n ≥ k, CondSat(n, ψ, Vκ , b′). The
result follows. 
As a first application of Theorem 8.8, we improve upon Theorem 2.14(2) and
Proposition 5.6:
Corollary 8.9. Suppose A(x) is a large cardinal property expressible in the language {∈}.
Suppose ZFC + WA0  A(κ). Then
ZFC + WA0  ∀α ∃λ > α A(λ).
Proof. By Theorem 8.8(2) and Theorem 2.14(1),
Vj(κ) |	 A(κ) ∧ “{α < κ : A(α)} is unbounded in κ”. (8.14)
For each n for which jn(κ) exists, i = jn  Vj2(κ) exists and is an elementary embedding.
Applying i to (8.14), we have
Vjn+1(κ) |	 A( jn(κ)) ∧ “{α < jn(κ) : A(α)} is unbounded in jn(κ)”.
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Since the class of ordinals β such that β = jn(κ) for some n ∈ ω are cofinal in ON, the
proof is complete. 
We turn to the proof that WA0 has essentially the same large cardinal consequences as
those that are known to follow from WA itself. We first recall the notions of n-huge and
super-n-huge cardinals: For each n ∈ ω, κ is n-huge if there exists an inner model M
and an elementary embedding j : V → M such that cp( j) = κ and M is closed under
j n(κ)-sequences; j (κ) is called the target of j and j is called an n-huge embedding. For
any cardinal ν, κ is n-huge ν times if there is a one–one function f : ν → ON and there are
elementary embeddings jα, α < ν such that for each α, the target of jα is f (α). Finally,
κ is super-n-huge if, for every cardinal λ > κ , κ is n-huge λ times. It is well-known
(see [4] or [12]) that the existence of a huge cardinal implies the consistency of many
strong, supercompact, and extendible cardinals; that a superhuge cardinal is also strong,
supercompact, extendible, and, of course, huge; that consistency of n + 1-huge implies
consistency of super-n-huge; and that the property of being super-n-huge for every n is the
strongest among these variants of hugeness.
Let κ0 = κ and for all n ≥ 1 for which jn(κ) exists, we let κn = jn(κ). We need two
other notions. For any j-class C, we define j · C by
j · C =
⋃
α∈ON
j(C ∩ Vα).
In ZFC + WA, such definitions make sense since C ∩ Vα is a set. We call · application. It
is easy to see that
j · j =
⋃
α∈ON
j(j Vα).
The definition of j · j makes essential use of Separationj; for this reason, it is not definable
in weaker theories such as ZFC + BTEE + Inductionj. Using straightforward variants
of the definition of application, it is also not possible to define iterates of application in
ZFC + WA0—for instance, we could try to define j · j = {(x, y) : ∃X [x ∈ j(X) ∧
j( j  X)(x) = y]}. But since j · j has a Σ1 definition, ( j · j) Y is not, in general a set in
ZFC + WA0 for arbitrary sets Y since it requires a Σ1 instance of Separation j . To handle
the problem, one might try the definition j · j = {(x, y) : x ∈ j(x) ∧ j( j  j(x))(x) = y]}.
With this approach, j · j becomes Σ0-definable, but it is not defined everywhere. (Under
this definition, j · j is defined on every ordinal α and rank Vα for which α ≥ κ , but is not
defined on members of Vκ , on any finite set, nor on any set A for which A "∈ ran ( j) and
|A| < κ .) Therefore, j · ( j · j) is not definable in any obvious way in ZFC + WA0.
The following results are well-known and easily proven in ZFC + WA; we verify that
only Σ0-Separationj is required:
Proposition 8.10. The following can be formalized and proven within ZFC + WA0:
(1) cp( j · j) = j(κ).
(2) for all n ≥ 1, if κn exists, j · j(κn) = κn+1.
(3) ( j · j) ◦ j = j ◦ j.
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Proof of (1). Let α > κ . Let i = j Vα . Since cp(i) = κ , we have, by elementarity, that
∀β < j(κ) ( j(i)(β) = β),
and
j(i)( j(κ)) > j(κ).
Thus, cp( j · j) = j(κ). 
Proof of (2). Let α > κn−1. Let i = j Vα. Applying j to the formula
i(κn−1) = κn
yields
j · j(κn) = j(i)( j(κn−1)) = j(κn) = κn+1.
( j was applied in the middle step. Notice that Inductionj is not required for the
argument.) 
Proof of (3). Let x be a set and α an ordinal such that x ∈ Vα. Let i = j  Vα and let
y = j(x). Then, applying j to the formula
i(x) = y
yields
( j · j)( j(x)) = j(i)( j(x)) = j(y) = ( j ◦ j)(x),
as required. ( j was applied in the middle step.) 
In later sections, we will need to consider the self-applicative iterates
j · ( j · j), j · ( j · ( j · j)), . . .
defined in ZFC+WA, and so we give the relevant definitions and preliminary lemmas here;
these will not be used in the rest of this section.
We work in the theory ZFC + WA; in particular, full Inductionj holds. Using the
definition-by-induction theorem (Theorem 4.7), we may define the two-variable j-class
sequence 〈j(n) : n ∈ ω〉; we begin by defining auxiliary class functions F, G and H:
F(x) = Vrank(x)+1;
G(0, x) = j F(x)
G(n + 1, x) = j(G(n, x));
H(n, x) = G(n, x)(x);
Now we define j(n) by
j(n)(x) = H(n, x).
Note in particular that j(0) = j, j(1) = j · j, and j(2) = j · ( j · j).
Using the ideas in the proof of Proposition 8.10, one uses Inductionj to prove the
following:
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Proposition 8.11. The theory ZFC+ WA proves the following:
(1) ∀n ∈ ω cp( j(n)) = κn.
(2) ∀n ∈ ω ∀r ≥ n j(n)(κr ) = κr+1. 
We also obtain the following:
Proposition 8.12. Suppose M¯ = 〈M, E, j〉 |	 ZFC+WA and suppose M¯ |	 n ∈ ω. Let
k : M → M be defined by
k(x) = y ⇐⇒ M¯ |	 j(n)(x) = y.
Then 〈M, E, k〉 |	 ZFC + WA.
Proof. The fact that k is a nontrivial elementary embedding is obvious. The fact that the
new model satisfies Separationj follows from the fact that j(n) is defined from j in M¯. 
See [18] for many results concerning application (in the context of embeddings j : Vλ →
Vλ).
We also define:
U j = {X ∈ P( j(κ)) : j(κ) ∈ j · j(X)}.
Notice that U j is a Σ0-definable subset of P( j(κ)). One verifies easily that U j = j(U),
where U = {X ∈ P(κ) : κ ∈ j(X)}.
Finally, since Φ and Ψ are not guaranteed to be total class functions in the context of
ZFC + WA0, we define the following notion: Let A = {n ∈ ω : κn exists}. A may be
a proper j-class. By the Cofinal Axiom, every set is contained in a Vκn for some n ∈ A.
Working in the context of ZFC + WA0, we shall say that, for any property P(n), P is true
for all n that matter if for all n ∈ A, P(n) holds.
Proposition 8.13. ZFC + WA0  κ is the κ th cardinal that is super-n-huge for all n that
matter.
Proof. We first show that the expected proof of n-hugeness goes through under the given
hypotheses. Let n ∈ A. By Proposition 8.3, j′′κn is a set. We obtain the usual n-huge
ultrafilter U as follows:
U = {X ∈ P(P(κn)) : ∃z ∈ P(κn) (z = j′′κn ∧ z ∈ j(X))}.
Since j′′κn is Σ0, the defining formula for U is clearly also Σ0, and hence U is a set
by Σ0-Separation j . It is necessary to verify that U is κ-complete, fine, closed under
diagonal intersections, and also contains all collections of the form Ci = {x ∈ P(κn) :
ot(x ∩ κi+1) = κi } for each i < n. The usual proofs work as long as the usual collections
are actually sets. The verification of the first three of these involves only straightforward
applications of elementarity of j. That each of the Ci is a set follows immediately from
ZFCj.
Next, for each n ∈ A we show that for all m ∈ A, κ is n-huge with κm targets. Since
the κm for m ∈ A are cofinal in ON, this suffices to establish super-n-hugeness. Define
S1 =
{
α < j(κ) : α is a target of some n-huge embedding having critical point κ }.
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Clearly, S1 is a set. Also, S1 ∈ U j since j(κ) is a target of an n-huge embedding having
critical point κ , as we just showed. Hence, S1 is stationary.
We wish to define by recursion on the natural numbers in A
Sm+1 = ( j · j)(Sm) (8.15)
and observe by elementarity that each Sm is stationary in κm for each m ∈ A, thereby
completing the proof of super-n-hugeness. The standard formula for defining the Sm by
recursion is Σ1 (since it asserts the existence of functions that describe the build-up of
the Sm and since A is Σ1); to obtain the construction using only Σ0 notions, we proceed
indirectly, as in Theorem 8.4: Assume that for some m ∈ A, κ is not n-huge with κm
targets. In other words,
∀α ≥ κm ∀X ⊆ α | {γ ∈ X :γ is a target of an n-huge
embedding with critical point κ} |< κm . (8.16)
Let δ be a cardinal such that δ = |Vδ| and κm < δ. Let z = j Vδ . We use Σ0-Inductionj to
prove the following:
∀k ∈ ω γ (k,m, n, z, S1, Vδ),
where
γ (k,m, n, v,w, Y ) ≡ k ≤ m 	⇒[
∃X ∈ Y ∃ f ∈ Y [1,k]
(
“ f, v are functions” ∧ dom v = Y ∧
f (1) = w ∧ ∀i
(
2 ≤ i ≤ k 	⇒ f (i) = j(v)( f (i − 1))
)
∧ f (k) = X ∧
∃β ∈ Y ∃g ∈ Y k+1(Θ(g, k, κ, β) ∧ “X is stationary in β”)∧
∀ν ∈ X ∃U ∈ Y target(κ, n, ν,U)
)]
,
where target(κ, n, ν,U) asserts that U is an n-huge ultrafilter on P(ν) with critical point κ .
We observe the following:
(a) The definition of f starts at 1 rather than at 0.
(b) In the formula γ (k,m, n, z, S1, Vδ), j(z)( f (i − 1)) must agree with ( j · j)( f (i − 1))
for each i because the domain of z is large enough.
(c) As in previous arguments (such as Theorem 4.4(1)), uniqueness of f and X are
guaranteed by ZFCj.
(d) The final clauses in the definition of γ (k,m, n, z, S1, Vδ) say that f (k) = X is a
stationary subset of κk and that X consists of targets of n-huge embeddings with critical
point κ , formalized in terms of ultrafilters. Note that δ was chosen large enough to
contain all such ultrafilters and to ensure that all of their relevant properties, including
stationarity of X , are expressible as Σ0 properties relative to Vδ .
For the induction, the case k = 1 is easy. Assuming γ (k,m, n, z, S1, Vδ) and 1 ≤ k <
m, we obtain witnesses fk, Xk where fk : [1, k] → Vδ and Xk is a stationary subset of
κk . Define X = j(z)(Xk) and f = fk ∪ {(k + 1, X)}. Certainly, f : [1, k + 1] → Vδ .
P. Corazza / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 139 (2006) 327–399 383
Also X = ( j · j)(Xk) ⊆ κk+1, and by elementarity, X is stationary. Since j · j fixes κ , we
still have that ∀ν ∈ X ∃U ∈ Y target(κ, n, ν,U). This completes the induction.
It now follows that we have witnesses f : [1,m] → Vδ and X ⊆ κm for γ . The fact that
X is a stationary subset of κm consisting of targets of n-huge embeddings having critical
point κ contradicts (8.16). We may therefore conclude that κ is n-huge κm times. Since
n,m were arbitrary and the κm are cofinal, it follows that κ is super-n-huge for all n that
matter.
Finally, to prove that κ is the κ th such cardinal, we apply Theorem 2.14(1). 
Because ZFC + WA0 appears to have the same large cardinal consequences as ZFC +
WA, it is natural to ask whether the theories are the same, or if not, equiconsistent. Hamkins
[9] shows that WA0 "≡ WA1 by obtaining a forcing extension of a model of ZFC + WA0
in which the latter holds, but in which a Σ1-definable subclass of ω fails to be a set.
Another example, which underscores the need to keep track of which jn(κ) are defined
in our arguments under ZFC + WA0, is a modification of Hatch’s model (Section 4) (also
observed independently by Hamkins): Start with a nonstandard modelM = 〈M, E, j〉 of
ZFC+WA0, and defineN = 〈N, E, i〉 by letting N = {x ∈ M : ∃n ∈ ωM |	 rank(x) <
jn(κ)}, and i = j  N , as in Hatch’s model. As before,N is a model of ZFC + BTEE, and
as in [8], Σ1-Induction j fails for the formula Ψ : in particular, there are nonstandard n for
which i n(κ) fails to be defined. Finally, it is easy to see that,
∀x ∈ N N |	 ∃z z = i  x . (8.17)
Therefore, WA0 holds in N . This shows that ZFC + WA0 fails to prove one of the
consequences of ZFC + WA1; in particular, it shows that Σ1-Induction j is not provable
from ZFC+ WA0.
9. Intermediate axioms
The results of the last section show that there is a significant gap between the
consistency strengths of the theories ZFC + BTEE and ZFC + WA0. We would like
to close this gap by carefully selecting individual instances of Σ0-Separation j to add to
ZFC+ BTEE, or possibly other axioms, with the hope of gently increasing the strength of
the theory and in this way obtain a ladder of extensions of ZFC + BTEE having the full
spectrum of consistency strengths. However, as Theorem 8.2 shows, even apparently weak
consequences of Σ0-Separation j can turn out to be very strong.
As a first step, we give a simple characterization of 0#. We also consider several
natural candidates for such axioms. The most fruitful approach that we have discovered for
obtaining intermediate strength axioms is by restricting Amenabilityj to local versions of
Amenability—in other words, axioms of the form ∃z (z = j  x), for various sets x . Axioms
of this kind produce extensions of ZFC + BTEE having consistency strengths with lower
bounds ranging from a strong cardinal to a huge cardinal, and beyond. So far, however,
we do not know how to provide tight upper bounds for many of these theories, except for
those at the upper end of the spectrum. On the other hand, we can provide better bounds
for the theory obtained by adding an axiom that asserts the existence of the ultrafilter on κ
derived from j: We show that the theory ZFC+ BTEE, augmented by this new axiom, has
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consistency strength somewhere between a measurable cardinal of high Mitchell order and
a cardinal κ that is 2κ -supercompact.
Proposition 9.1. The following are equivalent:
(1) 0# exists.
(2) There is a model 〈M,∈, j〉 which satisfies the theory ZFC + BTEE such that M is a
transitive class containing all the ordinals.
(3) There is a transitive set M and an elementary embedding i : M → M with critical
point κ such that ONM is an uncountable cardinal.
Proof. Assuming 0# exists, we can obtain nontrivial elementary embeddings L → L and
Lλ → Lλ for any uncountable cardinal λ (see Theorem 3.2); this establishes (1) ⇒ (2)
and (1) ⇒ (3). The converse in each case is obtained by restricting the given embedding
M → M to LM → LM . 
In our present framework, it becomes apparent that the proof of the equivalence between
the existence of 0# and the existence of a nontrivial elementary embedding L → L requires
an additional assumption that is not usually mentioned in the literature: in order for the
existence of a j : L → L to imply 0#, j must be “sufficiently” definable in V (though not
in L). Certainly, requiring that the model 〈L,∈, j〉 be sharp-like is sufficient, but even the
assumption that j satisfies all Separation axioms is enough. Without such an assumption,
the equivalence can fail:
Example 9.2. A model in which there is an elementary embedding L → L and 0# does not
exist. Assume that the universe 〈V ,∈, j〉 is a model of ZFC+BTEE+ “0# does not exist”
(such a model is easy to obtain: if there is an ω-Erdös cardinal, there is one in L, and so
we can carry out the argument in Proposition 3.5 to obtain the required model). We obtain
an inherited model 〈L,∈, j L〉 by restriction of j . Now we have j : L → L and 0# does
not exist.
Of course, there is no such model which is sharp-like. We turn to a brief discussion of
four candidates for intermediate axioms; the formulation of each of these axioms is natural
in the present context. The first of these provides a natural restriction of Amenabilityj:
Ordinal Amenabilityj: ∀α
[
“α is an ordinal” 	⇒ ∃z (z = j α)].
We also consider restrictions of Amenabilityj to sets. Since κ is the only legitimate
constant in the language, such local versions need to be formulated in terms of κ . We shall
write LOAj as an abbreviation for Local Ordinal Amenability.
LOAj(κ+): ∃z (z = j  κ+).
P(κ)-Amenabilityj: ∃z (z = j  P(κ)).
We also consider a syntactically natural axiom: It says that one of the j-classes
determined by the atomic j-formula “κ ∈ j(X)” is a set:
Measurable Ultrafilter Axiom: The class {X ⊆ κ : κ ∈ j(X)} is a set.
At the end of this section, we will discuss a sequence of additional axioms
that generalize Measurable Ultrafilter Axiom. We now discuss the relative consistency
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strengths of the axioms described above, as far as these are known. First, we show that
Ordinal Amenabilityj is in fact equivalent to Amenabilityj; this observation is due to the
referee:
Proposition 9.3. The following are equivalent in ZFC + BTEE:
(1) Amenabilityj
(2) Ordinal Amenabilityj.
Proof. We prove (2) ⇒ (1). Assume Ordinal Amenabilityj. Given a set A, let π :
A → γ be a bijection, where γ is a cardinal. Clearly, j(π) : j(A) → j(γ ). By
Ordinal Amenabilityj, there is a set function f = j  γ . Let p = j(π). Define g on A
by
g = {(x, y) | x ∈ A and f (π(x)) = p(y)}.
A π ✲ γ
g=j  A
❄ ❄
f =j  γ
j(A) p=j(π) ✲ j(γ )
Clearly, g = j  A. 
The proof shows slightly more: For any infinite cardinal λ, the proof gives us that
∃z (z = j  λ) ⇐⇒ ∀A (|A| = λ −→ ∃z (z = j  A)). (9.1)
Also, by the proposition, we have:
Amenabilityj 	⇒ Ordinal Amenabilityj 	⇒ P(κ)-Amenabilityj 	⇒ LOA(κ+).
We also have that P(κ)-Amenabilityj 	⇒ Measurable Ultrafilter Axiom (use ordinary
Separation to define U = {X ∈ P(κ) : κ ∈ ( j  P(κ))(X)}).
Next, we show that the existence of 0# is derivable from LOA(κ+), but then observe that
both this axiom and P(κ)-Amenabilityj are actually much stronger than this lower bound
suggests.
Proposition 9.4. ZFC + BTEE + LOAj(κ+)  “0# exists”.
Proof. Using LOAj(κ+), obtain the restriction i = j  Lα : Lα → Lj(α), where α = κ+.
Certainly j(κ+) is a cardinal. By Theorem 3.2, the result follows. 
M. Zeman pointed out to the author that, using standard techniques from inner model
theory, many natural candidate axioms that are restrictions of Amenabilityj can be shown
to have consistency strength in the vicinity of the strongest large cardinals for which there
is a good core model theory. With his permission, I have given below an outline of results
of this kind for the axioms LOAj(κ+) and P(κ)-Amenabilityj. These proofs assume some
background in inner model theory which we do not provide here; see [23].
Proposition 9.5 (Zeman). ZFC + BTEE + LOAj(κ+)  “there is an inner model of a
strong cardinal”.
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Proof (Outline). Assume there is no inner model of a strong cardinal and build the
corresponding core model K. Clearly, j K : K → K. It is easy to show that from
LOAj(κ+), one gets the existence of the set z = j J Eκ+ , where E is the extender sequence
for K. Let ν = sup( j′′(κ+)). Because κ+ has uncountable cofinality, one defines from z
in a canonical way a class embedding π : K → N ; moreover, it follows that N = L[E ′]
for some extender sequence E ′ for which J E ′ν = J Eν . The Iteration Map Theorem (which
holds in the context of building inner models of a single strong cardinal) implies that π
must be an iteration map. This yields a contradiction because the extender sequences for
K and N must agree on [κ, o(κ)). (They clearly do not agree here since, for example there
must be a β in this interval for which Eβ "= ∅ for K, but any such Eβ must be empty for
N because j(κ) > β.) The result follows. 
Proposition 9.6 (Zeman). ZFC + BTEE + P(κ)-Amenabilityj  “there is an inner
model of ω Woodin cardinals”.
Remark. This proposition represents a sample of what is possible; since it is known that
the construction of Kc does not break down under the assumption that there is no inner
model of ω Woodin cardinals, we have used this particular large cardinal assertion here. In
fact, any such large cardinal assertion whose negation admits a successful construction of
Kc could be used here.
Proof (Outline). Assume there is no inner model of ω Woodin cardinals. Build Kc by the
usual inductive construction of Nα, Mα, and E Nαωβα , with Mα = core(Nα). The clause in
this construction that concerns us is the case in which α is a limit and we have defined
E Nα , and there is an extender F for which the following two conditions hold:
(a) 〈J E Nαβα , F〉 is a premouse; and
(b) F is background certified.
Recall that in this case, the induction specifies that
Nα = 〈J E Nαβα , F〉. (9.2)
Having constructed Kc, we see again that j Kc : Kc → Kc. Let λ = j(κ) and
ν = sup( j′′(κ+)); certainly λ is a cardinal. Let E denote the extender sequence for Kc. Let
F be the extender derived from j Kc. Note that F is definable from the set j  P(κ) since,
in fact, F = j  PW (κ) where W = Kc.
Now observe there is α such that E Nα = E  ν (where E Nα was defined as above in
the inductive definition). We verify that Nα is defined at this stage as in (9.2). Because F
is derived from an embedding, condition (a) holds. Also, F is background certified (in a
strong sense) because F = F ′ ∩ J Eν where F ′ is the extender derived from j. Again, note
that F ′ is a set because we have assumed j  P(κ) exists. It follows that
Nα = 〈J E Nαβα , F〉 = Mα,
since ωρnNα = ωρωNα = λ. Now, we have
ρα∞ = λ and τα,∞ ≥ βα.
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Thus, Mα is an initial segment of Mα¯ whenever α¯ > α. But this is impossible, and the
result follows. 
At the end of this section, we build a transitive model of ZFC + BTEE + P(κ)-
Amenabilityj assuming a 2-huge cardinal. We next consider the Measurable Ultrafilter
Axiom, and obtain upper and lower bounds. The bounds in this case are much sharper.
Proposition 9.7. Let T = ZFC + BTEE + Measurable Ultrafilter Axiom.
(1) T  “κ is a measurable cardinal”.
(2) T  “the measurables below κ form a normal measure 1 set”.
(3) For each particular natural number n ≥ 1,
T  “the measurables below jn(κ) form a normal measure 1 set”.
Proof. (1) is clear, and (2) follows as usual because κ ∈ j({α < κ : α is measurable}).
(3) follows from (2) by elementarity of jn . 
In fact, the theory T = ZFC + BTEE + Measurable Ultrafilter Axiom has consistency
strength at least a measurable of high Mitchell order. To show this, recall the Mitchell order
on normal measures over a measurable cardinal κ is defined by
U1 < U2 iff U1 ∈ Ult(V ,U2),
where, as usual, Ult(V ,U2) is identified with its transitive collapse. The order relation is a
well-founded pre-order. For any normal measure on κ , o(U) is the rank of U in <; also,
o(κ)—the Mitchell order of κ—is the height of <. See [10] for more discussion of basic
results.
We define the degree deg(κ) of a cardinal κ inductively by the following clauses:
(a) deg(κ) ≥ 0 iff κ is measurable
(b) if 0 < γ < κ , then deg(κ) ≥ γ + 1 iff for some normal measure U on κ ,
{α < κ : α is a cardinal and deg(α) ≥ γ } ∈ U.
(c) if 0 < γ ≤ κ is a limit, then deg(κ) ≥ γ iff for some normal measure U on κ , Sδ ∈ U
whenever δ < γ and Sδ = {α < κ : α is a cardinal and deg(α) ≥ δ}.
Lemma 9.8. Suppose κ is an infinite cardinal and 0 ≤ γ ≤ κ . Then deg(κ) ≥ γ if and
only if there is a normal measure U on κ for which o(U) ≥ γ .
Proof. We proceed by induction on γ to prove the following slightly stronger statement:
For all normal measures U on κ and all γ ≤ κ , U witnesses that deg(κ) ≥ γ if and only if
o(U) ≥ γ . The case γ = 0 is obvious. If γ > 0 is a limit, then, for all normal measures U
on κ ,
U witnesses deg(κ) ≥ γ ⇐⇒ Sδ ∈ U whenever 0 ≤ δ < γ
⇐⇒ o(U) ≥ δ whenever 0 ≤ δ < γ
⇐⇒ o(U) ≥ γ .
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For the successor step, assume o(U) ≥ γ + 1. Let U ′ < U , where o(U ′) ≥ γ . By the
induction hypothesis, U ′ witnesses that deg(κ) ≥ γ . Let M = Ult(V ,U). Since U ′ ∈ M
and P(κ) ⊂ M , M |	 deg(κ) ≥ γ . It follows that U witnesses deg(κ) ≥ γ+1. Conversely,
if deg(κ) ≥ γ + 1 with witness U and M = Ult(V ,U), it follows that M |	 deg(κ) ≥ γ ,
and in M there is a witness U ′. Since P(κ) ⊂ M , we have in V that U ′ is a normal measure
in V , U ′ < U , and U ′ witnesses deg(κ) ≥ γ . By the induction hypothesis, o(U ′) ≥ γ .
Therefore, o(U) ≥ γ + 1. 
Proposition 9.9. ZFC + BTEE + Measurable Ultrafilter Axiom  o(κ) > κ .
Proof. Let U be the ultrafilter on κ derived from j. We prove by induction on γ that U is a
witness for deg(κ) ≥ γ for all γ ≤ κ . The statement is obvious for γ = 0.
For the successor step, if γ < κ , we show deg(κ) ≥ γ + 1; this follows, as we show,
because it is equivalent to the statement deg(κ) ≥ γ :
deg(κ) ≥ γ ⇐⇒ κ ∈ {α < j(κ) : deg(α) ≥ γ }
⇐⇒ {α < κ : deg(α) ≥ γ } ∈ U
⇐⇒ deg(κ) ≥ γ + 1.
For the limit step, if γ ≤ κ is a limit, then, by the induction hypothesis, U witnesses
deg(κ) ≥ δ + 1 for all δ < γ , whence {α < κ : deg(α) ≥ δ} ∈ U; the result follows. 
On the other hand, we can build a model of ZFC + BTEE + Measurable Ultrafilter
Axiom from a 2κ -supercompact cardinal κ , using the method of Proposition 7.6, as
follows.
Proposition 9.10. If κ is 2κ -supercompact, there is a transitive model of ZFC + BTEE +
Measurable Ultrafilter Axiom.
Proof. Let κ be 2κ-supercompact and let U be a normal measure on Pκ(2κ). We may
obtain a sequence of iterated ultrapowers based on U , just as in Proposition 7.6:
M0
i01−→ M1 i12−→ M2 → . . .→ Mn in,n+1−→ Mn+1 → . . .→ Mω.
Using the same arguments, one obtains the following commutative diagram of elementary
embeddings
V iω ✲ Mω
i1
❄ ❄
i1 Mω
M1 i1·iω ✲ i1(Mω)
and one shows, as before, that j = i1  Mω : Mω → Mω , and that the critical sequence
for j is 〈κ(0), κ(1), . . .〉, with supremum κ(ω). As before, 〈Mω,∈, j〉 |	 ZFC + BTEE. We
observe however that, in the present setting, we have
(
P(P(κ))
)Mω = (P(P(κ)))V , (9.3)
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where κ = κ(0). To see this, first note that since M1 is closed under 2κ-sequences,
(P(2κ))M1 = (P(2κ))V . Also, because i01(κ) > 2κ , the standard argument shows that
i1ω(X) = X whenever X ⊆ 2κ , and likewise, i1ω(Y ) = Y for all Y ⊆ P(κ). Eq. (9.3)
follows, and therefore, U = {X ⊂ κ : κ ∈ j (X)} ∈ Mω . Therefore,
〈Mω,∈, j〉 |	 ZFC + BTEE + Measurable Ultrafilter Axiom. 
The techniques for establishing upper and lower bounds on Measurable Ultrafilter
Axiom can be generalized in many ways; we illustrate with one example, which provides
a sequence of additional axioms whose consistency strengths lie in the vicinity of n-huge
cardinals. For each particular n, we define:
Huge Amenabilityn: ∃z (z = j  P(P( jn(κ)))).
For the rest of this section, let f = j  P(P( jn(κ))) and let g = j  jn(κ). The existence
of f allows us to define the n-huge ultrafilter W derived from j:
W = {X ∈ P(P( jn(κ))) | range(g) ∈ f (X)}.
Moreover, if U denotes the normal measure on κ derived from j, it is easy to see that
{α < κ | α is n-huge} ∈ U.
Therefore Huge Amenability Axiomn is bounded below by the existence of an n-
huge cardinal with many n-huge cardinals below it (and, reasoning as we did for
Measurable Ultrafilter Axiom, many n-huge cardinals above, as well).
For an upper bound, we can perform an iterated ultrapower construction, starting with
an n + 2-huge ultrafilter U . Following the development in the proof of Proposition 9.10,
we obtain the sequence
M0
i01−→ M1 i12−→ M2 → . . .→ Mn in,n+1−→ Mn+1 → . . .→ Mω.
Letting j = i1  Mω : Mω → Mω , one shows as before that j has critical sequence
〈κ(0), κ(1), . . .〉, with supremum κ(ω), and that 〈Mω,∈, j〉 is a model of ZFC + BTEE. In
the present context, we have that M1 is closed under j n+2(κ)-sequences, and so(
Vj n+2(κ)
)M1 = Vj n+2(κ).
Since the critical point of i1ω is j n+2(κ), it follows that for each X ∈ Vj n+2(κ), i1ω(X) = X.
It follows, therefore, that
(
Vj n+2(κ)
)Mω = Vj n+2(κ).
We therefore have
j  P(P( j n(κ))) ∈ Vj n+2(κ) ⊂ Mω,
and so
〈Mω,∈, j〉 |	 ZFC + BTEE + Huge Amenability Axiomn .
We summarize these observations in the following proposition:
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Proposition 9.11. Upper and lower bounds for ZFC+BTEE+Huge Amenability Axiomn
are given by the following, for each particular n:
(1) ZFC + BTEE + Huge Amenability Axiomn  “κ is n-huge and admits a normal
measure that contains the set of n-huge cardinals below κ”.
(2) Assuming an n + 2-huge cardinal κ , there is a transitive M and an elementary
embedding j : M → M such that 〈M,∈, j〉 |	 ZFC + BTEE +
Huge Amenability Axiomn. 
The “n + 2-huge” upper bound can certainly be improved. Indeed, if one is willing
to accept a more clumsy pair of axioms as a means to formulate the intuition that the
n-huge ultrafilter derived from j exists (and so, replace Huge Amenability Axiomn with
this alternative pair of axioms), one can get by with “n + 1-huge”: The first axiom asserts
the existence of g = j  jn(κ), and the second asserts the existence of the ultrafilter
W = {X ∈ P(P( jn(κ)) | range(g) ∈ j(X)}. These two together still imply that
κ is n-huge with a normal 1 measure set of n-huge cardinals below. But now, if we
construct 〈Mω,∈, j〉 as above, starting from an n + 1-huge, since both j  j n(κ) and
{X ∈ P(P( jn(κ)) | range(g) ∈ j(X)} are elements of Vj n+1(κ), 〈Mω,∈, j〉 is a model
of these two alternative axioms.
Finally, let us observe that our reasoning above shows easily that the model 〈Mω,∈, j〉
obtained from a 2-huge cardinal satisfies both LOA(κ+) and P(κ)-Amenability, though
one would expect that this bound is far from optimal.
10. Replacement axioms and inconsistency
In Section 7 we showed that, under mild large cardinal hypotheses, transitive models of
both ZFC + BTEE + Cofinal Axiom and ZFC + BTEE + ¬Cofinal Axiom can be built.
In Sections 8 and 9, we studied extensions of the first of these theories, and observed that
these are the extensions that have consistency strengths that parallel those of the usual large
cardinal axioms. In this section, we attempt to extend ZFC+BTEE+¬Cofinal Axiom as
far as possible by adding as much Replacement for j-formulas as possible. The strongest
version of Replacement for j-formulas already implies Cofinal Axiom (even Separationj),
and so in this case we cannot obtain a consistent theory if we include all the possible
instances. However, we show that all possible instances of Collection for j-formulas can
consistently be added. We also describe several inconsistent theories that combine low
complexity Separationj instances with low complexity instances of each of the following
variants of Replacement: Replacementj,Collectionj,Strong Replacementj, defined below.
Replacement j : For each j-formula ψ(x, y, u),
∀A ∀a (∀x ∈ A ∃!y ψ(x, y, a) 	⇒ ∃Y ∀z [z ∈ Y ⇐⇒ (∃x ∈ A ψ(x, z, a))]). (10.1)
Strong Replacement j : For each j-formula ψ(x, y, u),
∀A ∀a (∀x ∈ A ∃∗y ψ(x, y, a)
	⇒ ∃Y ∀z [z ∈ Y ⇐⇒ (∃x ∈ A ψ(x, z, a))]). (10.2)
where ‘∃∗’ is an abbreviation for “there exists at most one”.
P. Corazza / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 139 (2006) 327–399 391
Collection j : For each j-formula ψ(x, y, u),
∀A ∀a (∀x ∈ A ∃y ψ(x, y, a) 	⇒ ∃Y ∀x ∈ A ∃y ∈ Y ψ(x, y, a)]). (10.3)
As in Section 7, we let Σn-Replacementj (Πn-Replacementj) denote the restriction of
the Replacementj schema to Σn (Πn) j-formulas ψ . (We continue to follow our convention
of calling a formula Σn (Πn) when it may only be ΣZFCjn (Π ZFCjn ).) Similarly, we define
Σn(Πn)-Strong Replacementj and Σn(Πn)-Collectionj.
We observe that Σn-Strong Replacementj 	⇒ Σn-Separationj: Given a Σn-formula
φ(x, u), let ψ(x, y, u) ≡ φ(x, u) ∧ x = y. Let A be a set and a a finite sequence. Then
the set Y given by Σn-Strong Replacementj for ψ, A, a is precisely {x ∈ A : φ(x, a)}.
Implications between these versions of Replacement for j-formulas are the same as for
the ZFC versions.
Proposition 10.1. The theory ZFCj proves the following implications:
(1) Strong Replacementj 	⇒ Replacementj ∧ Collectionj.
(2) Replacementj + Σ0-Separationj 	⇒ Strong Replacementj.
(3) Collectionj + Σ0-Separationj 	⇒ Strong Replacementj.
Proof. The proof of Strong Replacementj 	⇒ Replacementj in (1) is easy, and the proof
of Strong Replacementj 	⇒ Collectionj is the same as the ZFC version; see [11, pp. 72–
73]. The proof of (3) can also be found in [11, p. 73]. We prove (2): Given a j-formula
φ(x, y, u), sets A, a, and the fact that ∀x ∈ A ∃∗y φ(x, y, a), define a (total) class function
F by
F(x) =
{
(1, y) if φ(x, y, a)
(0, 0) otherwise
By hypothesis, F is well defined, and so, by Replacementj, there is a set Y0 = F′′A. Let
S = Y0 \ {(0, 0)}, let α = rank(S) + 1, and let W = Vα. Let Y = {y ∈ W | ∃w ∈
S (y = (w)1)}. By Σ0-Separationj, S and Y are sets. Now Y = {y | ∃x ∈ A φ(x, y, a)}, as
required. 
As claimed in Section 7, the axiom ¬Cofinal Axiom is a consequence of (a version of)
Replacement:
Proposition 10.2. ZFC+ BTEE + Collectionj  ¬Cofinal Axiom.
Proof. Since Ψ may not be a (total) class function, we define the class function F by
F(x) =
{
y if Ψ (x, y)
κ if ¬∃yΨ (x, y).
Since F is total, we can apply Collectionj and obtain Y such that for all n ∈ ω, there is
y ∈ Y with y = F(n). If α = sup(Y ), then the critical sequence is bounded by α. Hence,
¬Cofinal Axiom holds. 
Note that the class function F in the last proposition is definable by a Σ1 formula:
y = F(x) ⇐⇒ ∃ f Θ( f, x, κ, y) ∨ y = κ.
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Therefore ¬Cofinal Axiom is in fact derivable from Σ1-Collectionj.
We turn now to the program of consistently extending the theory ZFC + BTEE +
¬Cofinal Axiom by adding instances of (versions of) Replacement for j-formulas. The
next proposition generalizes an observation due to Hamkins:
Proposition 10.3. Suppose 〈M,∈〉 is an inner model of ZFC, M "= V , and 〈M,∈, j〉 is a
sharp-like model of ZFCj. Then
〈M,∈, j〉 |	 ZFC + Collectionj.
Remark. The condition “M "= V ” in the hypothesis of the proposition is redundant since
it follows from the fact thatM is sharp-like.
Proof. Let M = 〈M,∈, j〉. Suppose φ(x, y, u) is a formula and A ∈ M . Suppose there
are a such that
M |	 ∀x ∈ A ∃y φ(x, y, a).
In V , this means that for each x ∈ A, there exists y such that φM (x, y, a) ∧ y ∈ M .
Since j and M are definable in V , we may apply ordinary Collection to φM to obtain W
satisfying
∀x ∈ A ∃y ∈ W φM (x, y, a) ∧ y ∈ M.
We may assume (using Separation in V if necessary) that W ⊂ M . Let δ > rank(W ). It
follows that
M |	 ∀x ∈ A ∃Y φ(x, y, a),
where the witness Y is V Mδ . 
Both the models M and N of Proposition 7.6 are examples of Proposition 10.3,
obtained under the assumption of a measurable cardinal. These examples show that
ZFC + BTEE + Collectionj does not decide whether the critical sequence is a set, even
though ¬Cofinal Axiom is derivable. The next corollary was observed in [4, Metatheorem
2.5], but proved by different means.
Corollary 10.4. There is no sharp-like model 〈M,∈, j〉 of ZFC+ WA or ZFC+WA0 for
which 〈M,∈〉 is an inner model.
Proof. If there were such a model M, by Propositions 10.2 and 10.3, M |	
¬Cofinal Axiom; since ZFC+ WA0  Cofinal Axiom, this is impossible. 
Note that the corollary does not forbid the inner model V itself from admitting a j for
which 〈V ,∈, j〉 |	 ZFC + WA.
The proof of Proposition 10.3 also gives us the following:
Corollary 10.5. Suppose 〈M,∈〉 is a transitive set model of ZFC, ONM is a regular
cardinal, and j : M → M is a function (not necessarily elementary). Then
〈M,∈, j〉 |	 ZFC + Collectionj. 
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Corollary 10.6. There is no transitive set model 〈M,∈, j〉 of ZFC + WA or ZFC + WA0
for which ONM is a regular cardinal. 
In contrast to Collectionj, we cannot hope to add all axioms of Strong Replacementj to
ZFC+ BTEE and obtain a consistent theory:
Proposition 10.7. The theory ZFC+Elementarity+Nontriviality+ Strong Replacementj
is inconsistent.
Proof. Since Strong Replacementj implies Separationj, the theory proves Cofinal Axiom.
Since Strong Replacementj also implies Collectionj, the theory also proves ¬Cofinal
Axiom. 
Recall that, if 〈M, E〉 is a model of ZFC, a set A ⊆ M is said to be weakly definable
in M if the extended structure 〈M, E, A〉 for the extended language in which there is an
additional unary relation U, satisfies Strong Replacement for U-formulas.
Corollary 10.8. If 〈M, E〉 |	 ZFC, there is no weakly definable nontrivial elementary
embedding M → M.
Proof. If there were such an embedding j , the structure 〈M, E, j〉 would satisfy the
inconsistent theory ZFC + Elementarity+ Nontriviality+ Strong Replacementj. 
We consider next several refinements of Proposition 10.7. These will lead to some
partial results concerning the question, How much Replacementj can be added to either
of the theories ZFC + WA0, ZFC+ WA without introducing inconsistency?
Lemma 10.9. ZFC+ BTEE + Σ0-Collectionj  Σ1-Collectionj.
Proof. Given a Σ1 j-formula ψ(x, y, u), let θ(x, y, u, z) be a Σ0 j-formula such that
ψ(x, y, u) ≡ ∃z θ(x, y, u, z).
Working in ZFCj, let A be a set and a be a finite sequence of parameters. Assume
∀x ∈ A ∃y ψ(x, y, a). Then
∀x ∈ A ∃y ∃z θ(x, y, u, z). (10.4)
Clearly, (10.4) is equivalent to
∀x ∈ A ∃w θ ′(x, (w)0, u, (w)1, w),
where (w)0 and (w)1 are the zeroth and first coordinates of the ordered pairw, respectively,
and θ ′(x, y, u, z, w) is the formula θ(x, y, u, z) ∧ “w is an ordered pair”. (Note that
θ ′(x, (w)0, u, (w)1, w) is equivalent to a Σ0 formula.) By Σ0-Collectionj, we can find
a set Y such that
∀x ∈ A ∃w ∈ Y θ ′(x, (w)0, u, (w)1, w).
Without loss of generality, we may assume Y = Vγ for some limit γ . Thus,
∀x ∈ A ∃y ∈ Y ∃z ∈ Y θ(x, y, a, z),
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whence,
∀x ∈ A ∃y ∈ Y ψ(x, y, a, z),
as required. 
Lemma 10.10. ZFC + Elementarity + Nontriviality + Π1-Strong Replacementj  Σ0-
Collectionj.
Remark. As we show in Theorem 10.11, the theory ZFC+Elementarity+Nontriviality+
Π1-Strong Replacementj is in fact inconsistent; however, to prove this, we need the
preliminary step provided by this lemma.
Proof. Let φ(x, y, u) be a Σ0 formula and let A, a be sets. Assume that
∀x ∈ A ∃y φ(x, y, a).
The proof proceeds like the standard proof of Collection from Strong Replacement: for
each x ∈ A, one forms the set Xx = {y : φ(x, y, a) and y is of least possible rank}.
Letting Y ′ = {Xx : x ∈ A}, the required set Y is ⋃ Y ′. What is needed here is to show that
Π1-Replacement j is sufficient to carry out the argument.
Consider the following Π1 j-formulas:
ψ1(x, β, v, γ, u) ≡
[
∀δ < β ∀w (rank(w) = δ 	⇒ ¬φ(x, w, u))
]
∧
[
v = Vγ ∧ γ = β + 1 ∧ ∃w ∈ v
(
φ(x, w, u))
]
,
and
ψ2(x, X, Z , u) ≡ ∀w ∈ X [(∃β ∈ Z rank(w) = β) ∧ φ(x, w, u)] ∧
∀w [((∃β ∈ Z rank(w) = β) ∧ φ(x, w, u)) 	⇒ w ∈ X].
The formula ψ1(x, β, v, γ, u) says that β is the least ordinal for which there is a w such
that φ(x, w, u) holds and rank(w) = β. The fact that ψ1 is Π ZFCj1 follows from the fact
that “z = rank(x)” is ∆ZF1 and v = Vγ is Π ZF1 . It is easy to see that
∀x ∈ A ∃!β ψ1(x, β, v, γ, a).
By Π1-Replacement j , there is a set Z such that
Z = {βx : x ∈ A}, (10.5)
where βx is the unique β associated with a given x ∈ A.
Next, the formula ψ2(x, X, Z , u) asserts that X is the set of all w for which φ(x, w, u)
holds and for which rank(w) ∈ Z . Verification of the fact that ψ2(x, X, Z , u) is Π ZFCj1 is
straightforward; notice that the subformula “∃β ∈ Z rank(w) = β” is equivalent to a Π1
formula because the bounded quantifier can be moved inside the scope of the unbounded
quantifier in the Π1 formulation of “rank(w) = β”. (This trick always works for ∈-
formulas, but not generally for L-formulas, as pointed out in (2.1).)
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Now, using the Z defined in (10.5) as a parameter in ψ2, it is clear that
∀x ∈ A ∃!X ψ2(x, X, Z , a).
By Π1-Replacement j , we can form the set
Y ′ = {Xx : x ∈ A},
where Xx is the unique set X associated with x ∈ A. But now we have
∀x ∈ A ∃y ∈ Y φ(x, y, a),
where Y =⋃ Y ′, as required. 
Theorem 10.11. Each of the following theories is inconsistent:
(1) ZFC + Elementarity+ Nontriviality+ Σ1-Strong Replacementj,
(2) ZFC + WA0 + Σ0-Collectionj,
(3) ZFC + Elementarity+ Nontriviality+Π1-Strong Replacementj,
(4) ZFC + WA0 + Σ1-Inductionj + Σ1-Replacementj
(5) ZFC + WA0 +Π1-Inductionj + Σ1-Replacementj
Proof of (1). Σ1-Strong Replacementj implies Σ0-Separationj, Σ1-Inductionj, and Σ1-
Replacementj. The first of these implies Cofinal Axiom; the third implies CI; and CI
together with Σ1-Inductionj implies ¬Cofinal Axiom. 
Proof of (2). Σ0-Collectionj implies Σ1-Collectionj, which in turn implies ¬Cofinal
Axiom. Since WA0 implies Cofinal Axiom, the result follows. 
Proof of (3). By Lemma 10.10, Π1-Strong Replacementj implies Σ0-Collectionj. On the
other hand, Π1-Strong Replacementj implies Π1-Separationj, which is equivalent to Σ1-
Separationj. Now the result follows from (2). 
Proof of (4) and (5). Use Σ1-Inductionj or Π1-Inductionj to ensure that each jn(κ) exists,
so that the hypothesis of CI holds. By Σ1-Replacementj, CI holds, and it follows that
the critical sequence is a set, whence we have ¬Cofinal Axiom. But WA0 implies
Cofinal Axiom. 
Theorem 10.11 leaves open two natural questions:
Question A. Is Replacementj consistent with ZFC + WA0 (or even with ZFC + BTEE)?
Question B. Is Σ0-Replacementj consistent with ZFC + WA?
For Question A, Hamkins has observed the following:
Proposition 10.12. Relative to ZFC+BTEE+Collectionj, it is consistent for Replacementj
to hold for all sets of size ≤ κ .
Proof. Let us recall the modelN from Example 7.6:N = 〈Mω[S],∈, jˆ〉 where Mω is the
direct limit of the ultrapower models 〈Mn; imn : 0 ≤ m ≤ n < ω〉, starting from a normal
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measure in V ; and j = j1  Mω; S = {κ(n) : n ∈ ω}; and jˆ is the usual lifting to the forcing
extension. It is known (see [10, Theorem 21.15]) that
N =
⋂
n
Mn .
We have observed that N |	 Collectionj. We show that N satisfies Replacementj for
sets of size ≤ κ . Suppose φ(x, y, u) is a j-formula, A is a set that, in N , has cardinality
≤ κ = κ(0), a are sets, and N |	 ∀x ∈ A ∃!y (φ(x, y, a)). Since each Mn is κ-closed,
N = ⋂n Mn is also κ-closed, and so |A| ≤ κ (in V ). Since jˆ is definable in V , we have
in V
∀x ∈ A ∃!y (y ∈ N ∧ φN (x, y, a)).
We can use ordinary Replacement in V to obtain Y such that
Y = {y ∈ N | ∃x ∈ A φN (x, y, a)}.
Now Y ⊂ N and has cardinality ≤ κ . Again since N is κ-closed, Y ∈ N . 
In light of the proposition, a reasonable conjecture is that, for each cardinal λ, there
is an inner model Nλ = 〈Nλ,∈, jλ〉 satisfying ZFC + BTEE + Collectionj as well as
“Replacementj for all sets of size ≤ λ”. The strategy for showing this would be to perform
the iterated ultrapower construction starting either with a λ-supercompact ultrafilter or a
λ-strong extender. Most of the analogues to the theorems in the measurable case hold true
in these other settings, except that it is not known whether Mω[S] = ⋂n Mn—and this
latter fact is needed (apparently) to show that Mω[S] is λ-closed.
Our answer to Question B, however, will show that Replacementj for all sets—in fact,
Σ0-Replacementj for all sets—cannot hold in a transitive model of ZFC + WA0.
Proposition 10.13. The theory ZFC + Σ1-Inductionj + WA0 + Σ0-Replacementj is
inconsistent. In particular,
(1) the theory ZFC+ WA + Σ0-Replacementj is inconsistent
(2) there is no transitive model of ZFC + WA0 in which Σ0-Replacementj holds.
Proof. We prove the main part of the Proposition; parts (1) and (2) then follow
immediately. Consider the following Σ0 formula
Ψ0(n, q) ≡ n ∈ ω 	⇒ “q is a an ordered pair ∧ (q)0 is a function with domain n + 1”∧
(q)0(0) = κ ∧ ∀i
(
0 < i ≤ n 	⇒ (q)0(i) = j((q)0(i − 1))
)
∧ (q)0(n) = (q)1.
Using Σ1-Inductionj, one proves, as in Proposition 4.4, that
∀n ∈ ω ∃!q Ψ0(n, q), (10.6)
however, here, (10.6) is the hypothesis of a Σ0 instance of Replacementj. Now the rank
of the set Y that is given by Σ0-Replacementj bounds the critical sequence, and this
contradicts Cofinal Axiom and hence WA0. 
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11. Open questions
The most interesting questions left open by our work here have to do with obtaining
natural intermediate-strength extensions of ZFC+BTEE to fill out the hierarchy of theories
that we have begun to build. Having such a fine-grained ladder of theories could provide
a useful alternative to the usual large cardinal axioms for measuring the strength of other
theories in mathematics.
The first questions along these lines are concerned with pipointing a number of exact
consistency strengths:
Question 1. What is the exact consistency strength of the theory ZFC + BTEE +
Measurable Ultrafilter Axiom?
Question 2. What are the exact consistency strengths of each of the theories ZFC +
BTEE + LOA(κ+) and ZFC + BTEE + P(κ)-Amenabilityj?
Question 3. What is the exact consistency strength of the theory ZFC + BTEE +
Huge Amenability Axiomn for each particular n?
Also, is there a natural way to fill out the hierarchy further? We have the following
question:
Question 4. For each classical large cardinal axiom A, find a “natural” j-axiom B such
that Con(ZFC + A) is approximately equivalent to Con(ZFC + BTEE + B).
We showed in Proposition 10.12 that it is consistent with ZFC + BTEE + Collectionj
for Replacementj for all sets of size ≤ κ to hold. A natural question that we raised earlier
is the following:
Question 5. Can the construction ofN in Proposition 7.6 be modified to use supercompact
ultrafilters (as in Proposition 9.10) so that we may conclude the following: For each
cardinal λ > κ , there is an inner model Nλ and an elementary embedding iλ : Nλ → Nλ
such that
〈Nλ,∈, iλ〉 |	 ZFC + BTEE + Collectionj
+ “Replacementj for all sets of size ≤ λ”?
A technical question that is the key to answering Question 5, and obtaining other
interesting consistency results is:
Question 6. In the construction of Proposition 9.10, is it possible to prove that⋂
n
Mn = Mω[S]?
Similarly, can this be proven when, instead of supercompact ultrafilters, we use huge
ultrafilters? extenders for a strong or globally superstrong cardinal?
Our results on remarkability raise the following question (see Section 3):
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Question 7. Does consistency of ZFC+BTEE imply consistency of a remarkable cardinal,
or of the statement “L(R) is absolute (or absolute with ordinal parameters) under proper
forcings”?
In [4], we showed that, assuming ZFC + WA, the critical sequence 〈κ0, κ1, κ2, . . .〉 is a
j-class of indiscernibles in V . It is natural to ask whether the same result holds for any of
the subtheories of ZFC + WA studied here—in particular, for the theories ZFC + BTEE
and ZFC + WA0. The main observation in the proof of this result in ZFC + WA was the
following (stated in paraphrased form):
Lemma 11.1. Suppose n1 < n2 < . . . < ns and r > max({nm+1 − nm : 1 ≤ m < s}). A
j-class function i, defined from j · j, can be specified having the following properties:
(1) i : V → V is an elementary embedding;
(2) cp(i) > κn1;
(3) for 1 < m ≤ s, i(κnm ) = κn1+(m−1)r .
The lemma says that, given sequences κm1 < κm2 < . . . < κms and κn1 < κn2 < . . . <
κns , one can push these cardinals up high enough with the appropriate choice of i so that
their transformed values agree; indiscernibility follows easily from this observation.
The proof does not work for weaker theories like ZFC+BTEE because the definition of
i depends upon j ·j, and the latter is not definable in ZFC+BTEE alone since it requires the
existence of sets of the form j  X for arbitrary sets X (and this requires Amenabilityj). The
proof as it stands does not work in ZFC+WA0 either because j·(j·j) is not definable in that
theory (even j · j  X may not be a set). In Section 8, we repeatedly applied a trick to avoid
such problems—proceed with an indirect argument and thereby obtain an upper bound of
the form Vδ in which all the higher complexity arguments can be carried out in a Σ0 way.
When one attempts to apply this trick here, it is difficult to obtain the required upper bound.
A good choice would be Vδ, where (using the notation of Lemma 11.1) δ > κn1+(s−1)r .
However, assuming only WA0, we have no guarantee that κn1+(s−1)r exists. Thus, new
techniques will be needed to answer the following:
Question 8. Can the critical sequence be shown to be a j-class of indiscernibles for either
of the theories ZFC + BTEE or ZFC+ WA0?
Notice that if the answer to Question 8 is “no”, at least for the theory ZFC + WA0,
then we would have on our hands an interesting property of j that holds in ZFC + WA
but not in ZFC + WA0; this result would be of some interest since it is still unknown
whether there is a large cardinal property that follows from ZFC + WA but not from
ZFC+ WA0.
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